A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism Edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall iii A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism Edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus, Mark A. Wrathall Copyrightexistential © 2006 by phenomenology Blackwell Publishing Ltd 3 Existential Phenomenology MARK A. WRATHALL The terms “existential phenomenology” and “existentialist phenomenology” seem to have come into common use in the late 1950s and early 1960s as a way of designat- ing what was common to the thought of Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and the philosophers influenced by them. So far as I can tell, none of these philosophers designated their own work “existential phenomenology,” although they did describe their projects in related ways. Heidegger, following the emergence of existentialism as a movement in France, denied that his thought dealt with “existentialism or existence- philosophy” (Heidegger 1986: 650), but he described his approach to phenomenology in Being and Time as an “analytic of existence” (Existenz) (Heidegger 1962: 62). Sartre called his “special phenomenological method” “existential psychoanalysis” (Sartre 1984: 617). In the preface to The Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty explained that “phenomenology is also a philosophy which puts essences back into existence, and does not expect to arrive at an understanding of man and the world from any starting point other than that of their ‘facticity’ [i.e., their actual, definite ways of being]” (vi). A word of caution is in order, however. To pay inordinate attention to these verbal similarities is to invite confusion. For example, in the passages I just quoted, “existence” means different things for Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. For Heidegger, “Existenz” names the human mode of being; Merleau-Ponty’s “l’existence” refers to a much broader range of phenomena, and would include worldly things. And Sartre’s focus on consciousness (a focus indicated by his description of his method as “psychology”) sets him apart in important ways from what is distinctive about the existential phenomenologies of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. All the same, there is a justification for grouping these philosophers together under the heading “existential phenomenology.” This justification is grounded in com- monalities in their understanding of the phenomena upon which they focus (section I), and in the phenomenological method they use to account for such phenomena (section II). Existential phenomenologies have included descriptions of the meaning of being (Heidegger), the role of the lived-body in perception (Merleau-Ponty), and skillful cop- ing (Hubert Dreyfus). One can also see Arendt’s account of the public domain, Sartre’s account of bad faith and our concrete relations with others, de Beauvoir’s descriptions 31 mark a. wrathall of sex and aging, Levinas’s reflections on our encounter with the other, and Marion’s work on the “saturated phenomenon” of divine transcendence, as works in existential phenomenology. Even Nietzsche’s efforts to illuminate existence through the notion of the will to power, or Kierkegaard’s and Pascal’s efforts to redescribe religious faith in non-philosophical terms, belong with some justification to the canon of works in existential phenomenology. I will, however, explore the idea of existential phenomeno- logy primarily through the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, as their works are undisputed paradigms of what existential phenomenology is. I Existential Phenomena Existential phenomenologists all share the view that philosophy should not be con- ducted from a detached, objective, disinterested, disengaged standpoint. This is because, they contend, certain phenomena only show themselves to one who is engaged with the world in the right kind of way. I propose calling such phenomena “existential phenomena.” Insofar as they are phenomena, existential phenomena exist in revealing themselves to us: “the expression ‘phenomenon’ signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest” (Heidegger 1962: 51). Insofar as they really exist, they don’t depend for their being on our knowing them as such – they are what they are independently of whatever we happen to think of them. As Heidegger observes, “entities are, quite independently of the experience, acquaintance, and comprehension by which they are disclosed, discovered, and determined” (Heidegger 1953: 183). If one thinks that something can show itself to us, make itself manifest, only to the extent that we have a determinate and explicit awareness of it as such, then the idea of an existential phenomenon might seem paradoxical. But one of the key elements of existential phenomenology is the view that there are a number of different ways in which entities can show themselves to us. Indeed, both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty agreed that the most fundamental way in which we encounter entities, our “primary perception” of them, in the words of Merleau-Ponty, “is a non-thetic, pre-objective and pre-conscious experience” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 242). For Merleau-Ponty, we have a “non-thetic” perception of something when it is not posed or placed squarely before us as an object for perception – that means “we have no express experience of it” (Merleau- Ponty 1962: 258). Something is “pre-objective” when it has a structure that resists articulation into a content that allows it to be grasped in thought – it is a “positive indeterminate which prevents the spatial, temporal and numerical wholes from be- coming articulated into manageable, distinct and identifiable terms” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 12). Other existential phenomenologists describe such phenomena using differ- ent terms, but their aim is the same – they want to direct our attention to things which bear on us not by being available to thought, nor because we are expressly aware of them as such, but rather because they shape or influence our comportment with things. Thus, as Merleau-Ponty explains, the existential phenomenologist’s aim is “to re- turn to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the country-side in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: ix). Because 32 existential phenomenology existential phenomena may show themselves best when we are not focally aware of them, not reflecting on them, or not thinking about them, they may well present to our view something that can only be imperfectly and partially captured in theoretical statements. Thus, the method of existential phenomenology must be descriptive, and consists always only in leading us to an apprehension of the objects of research. Before returning to the nature and problems inherent in phenomenological descrip- tion, however, let’s try to get a better grasp of what the “existential phenomena” are. We’ll do this by examining some paradigmatic instances of things which exist in “showing themselves” to us, but which are perceived in “non-thetic, pre-objective and pre-conscious experience.” We will look, in particular, at existential-phenomenological accounts of (1) the entities with which we cope in our everyday practices, (2) the world, and (3) human being-in-the-world. 1 Worldly entities By “worldly entities,” I refer to those things which would not exist without an organ- ized context of human equipment, activities, purposes, and goals. For example, if there were no need to build things, and no such things as nails and boards, then there would be no hammers. This is not to deny the reality of the raw materials from which hammers are made – wood and iron, for example. Those sorts of physical objects presumably exist whether there is a human world that incorporates them or not. A physical object, as Merleau-Ponty notes, “exists partes extra partes, and . consequently it acknowledges between its parts, or between itself and other objects only external and mechanical relationships” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 73). That means that its exist- ence in no way depends on its being incorporated into a world of human uses and activities. For much of the philosophy of the early twentieth century (including both Neo- Kantian and transcendental phenomenological approaches), an object could only be given to thought if it had already been “constituted” by thought. “Constitution,” in its most general sense, means allowing something to be seen as what it is by giving it a place in an ordered context. Thus for Kant, for instance, an object could only be seen as an object if it was brought under certain categories of thought. The result of such a view of constitution is that an entity can only show itself when it is already structured conceptually. This view of constitution, in other words, commits one to a denial of the existence of existential phenomena. Heidegger accepted the importance of constitution – he believed that something could only be given to us as an existing entity once it had been placed into an ordered context. But Heidegger argued that this constitution didn’t need to be performed by thought or in the categories proper to the intellect. “Constituting,” Heidegger explained in a traditional sense, “means letting the entity be seen in its objectivity.” But, he argued, “this objectivity . is not a result of the activity of intellectual understanding upon the external world. It is not a result of an activity upon an already given mix of sensations or throng of affections, which are ordered to form a picture of the world” (Heidegger 1985: 71). Instead, Heidegger argues that entities are constituted – allowed to show themselves as they are in themselves – when they have a place in a whole con- text of relations to other worldly entities and human activities. A hammer is constituted 33 mark a. wrathall as the thing it is by the way it relates to nails and boards, and activities like pounding and building. If the very same object physically described were found in a different con- text, it would be a different worldly entity.