Australia and the Revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 73 Australia and the Revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Cheng-fung Lu Assistant Professor, Department of International and Mainland China Affairs, National Quemoy University Abstract Australia lacks capabilities required to be considered among the major powers, but it still intends to influence the regional security environment. Before “Indo-Pacific” emerged as an influential term within Australian strategic debate, the Defence White Paper 2013 identified Australia’s region within the “Indo-Pacific strategic arc” for the first time. “The Quad” initiative, which was intended to facilitate conversation and cooperation between the US, Japan, Australia, and India (the four maritime democracies), lasted from mid-2006 to early 2008. After Kevin Rudd defeated the four-term Prime Minister John Howard in the November 2007 election, however, Australia withdrew from the summit. As the four countries’ perceptions of China’s assertiveness have aligned much more closely since then, all partners have thought about how to make the Quad resilient. This article explores the Australian security strategy and the Quad’s revival, and it will include an overview of and introduction to the “Quad’s revival,” Australia’s Indo-Pacific security strategy system, Australia- Japan-US trilateral security, and the overall outlook for the Quad. Keywords: Quad, Indo-Pacific, Balancing China, Australia Security Strategy, Trilateral Security Dialogue 74 Prospect Journal No.19 I. Introduction and Overview In November 2017, officials from the US, India, Australia, and Japan convened on the eve of the leaders’ summit of East Asian Nations in Manila. During the meeting, the four countries agreed to cooperate towards a “free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo- Pacific region.”1 Instead of releasing a joint statement after the meeting, the four countries released separate statements. US officials also denied the move was aimed at containing China. This was the first meeting for the four-way alliance since its initiation a decade ago. Beijing warned that any maneuvers towards a security group should not target or damage a “third party’s interest.” Australia’s former Ambassador to China chimed in with Beijing.2 The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade indicated, “The participants [are] committed to continuing quadrilateral discussions and deepening cooperation on the basis of shared values and principles.” Professor Rory Medcalf, the Head of the National Security College at Australian National University described the development in this way, “It first coalesced in 2007 only to dissipate after Australia’s withdrawal in early 2008. Now it’s back......, Quad rebirth.”3 Atul Aneja, “Indo-Pacific Quad May Soon Have a Gaping Hole as China Re- engages Japan,” The Hindu, January 3, 2018, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/ international/indo-pacific-quad-may-soon-have-a-gaping-hole-as-china-re-en gages-japan/article22357798.ece>. Geoff Raby, “Why Joining the Quad Is Not in Australia’s National Interest,” The Australian Financial Review, November 6, 2017, <http://www.afr.com/ opinion/columnists/riding-a-quad-bike-away-from-our-national-inter est-20171105-gzfi2n>. Rory Medcalf, “India Locks in the Quadrilateral Dialogue to Counter China,” The Australian Financial Review, January 25, 2018, <http://www.afr.com/ opinion/columnists/india-locks-in-the-quadrilateral-dialogue-to-counter-chin a-20180124-h0ng2y>. Australia and the Revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 75 Termed in the media as “the quadrilateral security dialogue, or the “Quad,” analysts described it as “one of the most important geo- political development [that] came from a low key meeting between senior foreign services from four countries.”4 The idea of the quad- rilateral security initiative of “like-minded” democracies first was raised by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007, and the first exploratory meeting was on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum Summit in May 2007 in the Philippines.5 In 2007, Abe Visited New Delhi and delivered a speech to the Indian parliament, during which he pointed out that a “broader Asia” was emerging through the “dynamic coupling” of the Pacific and Indian oceans.6 He called for a partnership between Japan and India – and also Australia and the US – to build an “arc of freedom and prosperity.”7 Ten years later, on November 10, 2017, US President Donald Trump made a fieryspeechattheAPECmeetinginDaNang,Vietnam,Trumpin- troduced his “Indo-Pacific Dream.” Trump said, “we must uphold principles that have benefitted all of us, like respect for the rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navigation and overflight, in- Jiangtao Shi & Laura Zhou, “Wary China on ‘Quad’ Bloc Watch after Officials from US, Japan, India and Australia on ASEAN Sideline,” The South China Morning Post, November 13, 2017, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplo macy-defence/article/2119719/wary-china-quad-bloc-watch-after-officials-us- japan>. Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of the QUAD,” November 16, 2017, War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/>. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Confluence of the Two Seas, Speech by H. E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India,” August 22, 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, <http://www. mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html>. Yuki Tatsumi, “Is Japan Ready for the Quad? Opportunities and Challenges for Tokyo in a Changing Indo-Pacific,” January 9, 2018, WarontheRocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/japan-ready-quad-opportunities-challenges- tokyo-changing-indo-pacific/>. 76 Prospect Journal No.19 cluding open shipping lanes......and these principles create stability and build trust, security, and prosperity among like-minded na- tions.”8 Beijing’s growing power and assertiveness caused the four democracies to combine their military and economic influence to counter and push back China’s efforts. For a long time, Australia has held close ties with the United States, with former US President Barack Obama hailing the “unbreakable alliance,” but China has im- plemented a charm offensive towards Australia in order to “weaken US Leadership in Asia.”9 China is Australia’s most important trading partner, but China is meddling in Australia. Australia’s Fairfax media launched a series of investigative reports, citing examples of China attempting “to buy influence in Australia.” This included “Donations from pro-Beijing businessmen and businesses to the political campaigns of Australian senators.”10 This article seeks to explore the Australian security strategy and the Quad’s revival, and it will include an in- troduction to and overview of the “Quad’s revival,” Australia’s Indo- Pacific security strategy system, Australia-Japan-US trilateral security, and the overall outlook for the Quad. The White House, “Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit, Da Nang, Vietnam,” November 10, 2017, The White House, <https://www.white house.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da- nang-vietnam/>. Enrico Fels, Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific? (Gewerbestrasse: Springer Inter- national, 2016), p. 410. John Pomfret, “China’s Meddling in Australia － and What the U.S. Should Learn from It,” The Washington Post, June 14, 2017, <https://www.washing tonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/06/14/how-should-the-u-s-deal-with- chinas-rise-look-to-australia/?utm_term=.1085c5de4cad>. Australia and the Revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 77 II. Australia’s Indo-Pacific Security Strategy Since the end of World War II, three broad objectives have formed the core of a bipartisan foreign policy consensus in Australia: support for the US alliance, the development of closer relations with Asia, and integration with a rule-based international order.11 For the past three decades, successive Australian Defense White Papers have placed a denial strategy as the basis of the Australia’s defense policy.12 Australia’s “2013 National Security Strategy Report,” 2012 Australia in the Asian Century White Paper,andtheDefence White Paper 2013 should be seen together as a statement reflecting the government’s priority on Australia’s security and economic prosperity, while maintaining a strong Australian Defense Force to meet Australia’s national security challenges.13 After 4 years, the Australian government finally unveiled its Foreign Policy White Paper in November 2017, in which the government states, “the Government recognizes there is greater debate and uncertainty in the United States about the costs and benefits of its leadership in parts in the in- ternational system.”14 This white paper warned of a US retreat, and it said, “without sustained US support, the effectiveness and liberal character of the rules-based order will decline.” Nick Bisley, “‘An Ally for All the Years to Come’: Why Australia Is Not a Conflicted US Ally?” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 67, Issue 4, June 2013, pp. 403-418. Adam Lockyer & Michael D. Cohen, “Denial Strategy in Australian Strategic Thought,” Australian Journal of International Affairs,Vol.71,Issue4,January 2017, pp. 423-439. Australian Government, Defence White Paper 2013 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2013), p. 1. Australian Government, Opportunity, Security, Strength: The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 2017), p. 7. 78 Prospect Journal No.19 Before