SECTION 2: CHINA’S MILITARY REORGANIZATION AND MODERNIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES Key Findings • Chinese President and General Secretary of the Chinese Com- munist Party Xi Jinping significantly accelerated China’s mil- itary modernization goals in late 2017, requiring the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to become a fully “modern” military by 2035 and a “world-class” military by mid-century. This new guidance moves China’s military modernization timeline up nearly 15 years. • Beijing is currently capable of contesting U.S. operations in the ground, air, maritime, and information domains within the sec- ond island chain, presenting challenges to the U.S. military’s longstanding assumption of supremacy in these domains in the post-Cold War era. By 2035, if not before, China will likely be able to contest U.S. operations throughout the entire Indo-Pa- cific region. • China’s large-scale investment in next-generation defense tech- nologies presents risks to the U.S. military’s technological su- periority. China’s rapid development and fielding of advanced weapons systems would seriously erode historical U.S. advan- tages in networked, precision strike warfare during a potential Indo-Pacific conflict. • The PLA Strategic Support Force—whose organization and op- erations reflect the importance Beijing places on information warfare—poses a fundamental challenge to the United States’ ability to operate effectively in space, cyberspace, and the elec- tromagnetic spectrum. The new force signals Beijing’s intent to build a military capable of dominating these domains of warfare. • China’s rapid buildup of the PLA Navy as a blue water force through its continued commissioning of highly capable, multi- mission warships will give Beijing naval expeditionary capabil- ities deployable around the globe as early as 2025, well ahead of the PLA’s broader 2035 modernization goals. • China continues to develop and field medium- and long-range air, sea, and ground-launched missile systems that substantial- ly improve China’s capability to strike both fixed and moving targets out to the second island chain. China’s ability to threat- en U.S. air bases, aircraft carriers, and other surface ships pres- ents serious strategic and operational challenges for the United States and its allies and partners throughout the Indo-Pacific. (205) USCC2018.indb 205 11/2/2018 10:34:08 AM 206 • Beijing has sought to use its sweeping military reorganization efforts to address the PLA’s so-called “peace disease” and per- sistent weaknesses in its ability to conduct joint combat oper- ations. Much of Chinese leaders’ concerns center on the PLA’s lack of recent combat experience and the perceived inability of many operational commanders to carry out basic command functions such as leading and directing troops in combat. Pres- ident Xi’s “Strong Military Thought” ideology, promulgated in late 2017, also seeks to overcome perceived shortcomings in the PLA’s war preparedness and combat mindset. • Prior to the PLA achieving its objectives of becoming a “mod- ern” and “world-class” military, Beijing may use coercive tactics below the threshold of military conflict rather than resorting to a highly risky use of military force to achieve its goals in the region. However, as military modernization progresses and Beijing’s confidence in the PLA increases, the danger will grow that deterrence will fail and China will use force in support of its claims to regional hegemony. • The Central Military Commission’s assumption of direct con- trol over the People’s Armed Police and China Coast Guard in 2018 effectively removed all remaining civilian status from both forces and clarified their military role. The move places added importance on the China Coast Guard as an instrument to po- lice, enforce, and advance China’s domestic maritime interests. Recommendations The Commission recommends: • Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. De- partment of Homeland Security to provide to the relevant committees of jurisdiction a report, with a classified annex, as- sessing how the change in the China Coast Guard’s command structure affects its status as a law enforcement entity now that it reports to the Central Military Commission. The report should discuss the implications of this new structure for China’s use of the coast guard as a coercive tool in “gray zone” activity in the East and South China seas. This report should also de- termine how this change may affect U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard interactions with the China Coast Guard, and whether the latter should be designated as a military force. • Congress consider imposing sanctions on key Chinese state- owned enterprises and individuals involved in China’s ongoing militarization of the South China Sea. Introduction China’s sweeping reorganization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), initiated in 2016 and led by Chinese President, General Sec- retary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Xi Jinping, is designed to improve the PLA’s ability to advance China’s interests and constrain the ability of the United States to operate freely in the Indo-Pacific region. The most important goal of this restructuring effort is to build a joint force capable of projecting power farther from China’s USCC2018.indb 206 11/2/2018 10:34:08 AM 207 shores. New directives laid out by President Xi in late 2017 now sig- nificantly accelerate China’s military modernization timetable and squarely set the PLA’s sights on becoming a “world-class” military on par with the United States. President Xi views the PLA’s modernization as fundamental to achieving his signature initiative to realize the “Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”—restoring what Chi- na perceives as its historic and rightful place as the dominant power in Asia. The PLA is also building the capacity to support China’s ambitions to play an influential role on the world stage. China’s military continues to improve its ability to conduct expeditionary operations to protect Beijing’s overseas interests, facilitated by the buildup of a blue-water navy, China’s construction of its first over- seas military base, and potentially by a range of ports and airfields developed around the world through President Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Chinese leadership’s vision for the PLA is therefore expansive. It seeks to build capabilities not only suited to resolv- ing regional sovereignty disputes in China’s favor, but that will also allow China to achieve the further-reaching goals implied by the “China Dream,” likely by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 2049. These goals include achiev- ing unification with Taiwan, resolving other remaining territorial disputes, and fully restoring China’s regional and global prestige. One key element of China’s worldview is that the first two decades of the 21st century—and potentially longer—serve as an important “period of strategic opportunity” for expanding China’s comprehen- sive national power, during which the likelihood of an outside power initiating a large-scale conflict with China remains low. President Xi’s initiation of his overhaul of the PLA—whose major components are scheduled to be completed by 2020—aligns with this strategic window and further shapes Beijing’s belief that it is increasingly well positioned to contest the U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pa- cific, which it views as the foremost obstacle to China achieving its goals in the region. Beijing also believes its growing military pow- er will undermine the confidence of U.S. allies and partners in the ability of the United States to deter China’s pursuit of these goals. Today, the United States and its allies and partners are facing a China more capable and increasingly confident in its ability to use the military as a tool to intimidate countries throughout the Indo-Pacific and support the expansion of its global interests. The PLA’s modernization over the past two decades has already resulted in a force capable of contesting U.S. operations in the region, pre- senting challenges to the U.S. military’s longstanding assumption of enjoying ground, air, maritime, and information dominance in a con- flict in the post-Cold War era. As China continues to achieve its mil- itary modernization goals, the PLA will become increasingly capable of contesting all domains of warfare throughout the Indo-Pacific re- gion and beyond. Given the PLA’s lack of recent combat experience, however, Beijing may find itself hard-pressed to execute complicated military operations against a capable and modern opponent. In the meantime, the PLA will continue seeking to overcome these chal- lenges by improving combat-realistic training, which—if success- ful—will provide Beijing with a greater sense of confidence during USCC2018.indb 207 11/2/2018 10:34:08 AM 208 a crisis, especially should Beijing decide to use force. President Xi’s successful efforts to end term limits for himself, consolidate his pow- er on the CMC, and carry out a large-scale anticorruption campaign within the PLA have created an environment for him to shape and execute a reorganization and modernization program that will al- most certainly result in a much more capable, joint PLA. This section examines the drivers behind China’s military reorga- nization and modernization efforts and assesses President Xi’s vi- sion for how the PLA will help secure his signature “China Dream.” Further, it provides important updates on improvements in the PLA’s joint command structure, advancements in force building, and efforts to develop joint operational capabilities since the initiation of the PLA’s reform and reorganization in 2016.