Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (2012) 120–132 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsc The Lenoir thesis revisited: Blumenbach and Kant John H. Zammito Department of History, MS-42, Rice University, P.O. Box 1892, Houston, TX 77251-1892, USA article info abstract Article history: Timothy Lenoir launched the historical study of German life science at the end of the 18th century with Available online 25 June 2011 the claim that J. F. Blumenbach’s approach was shaped by his reception of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant: a ‘teleomechanism’ that adopted a strictly ‘regulative’ approach to the character of organisms. It Keywords: now appears that Lenoir was wrong about Blumenbach’s understanding of Kant, for Blumenbach’s Bil- Timothy Lenoir dungstrieb entailed an actual empirical claim. Moreover, he had worked out the decisive contours of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach his theory and he had exerted his maximal influence on the so-called ‘Göttingen School’ before 1795, Immanuel Kant when Lenoir posits the main influence of Kant’s thought took hold. This has crucial significance for the Teleomechanism historical reconstruction of the German life sciences in the period. The Lenoir thesis can no longer serve Reflective judgment Intrinsic purposiveness as the point of departure for that reconstruction. Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 1. Introduction (immanent purposiveness) to organisms was never an objective scientific knowledge claim.1 Lenoir organized his reconstruction of Some thirty years ago, now, in pioneering work on the emer- German life science from 1790 to 1860 into three periods: those of gence of biology in Germany at the end of the 18th century, Timo- ‘vital materialism,’ of ‘developmental morphology,’ and of ‘functional thy Lenoir formulated the thesis that the so-called ‘Göttingen morphology.’ (Lenoir, 1981b, p. 298, 1989) My critique will concern School’ around Johann Friedrich Blumenbach took up methodolog- his claims specifically concerning the ‘vital materialism’ of Blumen- ical guidelines developed by Immanuel Kant and established a bach and the ‘Göttingen School’ in the 1790s.2 While Lenoir has strictly heuristic (or in Kantian language, regulative) notion of ‘tel- many interesting claims concerning ‘teleo-mechanism’ in the nine- eo-mechanism,’ whereby the imputation of natural teleology teenth century, these will not enter into consideration here.3 E-mail address: [email protected] 1 ‘My principal thesis is that the development of biology in Germany during the first half of the nineteenth century was guided by a core of ideas and a program for research set forth initially during the 1790s. The clearest formulation of those ideas is to be found in the writings of the philosopher Immanuel Kant. I do not claim that German biologists discovered a program of research in Kant’s writings which they set out to realize in practice rather that in the latter part of the eighteenth century a number of biologists were seeking to establish a foundation for constructing a consistent body of unified theory for the life sciences which could adapt the methods and conceptual framework of Newtonian science to the special requirements of investigating biological organisms. Kant stepped into this ongoing dialogue and set forth a clear synthesis. It was through Blumenbach and his students that Kant’s special brand of teleology entered biology.’ (Lenoir, 1989, pp. 2–3) See also Lenoir (1978, 1980, 1981a, 1981b, 1988). For thoughtful critiques, see Caneva (1990), Richards (2002). 2 I thank the peer reviewer on my piece for urging me to specify exactly what in Lenoir’s thesis I am disputing and to cite sources. In that light, since my emphasis is on the Kant-Blumenbach relationship, I would point out that it is Lenoir’s articles, not his book of 1982/1989, that spell out the details of his view, as he admits in the book: ‘Elsewhere I have attempted to document in detail the relationship between these two men and the extent to which Blumenbach incorporated Kant’s work into the mature formulation of his ideas.’ (Lenoir, 1989, p. 22) He refers the reader specifically to Lenoir (1980). It is with that text (and the other articles) that I will be primarily engaging. 