SECRET COPY NO. ....... THE PACIFIC COMMAND ..) \.) INTELLIGENCE 4 2 JIJL\g!ill NUMBER: 2 7- 5 0 323 5 oP "' 71 July 1950 DECLASSIFIED - - Authority J',/A/r) log'-YOO I c:!/ SECRET FOR U.S. EYES ONLY The Weekly Intelligence Digest is published solelT to disseminate intelligence to sub- ordinate units of the Pacific Co.mm.and. · Intelligence contained herein is the result of evaluation and synthesis of all sources available to the Pacific Commando Lower echelon commanders of the Pacific r,onmaod are here­ b7 authorized to disseminate this intelligence to their commands on a need-to-know basis with proper securit7 restrictions. Its use in formulating intelligence estimates is Jn­ couragedo There is no objection to the use of the Digest by addressees outside the Pacific Com­ mand, if it is understood that the secondaey. nature of its contents precludes its use as confirmation of any pr'~ sourceo The Digest simply represents current- estimates and evaluation of the Pacific Command· and is by no means rigid. This document contains information affecting the national defense ot the United Statee within the meaning ot the Espionage Act 50 1 Code 31 and 32, as am.en~ed. Its tranemission , or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited b7 law. Transmission by United states registered mail or registered guard .ma;iJ. is authorized in accordance with article 7-S, United States Na'V)" Security Manual to~ Classified Matter, and the pertinent paragraphs ot Arrq Regulations 380-.5. DISTRIBUTION (6-9- 50) ~ Addressee 22PZ Addressee ~ Addressee 1-30 CHO 135 CO PASROR ll4 176 DIBNAYINT!LSCHOOL 31-40 D/I GS US Arrq 136 C0MPHIBGRP l 177 OIC RAVCOl!MSTA Sonoma 41-78 D/1. US AIR PORCE 137 COMDESPLOT J. 178 CO AEROCHARTSERV 79-91 CINCPACP'LT 138 COMQESRON l · 179-180 COMOTARMJIJFORSi'AFFCOLt 92 CINCLAlffl'LT 139 COMDESRON 3 181 COMDT USMC 93 CINCNElll 140 COMDESRON 5 182 CG FMFPAC 94 COMFIRSTFLT 141 COMDESRON 9 18.3 CG AIBFMFPAC 95 COMSIXTHFLT 142 0011DESRON lJ. J.84 CG FIRSTMARAIRWIBG 96-100 COMSBYENTHP'LT 14.3 COUD~IY 12 185 CG FIRSTJlARDIY 101 COMCRUDESPAC 144 COMDESDIT 32 186 CO 11ARAIRGRP 12 102 COMAIRPAC 145 COMDESDIT 52 187 CO MARAiitGRP 33 103-104 COMSUBPAC 146 COMDESDif 71. 188 CG ffiPfflAOOTPHIBTRAPAC 105 COMPHIBPAC 147 COMDF.SDIY 92 189~195 CINCPB 106 COMSJ!RTPAC 148 COMDESDif ll2 196 CINCAL 107 COMTRAPAC 149 COMSOBFLOT 1 197 CIHCARIB 108 COMPHIBTRAPAC 150 COKSUBRON 1 198-205 CG SAC 109 COMRAlMARIARAS 151 OOlfSUBR0R 3 206-21.3 CG 'tJSABPAC · 110-112 COMRAYP'B 152 COMSUBRON S 214 CG PHILR!U 113 OOMNAYPHIL .1531 CO USS TALI.EI FORGI (Ci45) 215-216 CG MAR8> 114 CODESTSKlPROR 154 CO USS Bm2 (CY21) 217-218 CG EIGRffl ADI US C<JUL\WSEAFROI 155 .CO USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV47) 219-~5 CG FF.AF ll6 COlfALSBAPROR 156 CO USS BADOENG ST ( CVEll.6) 226 CG SIXTH ARlfI 117 COMELEYD 157' CO USS SICILY (CVEl.18) 227 CG~ US COMTWELlE 158 CO USS CURTISS (AV4) 228 COJIATS 119 COM?Hm'l'BEH ' 159 CO USS NOR'IDN SOUND (AVll) 229 ccm.ARTDIYMATS 120 00 'Pl.. ~~ ~YMATS 160 CO USS PINE ISLAND ( AV12) 230 CG 1~1; AIR PalCB 121 OOMP'AIR Alameda 161 CO USS SALISBURY OOUND (AV13) 231 CG 4th AIR FORCI 122 OOMPAIR Seattle 162 CO ·USS GARDimRS BAY (AVPJ9) 2.32-233 .CG 10th AIR PORQB 12.3 COMC.AJlDIY .3 163 CO USS FLOYDS BAY (AVP40) 234 CG 14th AIR FOBCB 124 COltCARDIY 5 164 CO USS SUISUN ( AVP53) 235 CG 20th AIR FORCE 125 C':\~ARDIY lS 16S CO USS SAINT PAUL ( CA 73) 236 CO 401st CIC -·' • 126 COD.UDIY 1 166 CO USS HELENA (CA75) 237 CO 6352nd ABU 127 OOIDttJDIY 3 167 CO USS ROCHESTER (CA124) 238-242 CO 5th ROT 128 COltCRtJDIY S 168 CO JJSS TOLEDO ( CA133) 243 CO 8292nd AU 129 OOMFADWING 1 169 CO USS MANCHESTER ( CI..83) 241+ CO 8301st AU 1.30 COMFilftWIHG 2· 170 CO USS JUNEAU (CI,AA119) 245 CO 8302nd AU 1.31 COMPAIRWIHG 4 171 ALUSNA Hong Kong 246 CO 8309th AU 1.32 COMFAIRWIRG 14 172 CO FL TOONARSCOL San Diego 247 CO 8310th 'AU 133 CO COIIPROR S 173 CO FALt.WEATRAPAC 248 CO 8311th AU 134 co eeMPROJf 6 174 CO FAIRBETUPAC 249 · JPM> DIYPACCOII 17S- _ma_Ut,b NAVAL DISTRICT ----~--~ ' ··--------·-~-- .. -DECLASSIFI »--~: RETAlN OR DESTROY BY BURNING SECRET Autborjo/ 1VN( ~YOO ~ SECRET Digest No. 27-50 CONTENTS KOREA Page Soviet Position in Northern Korea • • • • • • • • • • • • 2 Status of North Korean Regime • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2 Current Military Situation • • • • • • • • • • • • ~ • 3 Current Developments • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4 u.s,s,R. Delayed Response to Korean War • • • • • • • • • • . • • ·• • • • • 4 Military Defense Bonds between Satellites and Russia Tighten. • • 5 Soviet IL-12 Tr ansports Returned to Service • • • • • • • • • • 5 CHINA Convention of Communist Party Secretaries • • • • • • • • • • • • 6 Sino-Reds Renew Attack on Wan Shan Islands • • • • • • • • • • 6 Communist Naval Dispositions • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6 Troop Dispositions Along Coast • • • • • • • • • • • 7 JAPAN Communists Suffer Setbacks • . 