EXHIBIT A 1 Mary R. O’Grady, 011434 Joshua D. Bendor, 031908 2 Emma J. Cone-Roddy, 034285 OSBORN MALEDON, P.A. 3 2929 North Central Avenue, 21st Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2793 4 (602) 640-9000 [email protected] 5 [email protected] [email protected] 6 Attorneys for Secretary of State Katie Hobbs 7 8 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA 9 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA 10 KATIE HOBBS, in her official capacity as Arizona Secretary of State No. CV2021-006646 11 Plaintiff, 12 COMPLAINT vs. 13 KAREN FANN, in her official capacity as (Assigned to the Honorable 14 President of the Arizona Senate; WARREN Daniel G. Martin) PETERSEN, in his official capacity as 15 Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee; KEN BENNETT, in his official 16 capacity as the liaison of the Arizona Senate; and CYBER NINJAS, INC., a 17 Florida corporation, 18 Defendants. 19 20 Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbs (the “Secretary”), in her official capacity, 21 states her complaint against Karen Fann, President of the Arizona Senate, Warren 22 Petersen, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee; Ken Bennett, liaison of the 23 Arizona Senate; and Cyber Ninjas, Inc., a Florida corporation, as follows: 24 PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 25 1. The Secretary is Arizona’s Chief Elections Official. She brings this action 26 in her official capacity. 27 2. Defendant Karen Fann is a state senator and the President of the Arizona 28 Senate. President Fann is named in this action in her official capacity. 1 3. Defendant Warren Peterson is a state senator and the Chairman of the 2 Arizona Senate Judiciary Committee. Senator Peterson is named in this action in his 3 official capacity. 4 4. Defendant Cyber Ninjas, Inc. is a Florida corporation that has been hired 5 by the Arizona Senate to audit Arizona’s 2020 General Election in Maricopa County 6 (the “Audit”). 7 5. Defendant Ken Bennett is an Arizona resident and the Arizona Senate’s 8 liaison for the Audit. 9 6. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-123, 12-1831 and the 10 Arizona Constitution. 11 7. Venue is proper pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-401. 12 BACKGROUND 13 8. As Arizona’s Chief Election Officer, the Secretary is charged with 14 promulgating rules “to achieve and maintain the maximum degree of correctness, 15 impartiality, uniformity and efficiency on the procedures for early voting and voting, 16 and of producing, distributing, collecting, counting, tabulating, and storing ballots.” 17 A.R.S. § 16-452. These rules carry the force of law, and are recorded in the Elections 18 Procedure Manual (“EPM”) which was most recently published in 2019. 19 9. In addition to this authority, federal and state law requires ballots to be 20 retained and preserved for at least 22 months after an election. 52 U.S.C. § 20701; 21 A.R.S. § 16-624(A). And state law requires that equipment used to define, cast, or count 22 ballots be federally tested and certified and certified by the Secretary of State. A.R.S. § 23 16-442. 24 10. On November 3, 2020, Arizona conducted a free and fair election that 25 complied with Arizona’s election laws, as has been recognized by the courts and by 26 elected officials affiliated with both the Democratic and the Republican party, including 27 Governor Doug Ducey and the Secretary. 28 2 1 11. In Maricopa County, the election was conducted by both the Maricopa 2 County Board of Supervisors, whose majority then and now is made up of members of 3 the Republican Party, and in part by the then-County Recorder, a Democrat. 4 12. In both Arizona and Maricopa County, both parties were victorious in 5 some elections, and less successful in others. 6 13. There is no credible evidence of fraud in the Arizona elections or in 7 Maricopa County. 8 14. Nevertheless, the Arizona Senate has decided to “audit” the Maricopa 9 County election, and subpoenaed Maricopa County in order to take possession of every 10 ballot cast (more than 2.1 million physical ballots), as well as Maricopa County’s 11 election equipment, voter data, and other election materials. 12 15. As Arizona’s chief election officer, the Secretary was and is deeply 13 concerned that the Senate lacked the experience or expertise to safely store, handle, and 14 maintain the ballots of Maricopa County’s voters and Maricopa County’s voting 15 equipment. 16 16. In this spirit, on March 3, 2021, the Secretary reached out to President 17 Fann and offered to help the Senators identify a qualified contractor who could conduct 18 any sort of legitimate audit the Senate might desire. 