66-3392 KOGINOS, Emmanuel Theodore, 1933— THE PANAY INCIDENT: PRELUDE TO WAR. The American University, Ph.D„ 1966 History, modern Please note: Author also indicates first name as Manny on the title page. University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan Copyright by EMMANUEL THEODORE KOGINOS 1966 THE PANAY INCIDENT: PRELUDE TO WAR by y $anny)T^Koginos Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History Signatures of Committee: f A Vk 0 Chairman: O* lOctMr**- /~) y\ 7 ■ * Graduate Dean: Date: 2 7./9CS- Thewf^Mna?nnUnnVerSity AMERICAN UNIVERSITY Washington, D. C. LIBRARY ffOV 8 1965 WASHINGTON. D.C. TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE i CHAPTER Page I. Diplomatic Background .......... 1 II. The Crisis ............. hi III. The Settlement ........ 101 IV. The Ludlow Referendum............ 150 V. Naval Expansion ............. 190 VI. Conclusion........................... 2k2 BIBLIOGRAPHY....................... ....250 APPENDICES ........................................ 267 PREFACE The Panav incident in retrospect was the most dramatic single event in Japanese-American relations during the 1930's. i-.-. The attack upon the American gunboat in December, 1937 by Japanese forces contributed greatly to the general deterior­ ation and eventual breakdown in American-Japanese diplomatic relations. Though the immediate impact of the incident did not result in any radical departure from America's isola­ tionist position, it did modify American opinion in respect to foreign and domestic affairs. Indeed, pacifist influ­ ence was to reach its highest crest during the Panav epi­ sode. At the same time, the crisis vividly dramatized America's unwillingness to pursue a more positive policy in the Far East. The incident, however, did point out the need for military preparedness, and in the end, the affair served as one of the essential driving forces behind an upward surge of navalism which occurred in the spring of 1 9 3 8. This study is concerned with the events proceeding the sinking of the Panav and the immediate issues which followed. Chapter I briefly describes American policy in the Far East during the interwar period and reviews American attempts to protect its nationals and interests in China following the - i - outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan in July, 1937. It also examines the Japanese attitude toward non­ belligerents in the war zone. Chapter II deals In detail with the bombing and sinking of the Panav and reviews the domestic and foreign attitudes toward the episode. Chapter III analyzes the diplomatic implications involved in the crisis, the reaction of the Roosevelt Administration and the final settlement of the affair. It also includes the reaction of the British and other European governments to the incident. Chapter IV reviews the Ludlow Referendum on war, its potential effect upon future diplomacy and the pub­ lic response to the resolution. Chapter V analyzes the 1 causes for naval expansion, the foreign and domestic edit­ orial reaction to Roosevelt's naval program and the Congres­ sional debate which ensued on the issue. The final chapter briefly reviews and analyzes the causes of the sinking of the Panay and the events immediately following. I would like to extend my sincere appreciation and thanks to the members of my dissertation committee, Dr. Dorothy D. Gondos, Dr. E. Taylor Parks and Dr. Walter Rundell. I par­ ticularly wish to express my gratitude to the chairman of my committee, Dr. Arthur A. Ekirch Jr. His advice and as- ii sistance were not only invaluable in the completion of this study, but he has served as an inspiration to me throughout my graduate program. iii CHAPTER I DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND American foreign policy traditionally sought to main­ tain the status quo in the Far East and uphold the terri­ torial integrity of China; at the same time, the United States attempted to avoid any alliances with other powers in Far Eastern affairs. As early as 1900 when Secretary of State John Hay first proposed his open-door policy in regard to China, Japan, in particular, consistently challenged American efforts by endeavoring to extend its influence on the Chinese mainland and in Siberia.