EYEWITNESS Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali Battalion ASTRI SUHRKE The shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane over the Rwandan capital Kigali on 6 April 1994 set off multiple crises. There was the genocide itself - the systematic hunting down and killing of several hundred thousand persons - and a smaller civil war which unfolded alongside it. The events produced something akin to a crisis as well in the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. Deployed half a year earlier to help implement the peace agreement, UNAMIR was suddenly in the midst of a situation that was totally different from what it had been prepared and equipped for. It was soon to become a classic in the annals of UN peacekeeping gone awry. As a general failure of UN peacekeeping, the Rwanda case has been well documented.' Although this article does not focus on the political and diplomatic dimensions of the crisis, it is obvious that the mandate and configuration of the peacekeeping forces reflected the political attitudes of the permanent members of the Security Council. Effective UN action was obstructed by the major powers who had their own priorities.2 From the perspective of the forces on the ground, however, much has remained unexplored and unknown. What did the transformed situation mean to the UN contingent in operational, policy and moral terms? At the outset of the crisis, ten Belgian blue berets stationed in Kigali were killed by Rwandan soldiers. Rumours of force evacuation followed. Systematic 'cleansing' and killings took place all around them. This article presents the consequent dilemmas of protection as they appeared to the Belgian battalion in Kigali (KIBAT), which by virtue of its location and strength in UNAMIR as a whole took the brunt of the question of how to respond. The account is based largely on the battalion logbook which has recently become available and constitutes a uniquely valuable source. Because of the Astri Suhrke is Resident Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC, and Senior Fellow at the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen. International Peacekeeping, Vol.5, No.2, Summer 1998, pp.l-18 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON historical importance of the events of April 1994, and the enduring controversies which surround them, the Belgian unit most closely involved subsequently sought to present the record as it appeared in their sources. The 2nd Commando battalion which formed the Kigali Battalion undertook to systematically reconstruct events from 6 to 19 April 1994, when its last men were withdrawn. After three months of research based on the battalion logbook, records of the Belgian paratrooper unit which flew in to help with evacuation of expatriates, other notes and numerous interviews, the narrative was completed in September 1995. It is a detailed - at times minute-by-minute - account of the first crucial days as the Belgian unit experienced them. The account, entitled 'KIBAT. Chronique 06avr-I9avr 1994', is written in the format of a military log, and edited and endorsed by the battalion commander Col. J. Dewez. While presumably reflecting institutional biases, it remains a valuable primary source for an analysis of the peacekeepers' dilemmas during the first days of crisis in Kigali.' At times, the dilemma appeared to be one of saving themselves versus saving others. At other times the choice was between protecting expatriates or Rwandans. At critical points the choice was made for them. During the few days after 6 April when the battalion remained in Kigali, its resources were tied up by orders to help evacuate expatriates. About the same time, the Belgian government gave priority to saving the Belgian peacekeepers by unilaterally deciding to withdraw the battalion (announced on 12 April). In the UN, the Security Council readily followed the Belgian example by voting on 21 April to withdraw all but a token number of the entire force. The decision effectively terminated international presence in Rwanda during the next several weeks, permitting the organizers of the genocide to proceed unhindered. What happened during the first few days and nights after 6 April has remained of extraordinary concern and controversy, both in Rwanda and outside. Apart from the international tribunal proceedings against those accused of crimes, the most intense attention abroad was probably sustained in Belgium. The head of the Kigali sector of UNAMIR, the Belgian Colonel Luc Marchal, was court-martialed in Brussels in 1996 for failing to protect his men. The legal process was initiated by the families of the ten Belgian commandos who were killed; the court-martial pre-empted the possibility of a civil trial and ended in acquittal. Col. Marchal was widely viewed as a scapegoat for more deep-seated anger and bewilderment - anger against the seeming messiness of UN peacekeeping operations, and bewilderment about what constitutes moral and political responsibility in such situations, and where it resides. In an effort to sort out these issues, a Belgian parliamentary commission of inquiry was established and had by mid-1997 assembled a prodigious amount of testimony.' .