MEES 53:48 29 November 2010 Iraq And The Security Of Energy Supplies For Europe ByAhmed Mousa Jiyad Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant and scholar and Associate with the Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou‐[email protected]). The following is summary of his presentation to the Politics and Economics of European Energy Security conference organized by the Institute for Energy, Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, in Amsterdam on 18‐19 November. Geographical proximity, availability of needed regional infrastructure and the magnitude of petroleum re‐ sources could make Iraq a significant energy partner for the European Union (EU). In addition to the in‐ volvement of many international oil companies (IOCs) from the EU in Iraqi upstream projects, Iraq and the EU have already sufficient modalities and frameworks for energy cooperation. What is needed, though, is to move from intention to action, to put the vehicle of energy cooperation on the right platform, and the EU should be proactive and take the initiative in this direction. EU IOC Participation In Iraq’s Upstream Development Between November 2008 and October 2010 the Iraqi Ministry of Oil conducted three bid rounds, signed 12 long term technical service contracts for 14 brownfield and greenfield oil developments, and held in October 2010 a successful third bid round comprising three gas fields, with over 11 trillion cu ft gas in place. All rounds were concluded in one day. Total proven reserves of the oil fields amount to 68bn barrels, representing 59% of Iraq’s current (prior to 4 October revision – MEES, 11 October) proven reserves. When they are fully developed, as contracted, their total production capacity would increase from 1.7mn b/d at end‐2009 to a plateau of about 11.7mn b/d sus‐ tainable for the six consecutive years of 2017‐22 and generating a substantive influx (trillions of dollars) of oil export revenues for a duration of 20 years. There will also be 820mn cfd from the three gas fields mentioned above and significant associated gas, estimated at 11bn cfd, as a by‐product of the expanded oil production capacity. If one adds other oil and gas fields in the country the final figures would be higher. For the purpose of this paper the focus is on the outcomes of the three bid rounds only. Many IOCs from the EU area have direct involvement in this upstream program. Focusing the attention on the contracted IOCs only, excluding oil service companies, they fall in two categories: those belonging to (but not necessarily owned by) EU member states, such as BP, Shell, Eni and Total; and those belong to coun‐ tries not yet member states but having special relations with the EU, such as Statoil (Norway) and TPAO (Turkey). Assuming complete and timely development of the oil and gas fields and smooth implementation of the re‐ lated contracts, the direct involvement of the European companies in both categories would be significant. Based on the concluded contracts, on aggregate the EU IOCs managed to acquire a participation interest of about 9.77bn barrels in total reserves of oil fields offered and concluded under the first bid round and 8.85bn barrels for second round fields. A total of 18.62bn barrels from the two bid rounds represents a participation interest of 27.7% of all proven reserves of the oil fields contracted so far. As for oil production envisaged un‐ der these contracts, the EU IOCs have a participation interest of 1.865mn b/d and 1.265mn b/d the first and second bid rounds respectively, giving a total of 3.13mn b/d. This represents a participation interest of 28.3% in total production capacity and 31.3% in the incremental production capacity of these oil fields. ©Middle East Petroleum and Economic Publications (Cyprus) Ltd Reproducing MEES Is Strictly Prohibited www.mees.com MEES 53:48 29 November 2010 Moreover, from this 3.13mn b/d there will be a corresponding associated gas participation interest estimated at 2.9bn cfd. Contractually, the IOCs are entitled to the same remuneration fee applicable to oil for the proc‐ essed gas based on the barrels of oil equivalent (boe) of the related field. There are also three free gas fields – ʹAkkaz, Mansouriya and Siba. For these gas fields the EU contribution was limited to one company of cate‐ gory two – TPAO – which managed to have participation interests in Mansouriya and Siba, representing about 1.2 tcf of their combined proven reserves and 142mn cfd of their peak production. It should be clear that the participation interest referred to above is confined to two aspects only: the remu‐ neration fee, which has been concluded for the related field and the corresponding share of the IOC in cover‐ ing the “State Partner” share in the capital expenditure, which is carried by the