The Geneva Tripartite conference of 1927 in Japanese-American relations Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Clemensen, A. Berle Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 08/10/2021 06:26:35 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/565328 THE GENEVA TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE OF 19 27 IN JAPANESE-AMERICAN. RELATIONS Adolph Berle Clemensen A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the.Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 1 9 7 5 THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE I hereby recommend that this dissertation preparedunder my direction by _________Adolph Berle Clemensen___________ entitled THE GENEVA TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE OF 1927______ IN JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS________________ be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement of the degree o f ________________ DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY___________ After inspection of the final copy of the dissertation, the following members of the Final Examination Committee concur in its approval and recommend its acceptance:* This approval and acceptance is contingent on the candidate's adequate performance and defense of this dissertation at the final oral examination. The inclusion of this sheet bound into the library copy of the dissertation is evidence of satisfactory performance at the final examination. STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library, Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made, Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder. SIGNED: (Z)COPYRIGHTED BY ADOLPH BERLE CLEMENSEN 1975 iii PREFACE This dissertation has been written hopefully to shed more light on Japanese^-American relations precipitating in the Geneva Tripartite Conference of 1927. Several his­ torians have mentioned or written solely on this, second naval limitation conference of the 1920's. Most have ignored Japanese--American relations and have attributed the conference invitation to a desire for fiscal savings by both Secretary of State Frank B . Kellogg and President Calvin Coolidge. No one has shown that the President and Secretary held differing views on naval armaments, Coolidge, in fact, never desired to sacrifice the navy for a reduced budget. Dealing with the conference, these same historians have dwelled only on the Anglo-American refusal to compro­ mise their limitation plans, They have not delved beneath the surface of the dispute to reveal that the conflict involved differing naval strategy against Japan, Few have noted that the British and Americans.designed their diver­ gent proposals to obtain security against an imagined Japanese threat. From the standpoint of Japanese-American relations, however, they have not presented the many influences which produced the positions taken at the conference. This i have tried to do, iv V I wish to acknowledge the aid given to me by the many people in the National Archives; Library of Congress; Washington Navy Yard; University of North Carolina Library; V ; ' 1 Herbert Hoover Presidential Library; Minnesota State His­ torical Society; Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace; and University of Arizona Library„ I owe much to Mrs. Fusako Walker and Tomona Matsumoto who translated the Japanese documents for me, I want to thank Dr. Paul Carter and Dr. Michael Schaller of my committee for their counsel and suggestions, A special thanks goes to Dr, Herman Bateman, my dissertation director, whose guidance, patience, and advice were gratefully appreciated. I especially wish to thank my wife Margaret, for her typing, reading, and support made it all possible, TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT vii CHAPTER I, PLOTTING THE COURSE , » . „ , . , . , . , 1 II, CONFLICTING INTERESTS AND CONTINUED TENSION , •« 28 III, THE UNITED STATES AND FAR EASTERN TRADE . „ . 61 IV, JAPAN: A GROWING ASIAN POWER , . , , , . .. 85 V, NAVIES OF SMALLER VESSELS 104. VI, CONFLICTS REGARDING FURTHER NAVAL LIMITATION , 134 VII, THE ROAD TO GENEVA 150 VIII, THE CONFERENCE; PARTIAL AGREEMENT 167 IX. THE CONFERENCE; NATIONAL SECURITY AND CRUISERS . , ................................. 185 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 215 vi ABSTRACT Although Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes declared naval competition at an end after the Washington Conference, the failure to restrict small naval vessels insured continued rivalry„ Intensified by domestic develop­ ments, animosity between America and Japan perpetuated naval increases. The nativist movement within the United States blossomed into an "America first" approach to foreign nations in the 1920's, Not only did nativism promote dis­ criminatory legislation against the Japanese, but this outlook tended to emphasize commercial and financial aspects in American foreign policy, It served to justify an in­ creased tariff and equal opportunity for foreign trade to promote a higher standard of American life. In the Far East Washington hoped to widen the door of Chinese trade and ensure the continued flow of vital raw materials not found in the United States, Japan, too, felt the need to increase its foreign markets. Suffering from overpopulation and too few raw materials, Tokyo desired to develop further its industry, This approach meant an increased search for foreign raw materials, America's energetic thrust for foreign trade, however, gave the appearance of pushing Japan aside. At the same time its continued domestic discrimination against vii viii immigrants from the island empire angered the Japanese. Washington, in turn, viewed Japan as a competitor and looked with suspicion on its increased commercial activity in the Far East. Immediately following the Washington Conference, both Tokyo and the American Navy continued to emphasize construction of lesser naval vessels. Seeing the island empire building more ships to augment a presumed policy of political, economic, and military domination of the Far East, the United States Navy called for greater numbers of large cruisers as security against Japanese expansion. Amidst speculation of a Japanese-American war, the Navy redesigned its projected cruisers as pocket battleships in an effort to overcome the limitation placed on capital ships at Washington, At the same time Japanese naval leaders sought more vessels to protect their extended ocean trade routes, In America Congress resisted the specter of naval competition," Common opinion held increased or excessive armaments as the cause of war. Viewing naval rivalry as.the • cause not the symptom of international tension, members of Congress called for a second naval limitation conference as the solution. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and President Calvin Coolidge resisted congressional pressure, The situation changed, however, when Frank B , Kellogg succeeded Hughes as Secretary of State, Kellogg, in ix sympathy with the desire for a second conference, persuaded Coolidge to invite the signatories of the Washington Five Power Treaty to discuss additional naval limitation, From this invitation came the Geneva Tripartite Conference. Secretary Kellogg blundered badly in organizing the conference. Thinking he lacked the technical expertise to formulate the limitation plans, Kellogg naively allowed the Navy to draft the sole American proposal, Additionally, he appointed an Admiral to a position of leadership in the delegation, Dominating the American delegation and Kellogg, the Navy sought to use the conference partially to overcome the fortification restrictions imposed upon it in the Washington treaties, It attempted to use limitation not to ease Far Eastern tensions but to improve its strategic position in relation to Japan, Tokyo, too, proposed a scheme whereby it would gain greater advantage in the western Pacific, Britain, whose strategic needs differed from the United States, refused to compromise its plan to accommodate America. This refusal precipitated an Anglo-American dis^ pute which caused a conference deadlock and failure, A successful conference, however, would not have eased tension because neither the United States nor Japan made an effort to understand the other's problems, CHAPTER I PLOTTING THE COURSE The Geneva Conference of 1927 was one in a series of efforts by the United States to peacefully constrain Japanese imperial urges, reduce tensions, and td maintain equal economic opportunity in areas of the Far East outside American control„ Although its predecessor, the Washington Conference, did reduce the probability of war between America and Japan by limitation of large naval vessels and the agreement on fortifications in the Pacific, it did not end tensions nor bring expected cooperation in Asian affairs, Japanese^-American interests continued to collide, Racial antagonism, present before the Washington Conference, per-? sisted as exemplified through the United States Immigration Act of