* Tension continued to mount following the First World War and the United States government called upon the major powers of the world to meet in Washington in the hope that some understanding or agreement could be reached to preserve the status quo in the Far East. The Washington Conference, however, ultimately focused its attention upon ending the three-cornered naval rivalry be­ tween the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The dele­ gates at the meeting, nevertheless, signed an agreement on 6 February 1922 which in essence endorsed the American policy *- Hay's open-door policy was a measure by which he sought to secure for the United States equal trading privi­ leges within the spheres of interest which the major powers had established in China. - 2 - of the open door. More importantly the signatories from the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands agreed "to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and admini­ strative integrity of China." In other words, the so-called Nine Power treaty expressly prohibited the establishment of spheres of interest in that country. Prior to signing the Nine Power treaty, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, the American representative to the Conference, attempted to find some substitute which would terminate the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. The alliance had been formulated originally as a defensive measure against a possible threat from Germany and- Russia but these powers had ceased to be obstacles to Japan and Hughes felt that the agreement was now aimed at the*United States. To alleviate this problem, the United States, Great Britain, Japan and France agreed on 13 December 1921 to abrogate the Anglo-ap- anese alliance in a Four Power Pact. Under its provisions, the four powers also agreed "to respect their rights in re­ lation to their insular possessions and insular dominions ^Ruhl J. Eartlett (ed.), The Record of American Dip­ lomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign. Relations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961*), pp. ^89-^90. - 3 - in the region of the Pacific." For the United States, the Four Power Pact and the Nine Power Treaty had a triple value; it ended the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it re-affirmed Japan's promise to respect American sovereignty in the Philippines and it served as a check to further Japanese expansion in the Far East. 2 With the launching of a war of conquest and pacification of Manchuria, Japan in 1931 challenged the agreements reached at the Washington Conference. This challenge did not go un­ opposed and within the next two years the United States re­ fused to recognize the changes which Japan was making on the mainland of Asia. The Sino-Japanese conflict over Manchuria ran counter to the Administration's inclination that it should concentrate its attention upon the existing domestic depres­ sion. While the United States was overwhelmingly concerned with its own economic problems, an American foreign policy based upon new moral and legal assumptions with regard to the Far East was being forged. It ultimately pointed toward eventual involvement in the Far East where the United States historically had only a minor economic stake.^ 2 Ibid., pp. ^9 0-^9 1. ^William L. Newmann, America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur (Baltimore* The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 185. - b - During the 1 9 3 0's several determining factors also led to a sharp reversal in Japan's foreign policy. Externally, the steady growth of Chinese nationalism threatened Japan's privileged position on the mainland while the resumption of~- Sino-Russian relations late in 1932 appeared as an ominous warning to the Tokyo government. Internally, Japan's press­ ing need for raw materials, for outlets for its surplus popu­ lation and industrial exports strengthened the influence of those nationalists and militarists who sought to eliminate economic distress at home and to re-establish the country's L. prestige abroad. It was upon these essential factors, therefore, that the Japanese militarists provoked a clash with Chinese troops near Mukden with the intention of controlling all of Manchuria. The Chinese government immediately appealed to the League of Nations in a vain effort to marshal world opinion against the Japanese attack. A Commission of Inquiry headed by Lord Lytton was appointed to investigate the crisis and in October 1932 its findings were made public. The Lytton Report frankly described China's unsatisfactory control in Manchuria and recognized Japan's economic and strategic interests there — - , Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp.521-522. - 5 - but categorically denied that the latter had been justified in its methods to redress these grievances. The report sug­ gested that China's sovereignty be re-established in Man­ churia, while at the same time, Japanese interests and rights be safeguarded in the process. The recommendation was total­ ly unacceptable in Tokyo and before the report was debated at Geneva, Japan formally recognized Manchuria as the new state of Manchukuo. On 2V February 1933, the League of Nations Assembly voted that Manchuria still belonged to China and condemned Japan for violating the Legaue's Coven­ ant. At this point, Japan withdrew from the League perman­ ently. 5 Meanwhile, news of the Manchurian affair caught Washing­ ton somewhat by surprise. Neither Herbert Hoover nor his Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, were willing to take any concerted action that would lead to war and they sought therefore some preventative method that would bring moral pressure to bear upon Japan.