IOCs of the related consor‐ tium until they recover all the capital investment in the field. Therefore, participation interest should not be confused with or interpreted as ‘reserve booking’. Reality and expectations seldom coincide. Many had cast doubt on the feasibility of the pursued production targets even if the country was able to overcome all difficulties and was successful in installing the declared capacity. In upstream petroleum installed capacity is one thing, its optimum utilization is another. All con‐ sulted international industry sources unanimously agree that Iraq would not be able to achieve its stated ob‐ jectives according to the specified pace, time frame and production targets. The most optimistic among these sources suggest Iraq could, at best, achieve half the target production level. I would argue that even at ‘half‐ target’ success, Iraq would make a significant contribution to the security of energy supplies to Europe, and would also generate a huge influx of foreign exchange to the country. Therefore, Iraqi decision makers should start from now a serious professional dialogue to explore all possi‐ ble situations and the needed feasible policies to protect from and mitigate their highly probable effects. But this entails having a sound national energy policy and plan commensurate with the sustainable develop‐ ment of the country at large. To do so Iraq could utilize international facilities and engage its partners for that purpose, as discussed below. Iraq‐EU Cooperation in Energy Matters Three major modalities of international cooperation in the field of energy are currently available: Multilat‐ eral, bilateral and public/official‐private levels. The focus here is on the multilateral level with Iraq on one side and the EU (representing the member states collectively) on the other. Though cooperation between Iraq and the EU in the field of energy is part and parcel of general cooperation, the energy sector has its own sec‐ tion within the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) and its own framework, namely the Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Partnership in Energy (MOU/SPE). As early as 2004 the EU and Iraq issued a joint policy entitled, ‘The EU and Iraq: a Framework for Engage‐ ment’, with the objective of achieving “the development of a secure, stable and democratic Iraq.” In March 2009 the European Commission and Iraq signed the Financing Agreement on technical Assistance to Iraqi institutions. This agreement is aimed at “establishing a modern Iraqi administration based on the principles of democracy, good governance and accountability.” Between November 2006 and November 2009 Iraq and the EU negotiated and concluded a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The PCA will be the overarching framework and constitute the legal basis for cooperation, and its ratification by both parties is expected in 2010, or possibly next year for Iraq. The MOU/SPE, which was concluded in Baghdad in January 2010, reflects strategic EU policy guidelines aiming at diversifying energy supply to the EU, taking into account the possible role of Iraq as a natural gas supplier for the Southern Corridor and Iraq could become an energy bridge between the Middle East, the East Mediterranean and the EU. Finally, the first ever Joint Strategy Paper (JSP) for Iraq is a medium term plan covering 2011‐13. The ‘Concept Note’ presents an outline of the JSP main guidelines, and the general focus of EU support is on helping Iraq to better use its own resources, through capacity building activities. ©Middle East Petroleum and Economic Publications (Cyprus) Ltd Reproducing MEES Is Strictly Prohibited www.mees.com MEES 53:48 29 November 2010 MOU/SPE Main Components Since the MOU/SPE is the most direct instrument relating to our subject matter it is worth highlighting its main components as follows: • Formulating comprehensive and integrated energy policy and modernize the electricity sector for Iraq, preparing an updated Iraqi gas development program and implementing measures aiming to reduce gas flaring; and drawing up an “energy action program covering the period 2010‐15” for their imple‐ mentation. • Specific cooperation measures to enhance energy trade, including exports of surplus Iraqi natural gas, between the two parties with the involvement of EU member states and the private sector. • Preparing a plan of action for the development of renewable energy in Iraq, in particular solar and wind energy resources. • Cooperation on technological, scientific and industrial energy issues and promotion of training and education of young professionals. • Establishing a joint energy working group to explore possibilities and modalities for the implementa‐ tion of the priorities for cooperation set out in this MOU/SPE.