STRENGTHENING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE BY IDENTIFYING AND REDRESSING RECURRING GAPS AND SYSTEMIC BARRIERS: LESSONS FROM A CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY REGIONAL RESILIENCY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM A dissertation presented by Russell E. Bowman to The School of Public Policy and Urban Affairs In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of Law and Public Policy Northeastern University Boston, Massachusetts April, 2016 1 STRENGTHENING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE BY IDENTIFYING AND REDRESSING RECURRING GAPS AND SYSTEMIC BARRIERS: LESSONS FROM A CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY REGIONAL RESILIENCY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM by Russell E. Bowman ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Law and Public Policy in the College of Social Sciences and Humanities of Northeastern University April, 2016 2 Abstract This dissertation explores the concept of disaster “resilience” in the context of homeland security, in general, and critical infrastructure, in particular, as assessed at local and regional levels. It features two related, but distinct research foci: (1) identifying and exploring recurring “resilience gaps,” and (2) identifying and exploring systemic barriers that allow such gaps to emerge, or to persist. It employs content analysis and cross-case synthesis of 33 in-depth case studies generated by the Department of Homeland Security’s Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP). In so doing, this research also explores the ability of – and challenges with using – the concept of resilience as an operational construct for reducing “all hazards” risk and improving homeland security more broadly. Building on the work of those who study the resilience of communities and critical infrastructure assets and systems, especially with respect to their interaction with the communities and larger systems within which they are situated, this dissertation validates prior research by applying similar analyses to “new” data (i.e., the RRAP case studies). In brief, the RRAP data suggest that four recurring resilience gaps exist across many, if not most, infrastructure sectors and geographic regions. Specifically, these include: (1) a dependence on energy, aggravated by an insufficiency or complete absence of back-up power systems; (2) the fact that response and recovery plans and planning seldom include all relevant stakeholders necessary to address known hazards in a comprehensive manner; (3) the presence of numerous single or critical points of failure; and (4) a related lack of redundancy, insufficient system capacity, or both, that diminishes the resilience of many infrastructure systems. Additionally, this dissertation’s analysis of 33 RRAP Resiliency Assessments affirms the prevalence of five systemic barriers to improving resilience: (1) the nation continues to face 3 significant shortcomings in emergency response and recovery coordination efforts at the regional and cross-regional levels; (2) there is a widespread lack of visibility or understanding of how critical infrastructure components are inter-connected and how systems are dependent or interdependent on one another; (3) there is a dearth of important critical infrastructure information (beyond dependencies and interdependencies) that is available to cognizant authorities and operators – either because they do not understand why they should seek or insist on gaining access to information that would resolve certain “unknowns,” or because those in possession of relevant information are reluctant to share it; (4) there are insufficient incentives (and funding, in particular) for investing in resilience; and, (5) efficiency is often valued over ensuring continuity of function. Drawing on these findings, this work explains how there is clear benefit to adopting a systems-based, function-focused view of resilience that is hazard-agnostic. It also suggests the importance of further study concerning the barriers that underlie resilience gaps to facilitate broader understanding of the challenges we face, and proposes a framework for divining and analyzing linkages between common gaps and barriers. In closing, this dissertation suggests ways to further exploit the DHS program that is the focus of this research, the necessity of sharing subsequent DHS Resiliency Assessments more widely, and the related need to make the RRAP data on which the program’s assessments are based more accessible to researchers. 4 Acknowledgements Like the dependencies and interdependencies noted in many of the infrastructure systems studied in this research, this dissertation is closely intertwined with the work of many others, and dependent on the insight and assistance of parties too numerous to mention. That said, I wish to recognize several individuals without whom the present work would not have been possible. First, I wish to thank Dr. Stephen Flynn, whose vision, mentorship, and longstanding passion for improving national resilience continue to inspire my efforts. Second, I am indebted to Dr. Matthias Ruth, Director of the School of Public Policy and Urban Affairs; and Dr. David Alderson, Director of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Infrastructure Defense; for their patience, invaluable guidance, and timey and candid feedback throughout the research process underlying this work. I owe a similar debt of gratitude to my colleagues at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy whose staunch support, which included ensuring the time and space needed to think and write, enabled me to aggressively pursue this research. I also extend a special thank you to Ms. Jamie Richards, Mr. Daniel Genua, Mr. William McNamara, Mr. Caleb Slaton, Mr. Duane Verner, and the entire RRAP team at DHS and at Argonne National Laboratory, on whose work the present effort builds. Finally, and most importantly, I wish to publicly thank my wife Sarah, daughter Sadie, and son Cooper, whose unfailing love and support provide the rock-solid foundation on which all else is built. While each of the aforementioned individuals influenced this work, the views expressed herein are mine, and mine alone. They should not be construed as official, or as reflecting the views of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, the U.S. Coast Guard, or the Department of Homeland Security. 5 Table of Contents Abstract ..............................................................................................................................2 Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................5 Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................6 Chapter 1: Introduction - The Rise of “Resilience” ...............................................................7 Chapter 2: Literature Review - Defining and Assessing Resilience ......................................17 Chapter 3: Research Design and Analytical Methods ...........................................................54 Chapter 4: Results of RRAP Case Coding and Analysis .......................................................83 Chapter 5: Conclusions, Areas for Future Research, Broader Implications ..........................135 Appendix A: Northeastern Institutional Review Board Documentation ..............................169 References ..............................................................................................................................173 6 Chapter 1 I. Introduction Disasters – such as hurricanes and other extreme weather events, wildfires, oil and hazardous chemical spills, pandemics, intentional acts of terrorism – are increasing in both frequency and complexity (OECD 2003; National Academy of Sciences 2012). Superstorm Sandy, yearly wildfires throughout California and the American Southwest, numerous recent rail car explosions, record snowstorms, the 2014 Ebola outbreak, and the emerging Zika virus threat immediately come to mind. As a result, crisis management, vulnerability and risk assessment, and disaster research have deservedly received heightened political attention and intellectual inquiry. Correspondingly, the field of disaster research has evolved substantially over the past century. Starting from the sociological orientation of Samuel Prince’s study of the devastating 1917 fire and explosion of the French munitions ship MONT BLANC in the Port of Halifax, disaster research has grown to include efforts that incorporate an ever-growing variety of perspectives (Phillips 2014; Perry 2007; Scanlon 1988). These include the study of: phases of disaster (i.e., planning/preparation, prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery); hazard and agent types (natural, accidental / technical, intentional); systems theory (including studies of the built environment, physical domains, ecological systems, social networks, and the interactions among them), system complexity (including the original “Disaster Research Center typology” for organized disaster response1), and, increasingly in more recent years, the viewpoint of 1 What eventually came to be known as the Disaster Research Center (four part) typology was a simple means of classifying organized responses to disasters in terms of (1) the types of organizational entities involved (old or new), and (2) the types of tasks these entities were forced to undertake (regular