3 Of course, Kant was for nineteenth-century Germans an eminence fervently to be invoked as a model or warrant. (See Friedman & Nordmann, 2006). Yet whether the Kant they invoked was the historical Kant, and whether, more significantly, they really needed (or even used, rather than mentioned) Kant for their undertakings: these are matters that allow for more than one reading. That is, first: whatever they thought Kant meant (assuming we can establish that), there is a whole guild devoted to jousting over what Kant really meant, and jousters sometimes decide the best way to win the day is to proclaim what he should have meant. Usually that involves dismissing what others have thought Kant meant/should have meant. The nineteenth-century Kant reception falls fully within this conspectus, and Lenoir’s book documents some striking instances of this. Second: the arguments of nineteenth-century biologists typically involved both theoretical and empirical elements that were simply not part of Kant’s possible intellectual horizon, and these, rather than any direct appeal to Kant, appear far more plausibly central to their actual arguments, though Kant was always a rhetorical trump card, if he could be plausibly invoked. In any event, these are not questions here to be pursued. 1369-8486/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2011.05.011 J.H. Zammito / Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (2012) 120–132 121 In Lenoir’s view, Kant’s philosophy of science played a major theory of race after 1795 which he associates with Kant. (Bernas- role ‘in helping to shape the theoretical foundations of the life coni, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c; compare Lagier, 2004) Phillip Sloan sees sciences’ led by Blumenbach after 1790. (Lenoir, 1980, p. 77) a substantial influence of Kant on Blumenbach’s ideas about spe- ‘Initiated by Kant’s probing insights, the goal of uniting the tel- cies and organic form in these years, especially via the work of eological and mechanical frameworks of explanation was a topic his student and associate, Christoph Girtanner, (Sloan, 1979)5 of central importance in discussion on the philosophy of nature There is also evidence in the converse direction, i.e., Kant’s assimila- in the 1790s.’ (Lenoir, 1980, p. 83n) Concretely, Lenoir claimed: tion of Blumenbach’s scientific work into his own exposition of phi- ‘from the late 1780s to the late 1790s Blumenbach’s ideas on losophy of science. Was this a real convergence or was it a mutual natural history underwent a thorough revision in light of Kant’s misunderstanding? (Richards, 2000; compare Jardine, 2000, pp. analysis of the conceptual foundations for the construction of a 11–55) scientific theory of organic form.’ (Lenoir, 1980, p. 77) Lenoir There is no question that Blumenbach increasingly inflected found evidence of ‘a revolution in [Blumenbach’s] whole manner his theory of the Bildungstrieb in language taken from Kant. of thinking about the phenomena of natural history’ in the years There is similarly no question that he incorporated a great deal 1795–1797. (Lenoir, 1980, p. 77) Thus, ‘Blumenbach’s most sig- of Kant’s theory of race into his later writing. (See esp, Blumen- nificant achievement, from our point of view, was to synthesize bach, 1795) My question is whether Blumenbach actually under- some of the best elements of Enlightenment thought on biology stood and accepted the epistemological prescriptions of Kant for [...] in terms of a view of biological organization that he found biological science. Robert Richards has suggested that Blumen- in the writings of Kant.’ (Lenoir, 1981a, p. 115) That thesis has bach’s practice was in fact inconsistent with Kant’s prescriptions, remained a powerful influence on the field to this day, but it and that Kant improperly assimilated Blumenbach’s practices to has serious problems both as a historical claim about the ‘Göt- his prescriptions. (Richards, 2000, 2002, pp. 221–237) I agree tingen School’ and its founder, Blumenbach, as well as for the with Richards. (Zammito, 2003) I believe that Lenoir misunder- larger question of the place of natural teleology in the history stands both Kant and Blumenbach at crucial points, enabling a of modern biology and even for its status as a special science false assimilation of their positions. Lenoir does detect a crucial today. metaphysical and methodological agreement between Kant and Lenoir notes: ‘It cannot be argued that Blumenbach fashioned Blumenbach: ‘it is not possible to reduce life to physics or ex- himself a follower of Kant.’ Instead, ‘Kant’s main contribution to plain biological organization in terms of physical principles. Blumenbach’s work was in making explicit the quite extraordi- Rather, organization must be accepted as the primary given nary assumptions behind the model of the Bildungstrieb.’ (Lenoir, [...] At the limits of mechanical explanation in biology we must 1989, pp. 22, 24) My claim is that these were not Blumenbach’s assume the presence of other types of forces following different assumptions, and that he could never assimilate them as types of laws than those of physics. These forces can never be assumptions, even after he became aware of Kant’s ‘contribu- constructed a priori from other natural forces, but they can be tion.’4 I dispute that any ‘revolution in [Blumenbach’s] whole the object of research.