ASRXXX10.1177/0003122417690325American Sociological ReviewWouters and Walgrave 6903252017 American Sociological Review 2017, Vol. 82(2) 361 –383 Demonstrating Power: How © American Sociological Association 2017 https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122417690325DOI: 10.1177/0003122417690325 Protest Persuades Political journals.sagepub.com/home/asr Representatives Ruud Woutersa and Stefaan Walgravea Abstract How do public opinion signals affect political representatives’ opinion formation? To date, we have only limited knowledge about this essential representative process. In this article, we theorize and examine the signaling strength of one type of societal signal: protest. We do so by means of an innovative experiment conducted among Belgian national and regional politicians. Elected officials were exposed to manipulated television news items covering a protest demonstration. Following Tilly’s previously untested WUNC claim, four features of the event were manipulated: the demonstrators’ worthiness, unity, numerical strength, and commitment. We argue that these protest features present elected officials with useful cues about what (a segment of) the public wants. We find that these cues affect elected officials’ beliefs. The salience they attach to the protest issue, the position they take, and their intended actions all change as a consequence of exposure. The size of a protest event (numbers) and whether the protesters agree among themselves (unity) are the most persuasive protest factors. The effects of the protest signals come on top of strong receiver effects. We find no evidence that elected officials’ predispositions moderate the effects of the protest features. Keywords protest, representation, opinion formation, elected officials, experiment In a democracy, elected representatives are To date, we have only limited knowledge supposed to represent society. In the words of about this essential representative process of Dahl (1973:1), “a key characteristic of a individual opinion formation by elected offi- democracy is the continuing responsiveness cials (for a similar argument, see Belchior of the government to the preferences of its 2014; Broockman and Skovron 2013; Miler citizens.” Because elected officials aim to 2007). To be sure, we do know that elected remain in office and fear electoral sanctions, officials resort to different sources, like they have an interest in keeping close track of what the public wants and are expected to adjust their beliefs and actions accordingly aUniversity of Antwerp (Downs 1957; Miller and Stokes 1963). But how do elected representatives form percep- Corresponding Author: tions about what the public, or a relevant seg- Ruud Wouters, Research Group Media, Movements & Politics (M²P), University ment of the public, wants? And, most impor- of Antwerp, Lange Nieuwstraat 52, 2000 tantly, to what extent are their own opinions Antwerpen, Belgium affected by these perceptions? E-mail: [email protected] 362 American Sociological Review 82(2) opinion polling (Geer 1996), mass media opinion of a segment of the public. The sig- (Herbst 1998), contact with constituents nals we confront them with are different (Fenno 1978), and different forms of advo- media portrayals of a protest event. We test to cacy (Burstein 2014) to gauge what the public what extent different versions of the signal— wants. And a large and growing body of in this case, carefully manipulated features of research scrutinizes the actual correspond- the protest action—differently affect the ence between public opinion signals and pol- extent to which representatives align their icy behavior; that is, what elected officials do own opinion with that of the protesters. (Burstein 2014; Erikson, MacKuen, and Access to a large sample of national elected Stimson 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992; officials and the assets of experimentation Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 2004). give us unique leverage to address questions These studies find considerable evidence for of how incoming societal signals affect repre- a link between public opinion and policy. Yet sentatives’ opinion formation. this general pattern hides a great deal of vari- We consider protest as one particular pub- ation in responsiveness as well. Policies tend lic opinion signal that may influence elected to better reflect the preferences of the most representatives. Politicians, of course, are affluent, for instance (Bartels 2008; Gilens exposed to many other societal signals. 2005). Citizens with more money and politi- Focusing on protest as an expression of a part cal skill can better organize, have better of public opinion has distinct substantive, access to policymakers, and manage to com- theoretical, and methodological advantages. municate their interests better and with more Substantively, staging protest is the weapon pressure (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady of the weak. Protest groups typically are 2012). Similarly, public policy is biased resource poor. They lack direct access to the toward the status quo, protecting the powers policymaking process and often challenge that be against the efforts of those who chal- (the lack of ) extant policies. These elements lenge extant policy (Gilens 2005). Finally, make responsiveness unlikely. By staging democratic linkage is strongest for issues the protest and going public, protesters seek general public cares most about (Burstein social support, hoping to set in motion a pro- 2014; Wlezien 2004). Politicians’ leeway to cess that will make it hard for elected officials cater to special interests is considerably larger to continue ignoring them. As such, studying for (the many) issues that stay under the pub- the persuasiveness of protest signals is of lic radar. particular substantive interest, as it can In summary, although we know that politi- increase our understanding of the conditions cians resort to different sources to learn about under which a democracy can be more inclu- public opinion, and although we have sub- sive (or at least pluralistic). Focusing on pro- stantial evidence about democratic congru- test as societal signals also has methodological ence and its contingencies, little is currently and theoretical advantages. Protest signals are known about how individual elected officials clearly delineated in terms of place, time, and process incoming public opinion signals and issue and can thus be studied more easily than how these signals affect their own opinions. broader, more ambivalent signals. Addition- To further our knowledge about how ally, we can build on a sizable body of exist- elected representatives form opinions—opin- ing theory about when protest matters (for a ions that may later affect the actual policy review, see Amenta et al. 2010; Andrews initiatives they take or endorse—this study 2004; Biggs and Andrews 2015). draws on an innovative experimental design More concretely, we theorize that who the and an exceptional set of respondents. We protesters are, how they behave, and what examine the process of opinion formation by they think determines the strength of the pro- elected representatives by presenting them test signal and affects the calculations elected with vignettes containing a story signaling the officials make on whether and how to Wouters and Walgrave 363 incorporate the protest signal in their own THE IMPOrtaNCE OF thinking (Gillion 2013; Lohmann 1993). In ELECTED REPRESENtatiVES’ particular, we test Tilly’s (2004) widely cited OPINIONS but untested claim that protest influences power-holders when protesters display wor- Ultimately, the political outcome of any soci- thiness, unity, numbers, and commitment etal signal to power-holders depends on the (WUNC). We conducted a survey-embedded perceptions, calculations, and subsequent vignette experiment with a large sample of actions of elected representatives (Jones, elected politicians in Belgium. These repre- Boushey, and Workman 2006). In the chain sentatives were exposed to manipulated tele- from signal to representation, the attitudes and vision news items of a protest action regarding beliefs of individual politicians matter for the asylum issue. Asylum is a heavily politi- their political decision-making and for poli- cized issue worldwide. In Europe in particu- cies in general (Carnes 2013; Mansbridge lar, it has been high on both the public and 1999; Mondak 1995). Also with regard to the political agenda since the onset of the Syrian impact of protest and social movements, the refugee crisis. In our study, fielded well idea that individual politicians’ opinions mat- before the dramatic increase in refugees ter has gained ground (Burstein 1999; Luders requesting asylum in Europe, the demonstra- 2006; Skrentny 2006). In fact, the social tors criticized the Belgian asylum procedure, movement literature holds that the presence of demanding a more humane process in due “elite allies” is an important, maybe even the time based on clear regularization criteria. In single most important, factor of movement the news item stimuli, the WUNCness of the success (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; asylum protest event varied systematically. Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Cress After exposure, representatives were sur- and Snow 2000; Soule and Olzak 2004). veyed about their own opinion regarding the We argue that at least three aspects of salience of the protest issue, their position on elected representatives’ opinions are relevant the protest issue, and the actions they intended and may affect subsequent actions: (1) the to undertake