7 SECRET SECRET WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST No. 27-50 KOREA Soviet Position in Northern Korea. The USSR's fundamental strategic concern with Korea is positional. Northern Korea has a short common border with Soviet territory, flanks sea and land communication lines between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, and shares a long, common frontier with Manchuria. Control of northern Korea provides the USSR with an advance fringe of secondary air and naval bases beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Far East. In addition, northern Kor,ea provides a base for eventual extension of Soviet con­ trol over southern Korea, which, if accomplished, would give the Soviet Union a further strategic advantage in its positional relationship with Japan and consequently enhance the position of the USSR vis-a-vis the U.S. in the Far East. Of increasing importance at the present time is the area's economic po~ntial, which, although limited, can make valuable ,contributions to the economy of the Soviet Far East. To assure continued control and to protect and advance strategfo and economic in­ terests ln northern Korea, the Soviet Union since 1945 has concentrated on the following objectives: (1) the establishment of a strong, effective, .and obedient Co]llDlunist govern­ ment and society; (2) the exploitation of economic and human resources; with simultane­ ous development of a self-supporting, expanding economy within northern Korea; and (3) the exploitation of northern Korea as a base for the penetration and subversion of southern Korea. Since the establishment of the «Democratic People's Republic"' (September 1948) and.the withdrawal uf Soviet troops (December 1948), the Soviet Union has maintained the I. fiction of northern Korean independence and has exercised its control through the medium of the Communist-dominated Korean Government and associated political organizations. The Soviet Embassy at the "capital city"' of Pyongyang is headquarters of the1 four- to five­ thousand-man Soviet mission in northern Korea. The Soviet mission, infiltrated as advisers throughout the government, economy, and political organizations, serves as a guara.1ltee of northern Korean subservience an4 a source of technical assistance. Status of North Korean Regime. The •nemocratic People's Repul>lic"' of northern Korea is a firmly controlled Soviet Satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence. At the present time there is no serious internal threat to the regime's stability, and, barring an outbreak of general hos­ tilities, the, Communists will continue to make progress toward their ultimate domestic goals. The ·communist regime in northern Korea suffers from a shortage of skilled admin­ istrati~e per~onnel and from weaknesses i~ its economy and its official Party organizations. • There is widespread, although passive, pppular discontent with the Communist government. Despite these Weaknesses, however, the regime has, with Soviet assistance, clearly dem­ onstrated an ability to continue its contro~ and development of northern Korea along prede- termined political, economic, -and social lines. :.. ~ - . Northern Korea's capability for, long-term ~ilitary operations· is -dependent upon in­ creased logistical support from the USSR. If the foreign supporters of each ·faction were I. called upon for increased assistance, there is no reason to believe that 8.<>vi~t support I withheld and considerations of proximity and availability of such assistance would I would )le I greJtly favor the northern Korean regime. Sov~et assis~ce tp northern Korea, however, probably would not be µi. the form of direc.t puticipation of regular ·Soviet or Chinese Com;. munist mill~ units except as a last resort. ~ ! . - DECLASS{Fjjf·-- Autb~rity iVNr ;;-?oo · ·. 2 SE c RB T ----.. ....... ___ _ -·- ........ -------- SECRET WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST No. 2'1-50 'KOREA (cont'd) The "Democratic People's Republic" is under the immediate control of a small group of Korean Communist leaders whose primary qualification for high office is loyalty to the USSR and willingness to accept a subordinate role within the pattern of Soviet con­ ,'I trol. Thus, Koreans with a Soviet background appear to ~ve been given positions superi­ or to those held by either native-trained Communists or Koreans who received Communist indoctrination in Yenan and Manchuria, and ~s Soviet-trained leadership appars to be well knit. The intensity of Soviet control, the leaders' lack of strong personal followings among the Korean people, and the composition of the present southern Korean Government which makes it unpalatable to possible northern "nationalist deviationists• as an alterna­ tive prevents either significant deviations or disruptive factionalism. Except for their loyalty and subservience to the USSR, northern Korea's leaders possess few qualifications for the responsibility of high government, and party office. They have gained no popular support and despite four years in office they still lack requisi~ ad­ ministrative and technical skills.