19 17. The Secretary also urged the Senate to develop and make public criteria 20 for selecting an auditor, including as to their qualifications and independence, and to 21 establish and abide by detailed procedures for ensuring the security, integrity, and 22 reliability of any audit conducted. 23 18. The Senate chose instead to hire Cyber Ninjas. On information and belief, 24 Cyber Ninjas has never conducted an audit of any election anywhere approaching the 25 scale of the November 3, 2020 General Election in Maricopa County. 26 19. Moreover, Cyber Ninjas’ founder and CEO has an extensive history of 27 spreading unfounded conspiracy theories regarding the 2020 General Election. 28 3 1 20. Cyber Ninjas has never made available the procedures it is using to 2 conduct the audit, including for securing the ballots and machines that belong to 3 Maricopa County and ensuring its count produces a reliable and trustworthy result. 4 The Audit 5 A. Pre-Audit Issues 6 21. On April 20, 2021, the Maricopa County Elections Department announced 7 it would begin transferring the ballots and voting equipment responsive to the Senate 8 subpoena to Veteran’s Memorial Coliseum (the “Coliseum”) on April 21. 9 22. On April 21, 2021, Sambo (Bo) Dul, the State Elections Director in the 10 Secretary’s office, emailed Defendant Bennett and President Fann and requested that the 11 Senate allow the Secretary and national nonpartisan organizations to designate experts 12 to observe the audit. 13 23. Ms. Dul also urged Defendant Bennett to reduce restrictions on media 14 observers, so that they could fully report on the audit. 15 24. By phone, Defendant Bennett expressed openness to these requests, and 16 the Secretary’s office coordinated with two independent experts, Ryan Macias and 17 Jennifer Morrell, who the Secretary intended to designate as observers. 18 25. To date, Defendants have not authorized or permitted the Secretary or 19 anyone else to designate expert observers. 20 26. Nor has Cyber Ninjas provided the Secretary or any other independent 21 observer any details regarding the procedures it will use, including for counting ballots 22 and securing the ballots. What information has come to light raises concerns that the 23 Senate and Cyber Ninjas are conducting their audit in a manner that violates state and 24 federal statutory law as well as the Arizona constitution, and with a startling disregard 25 for the security of the ballots and voting equipment in their possession. 26 27. One document that has been made public is Cyber Ninjas’ Statement of 27 Work, signed by Defendant Fann. 28 4 1 28. The Statement of Work indicates that Cyber Ninjas will deploy a 2 “Registration and Votes Cast Team” which will “identify voter registrations that did not 3 make sense, and then knock on doors to confirm if valid voters actually lived at the 4 stated address.” Cyber Ninjas has not provided any details about who is on this team, 5 how they are trained, what processes they are using to identify registrations that do not 6 make sense, or what processes they will use to question voters. 7 29. The Statement of Work also indicates that Cyber Ninjas intends to work 8 with “[p]rovisional ballots which still have signatures attached to them,” without 9 detailing who will be handling these ballots, how they will be trained, or what steps will 10 be taken to ensure the confidentiality of voter information, including signatures. Further, 11 Cyber Ninjas does not appear to understand that provisional ballots that are verified for 12 tabulation cannot be distinguished from other tabulated ballots, and provisional ballot 13 envelopes that were not verified for tabulation are prohibited by A.R.S. § 16-584(E) 14 from being opened. 15 30. Several additional concerns first arose on Thursday, April 22, 2021. The 16 first was media reports of significant physical security lapses at the Coliseum. In 17 particular, one investigative reporter reported that his team was able to enter the 18 Coliseum four days in a row, including accessing the main floor and approach the 19 ballots and voting equipment, without a security check. Similarly, Mr. Macias observed 20 inadequate security when he was at the Coliseum on April 22. 21 31. At a press conference that same night, Cyber Ninjas also indicated it 22 planned to image and potentially publish every single ballot. 23 32. A.R.S. § 16-625 prohibits the publication of “electronic or digital images 24 of ballots . including the unauthorized copying,” and requires “that all security 25 measures [for such ballots] are at least as protective as those prescribed for paper 26 ballots.” 27 33. Experienced election administrators know that voters often place 28 identifying marks on their ballots, and that images of ballots could contain identifying 5 1 marks. It is unclear what, if anything, Cyber Ninjas plans to do to ensure the right to a 2 secret ballot is protected in all circumstances.