SECTION 6: AFTERMATHS, 1965-1968 Documents on Raul Castro’s Visit to Eastern Europe, and Cuban-East European Contacts, March-May 1965 Records from the Polish, Bulgarian, and Czech Archives divisions—clearly ranked high on the agenda of meetings d. Note: In March-April 1965, Cuban Defense between communist party representatives, including Raul Minister Raúl Modesto Castro visited the Soviet Castro, who gathered in Moscow. Besides these various Union and several of the Kremlin’s Warsaw Pact allies international issues, bilateral Soviet-Cuban discussions also Ein Eastern Europe. The journey came at a sensitive moment had now perennial subjects to cover—the parlous state of the in both the communist world (and in Cuba’s relations with it) Cuban economy and the level and nature of Soviet-bloc aid, and in the broader Cold War. In Moscow, it was still a time and the continuing rift between Havana and Moscow over of transition following the October 1964 overthrow of Nikita the best means to promote revolution in Latin America (and Khrushchev, and this was the most senior Cuban figure to by extension the Third World), with the Cubans favoring come to meet the new leadership since then.1 It was also a armed guerrilla struggle, after their own triumph and in some moment of increasing tension in the Sino-Soviet split: Soviet respects closer to the more bellicose Chinese line, and the Premier Alexei N. Kosygin had met with Chinese leader Mao Soviets, more cautiously, preferring political or even parlia- Zedong in February, but their conversations had failed to mentary combat by established communist parties.5 produce any progress toward overcoming the friction between Unfortunately, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans have Moscow and Beijing, despite the newly emerging threat posed released records on the Soviet-Cuban discussions that took by US military escalation in Vietnam (see below).2 As it hap- place during Raul Castro’s visit to the USSR. However, the pened, the deepening Sino-Soviet schism coincided with a CWIHP Bulletin is pleased to present translated records of plunge in Sino-Cuban relations, burying Havana’s hopes of exchanges with the Cuban defense minister from three of not only improving their own bilateral relations with Mao Moscow’s Warsaw Pact allies—the Poles, the Bulgarians, and but even, perhaps, trying to mediate between Mao and the the Czechoslovaks. These records, procured from communist post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership in Moscow—in early party files in archives in Warsaw, Sofia, and Prague, offer February (just prior to Kosygin’s arrival), Ernesto “Che” considerable fresh evidence both on Cuba’s relations with Guevara had visited Beijing, but had disappointing talks the Soviet bloc—political, economic, and military—and that failed to surmount differences, and unlike his prior visit on Cuban (and East European) views of the international (in November 1960), he was not received personally by the situation at a time of global and communist-world turbulence. Chinese Communist Party chief.3 Further complicating the They include records of Raul Castro’s top-level discussions impact of these evident and growing divisions in the commu- with communist leaders in Warsaw and Sofia, and then, nist world, moreover, were the fresh signs of a new military after his return to Havana in early April, with the visiting confrontation between the United States and the communist- Czechoslovak defense minister, whose military delegation bloc in Southeast Asia: in the early months of 1965, precisely also met with Fidel Castro and President Osvaldo Dorticos as Raúl Castro traveled around the Soviet bloc, Washington (records included), as well as a record of a conversation the sharply escalated its involvement in Vietnam, and indicated following month in Prague between senior Cuban communist that steeper hikes were to follow. In particular, in February figure Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and a top Czechoslovak party and March 1965—following communist guerrilla assaults official. In addition to discussing issues of current import, as against US forces in Pleiku and intense secret planning and perhaps the highest-ranking Cuban to visit Eastern Europe discussions in Washington agreeing on the need to intensify since the fall of 1962, Raúl Castro also reviewed—especially a US military or else risk the collapse of the anti-commu- in his conversation with Polish communist leader Władysław nist regime in Saigon—the Johnson administration began Gomulka)—the still quite recent history of the Cuban Missile bombing North Vietnam (i.e., the Democratic Republic of Crisis, adding his own (still largely missing from the record) Vietnam) and sending additional troops, beginning with a perspective on the installation of the missiles (including deployment of Marines to guard the US air