NEPAL’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS Asia Report N°128 – 26 February 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE END OF THE 1990 CONSTITUTION ............................................................... 2 A. IN WITH A BANG ...................................................................................................................2 B. SECOND THOUGHTS ..............................................................................................................3 C. OUT WITH A WHIMPER..........................................................................................................3 III. THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION............................................................................... 5 A. THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION DRAFTING COMMITTEE ...........................................................5 1. Process .......................................................................................................................5 2. Public participation....................................................................................................6 3. Substance ...................................................................................................................6 4. Lessons ......................................................................................................................7 B. THE FINAL DOCUMENT .........................................................................................................7 1. How it was decided....................................................................................................7 2. Major features............................................................................................................8 3. Centralisation of power..............................................................................................9 IV. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY........................................................................... 10 A. GOALS ................................................................................................................................10 B. ELECTIONS..........................................................................................................................11 C. PROCEDURES ......................................................................................................................12 D. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AS LEGISLATURE ................................................................13 E. DURATION ..........................................................................................................................14 V. THE POLITICAL PLAYERS..................................................................................... 15 A. THE MAINSTREAM PARTIES ................................................................................................15 1. Views on constitutional substance and procedures..................................................15 2. Democratic reform...................................................................................................16 B. THE MAOISTS .....................................................................................................................17 1. Views on constitutional substance and procedures..................................................18 2. Democratic reform...................................................................................................19 C. THE RELUCTANT, THE RESISTANT AND THE REBELLIOUS....................................................19 VI. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION........................................................................................ 23 A. EDUCATION, DISSEMINATION AND DISCUSSION ..................................................................23 B. INCLUSIVENESS...................................................................................................................24 C. FROM CONSULTATION TO PARTICIPATION...........................................................................25 D. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE .............................................................................................26 VII. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE............................................................................ 27 A. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICALITIES .......................................................................................27 B. POLITICAL CONTEXT...........................................................................................................28 C. THE UN MISSION................................................................................................................28 D. AREAS OF ENGAGEMENT.....................................................................................................29 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 31 APPENDICES A. MAP OF NEPAL ...................................................................................................................33 B. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1740 (2007).......................................34 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................36 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA...............................................................37 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................39 Asia Report N°128 26 February 2007 NEPAL’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS With the formation of an interim legislature and international constituencies, primarily the major incorporating mainstream parties and Maoists, Nepal’s party leaderships and India. If their judgement is out peace process hinges on writing a constitution that of step with the national mood – as it often has been permanently ends the conflict, addresses the widespread in the past – it will produce new problems. grievances that fuelled it and guards against the eruption of new violence. Most political actors have The constitutional process has to build a complex accepted the Maoist demand for a constituent equilibrium among elites. It must provide political assembly (CA) tasked with framing a new dispensation, space for the Maoists while limiting their options to although royalists are worried over the future of the use violence or coercion against political opponents. monarchy, which has in effect been suspended. The The consolidation of a competitive multiparty system major challenge is to maintain leadership-level consensus naturally bolsters the mainstream political parties but while building a broad-based and inclusive process in the short term will heighten their differences with that limits room for spoilers and ensures long-term each other and may encourage a return to the less than popular legitimacy. Recent unrest in the Tarai plains edifying tactics of earlier parliamentary politics. illustrates the dangers of ignoring popular discontent. Managing the transition in the palace’s role may also Key political actors need to prepare more seriously present difficulties: political leaders have skillfully for the CA. Led by the newly established United stripped royal powers comprehensively but gradually, Nations mission in Nepal (UNMIN), the international with no single step sufficient to prompt a backlash. community should pressure all sides to abide by their But a decisive alteration of traditional power structures stated commitments and global norms and provide will still encounter resistance from conservative technical assistance to the electoral process. institutions – not just the palace but also elements of the army, judiciary and bureaucracy. The interim constitution promulgated on 15 January 2007 established a framework for constitutional So far the process has concentrated on building elite change and enshrined the guiding principles agreed in consensus at the expense of intense political debate or earlier negotiations. The new constitution’s drafting extensive public consultation. A handful of SPA and process has to address the twin objectives of Maoist leaders have controlled closed-door peacebuilding and longer-term political reform. It negotiations; limited parliamentary scrutiny has not offers an opportunity to cement the Maoists’ integration even extended to recognising the concept of an into mainstream democratic politics, to determine the opposition. The interim constitution has granted the monarchy’s fate and to tackle long-standing ethnic, prime minister and cabinet sweeping authority, regional and caste fissures. But successful constitutional subject to minimal checks and balances; the processes require a delicate balance of elite compromised independence of institutions such as the accommodations and broad public participation. If the judiciary has weakened the principle of separation of joint mainstream party/Maoist leadership fails to powers. The inclusion of provisions such as the balance these sometimes competing demands, or the unrestricted authority to grant pardons suggests that process stalls, violent conflict may emerge once more. interim arrangements may enable the political elite to sweep past misdeeds under the carpet. There is also a tension over timescales – a speedy process would maintain momentum but could cut too Warnings