base in Danang his own July 1962 trip to Moscow), the crisis itself, and its in northern South Vietnam.4 The question of the communist consequences. Besides offering a snapshot of Cuban-Soviet- world’s response to this building conflict—and whether the bloc relations, they also provide some rare glimpses of Raúl new threat could enhance unity and cooperation between Castro, of one of the more reclusive members of the Cuban the Soviets and Chinese or, conversely, only accentuate their leadership (especially in contrast to Fidel!), who nevertheless 764 Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 17/18 has long been recognized as one of the revolutionary regime’s know a lot and we are well-informed, even though some mat- most powerful figures—a status confirmed more than four ters were not clear to us. We did not have a clear picture as decades after the events recounted here, when he formally to your position regarding the controversy [spór]6 within the succeeded his ailing brother in 2008 as Cuba’s president.-- international workers’ movement. When this dispute mani- J.H. fested itself in the harshest ways, it seemed to us that you were positioning yourselves somewhere in the middle and that you were not declaring yourself clearly. We would readily listen to how this looks now. The position assumed by you in Moscow is uniform with ours, with the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union], and with most parties which participated I. Polish Documents in the meeting. I recently read Cde. Fidel Castro’s speech to students in Memorandum of Conversation between Havana. Besides, we published it in our press. This speech Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro was directed against the aggression of the US imperialists and Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka, towards Vietnam. It was not difficult for us to decipher to Warsaw, 20 March 1965 whom it was addressed. It contains a sharp criticism of the CPC’s [Communist Party of China’s; CCP’s] position towards Present Vietnam, as well as its position toward the international work- ers’ movement. Cdes. J. Cyrankiewicz It seems to us that, due to your familiarization with the Z. Kliszko actual state of affairs, some evolution took place regarding M. Spychalski your positions. M. Moczar The second issue is not quite clear to us: We do not know G. Korczyński your ideas as to the prospects of legalizing the Cuban revolu- A. Werblan tion, organizing the organs of the local authority as well as J. Czesak building a party which, as we know, is in the process of being built. You surely must have some ideas regarding these mat- From the Cuban side ters. Such matters are hazy, not clear to us. If we may, could Cdes. R. Castro you also perhaps say a few words about the economic situa- tion and the prospects with regard to this issue? Carlos Olivares Sanchez – Cuba’s ambassador in Moscow Raul Castro Fernando L. Flores Ibarra – Cuba’s ambassador in Warsaw The news about the [Sino-Soviet] divergences [rozbieżnosci]7 After exchanging a few remarks on the subject of the destruc- reached us in 1960. We saw how they were developing and tion in Warsaw and its reconstruction, and about a number how the polemics were sharpening, how it turned into a heat- of Polish citizens who died in the last war, Cde. R. Castro ed [ostra]8 struggle and what damage it caused to the unity of wishes to express his thanks one more time for the invitation the socialist camp and the international workers’ movement. to Poland extended by Cde. [Zenon] Kliszko and states that We saw a fractional tendency being developed. We could not he highly values cooperation with the Polish delegation, with assume any position at that time, as not everything was clear which he had a few conversations at a meeting in Moscow. to us. Besides, our comrades also had contradictory opinions. Cuba’s position is undoubtedly known to us, but he would Some were leaning to one side while others to another. At that be willing to inform or explain what may be of interest to us. time our main task was the consolidation and protection of our revolution. Cde. Gomułka We cannot help but appreciate the activities of counter- revolutionaries in the United States of America as well as We are delighted with your visit. Cde. Kliszko invited you on those in countries of Latin America which are conducting behalf of our Political Bureau – he consulted with us on this intensive training for counter-revolutionaries. The social base matter. We advised that he take advantage of this opportunity in their countries is very weak for their activities. We also and invite you. What can be of interest to us? Generally, we made some efforts in the field of the economy. We now know 765 that the course towards such an abrupt liquidation of mono- regard to establishing international inspection whose task was culture was a mistake.