Journal of Peace Research 2015, Vol. 52(1) 62–75 Enemies with benefits? Violent rivalry and ª The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permission: terrorist group longevity sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0022343314550538 jpr.sagepub.com Brian J Phillips Department of International Studies, Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE), Mexico City Abstract Terrorist organizations often attack each other, but we know little about how this affects the involved groups. Some states encourage or turn a blind eye toward terrorist group interorganizational violence, hoping that it destroys at least one of the groups involved. This article argues that – contrary to the wishes of such governments – violent rivalries can contribute to the longevity of participating terrorist groups. Violent rivalries encourage civilians to take a side, inspire innovation, provide new incentives to group members, and spoil peace talks. Some of these mechanisms should be especially likely between rivals of different political goals (interfield rivalries), instead of between rivals seek- ing the same primary goal (intrafield rivalries). Illustrative cases in Colombia and Northern Ireland show that the theorized mechanisms occur in diverse environments. Quantitative global analysis of terrorist groups from 1987 to 2005, using original data on interorganizational violence, suggests that violent rivalries are generally associated with group longevity. Further analysis suggests that when rivalries are disaggregated by type, only interfield rivalries are positively associated with group longevity. Participation in violent rivalry is never found to increase a group’s chance of ending. The results suggest the importance of studying interorganizational dynamics, and raise questions about the notion of encouraging a violent rivalry as a way to hurt an involved terrorist group. Keywords event history analysis, organizational dynamics, terrorism, terrorist organizations How do violent rivalries affect terrorist groups? These Violent rivalries are also interesting because of relationships could harm involved terrorist organiza- broader issues relating to interorganizational dynamics tions, leading to their destruction, yet there are also rea- of terrorist groups. Many recent analyses of terrorist sons to expect that rivalries could spur on groups, groups have essentially assumed groups operate in isola- contributing to their endurance (e.g. Crenshaw, 1985: tion, failing to incorporate relationship attributes. The 483; Lichbach, 1995: 208–210, and see below). Beyond few studies to systematically explore effects of terrorist this particular puzzle, it is important to understand vio- group interactions have shown important conse- lent rivalries because sometimes governments turn a quences, but most have focused on cooperation (Asal, blind eye toward this behavior, hoping that it devastates Ackerman & Rethemeyer, 2012; Asal & Rethemeyer, involved groups. Government security forces have also 2008; Horowitz & Potter, 2013; Phillips, 2014). Stud- supported one terrorist group as it attacks another, hop- ies of terrorist group competition have tended to look at ing to destroy the targeted organization.1 the outcome of the level of violence more than the fate of involved groups (Bloom, 2004; Chenoweth, 2010; Findley & Young, 2012; Nemeth, 2014). Furthermore, 1 In Colombia, elements of the security forces and legislature supported the Autodefensas (Romero, 2003). A similar situation occurred in Turkey with Turkish Hezbollah (Pope, 1992), and in Corresponding author: Spain with the Anti-Terrorist Liberation Group (Woodworth, 2002). [email protected] Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at Queens University on August 12, 2015 Phillips 63 these studies generally conceptualize ‘competition’ as must stay relevant to their members, and to some degree political competition, and not necessarily intergroup vio- to the public, in order to survive. lence. Civil war scholars conduct research on rivalry A growing body of research seeks to address the between rebel groups in the context of civil war, but this important question of terrorist group longevity. Group research often looks at how the war is affected, instead of attributes seem to play an important role, such as the consequences for groups.2 number of members (Blomberg, Gaibulloev & Sandler, This study seeks to address these shortcomings in ter- 2011; Jones & Libicki, 2008), or motivations such as rorism research by examining how violent rivalries affect religion or ethnonationalism (Carter, 2012). Most stud- group longevity. Scholars have made progress under- ies of terrorist group tenure overlook interorganizational standing why some terrorist organizations last longer relationships. than others (Jones & Libicki, 2008; Cronin, 2009; Terrorist groups interact in important ways, and scho- Blomberg, Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2011; Carter, 2012; lars increasingly analyze the consequences of such inter- Miller, 2012), but most of these studies have over- actions. As noted previously, the majority of these studies looked intergroup dynamics. I argue that having a vio- look at cooperation. However, groups affect each other lent rival ultimately contributes to group longevity. through other types of interaction, such as physically This occurs through four mechanisms: encouraging attacking each other or other groups’ supporters. This is civilians to pick a side to support, fomenting innova- violent rivalry. It is comparable to what the interstate war tion, providing additional incentives to group mem- literature describes as rivalry, which it in turn defines as bers, and spoiling peace talks. ‘militarized competition’ (e.g. Diehl & Goertz, 2000). The next section defines terms and presents the argu- ment. Then I discuss several illustrative cases, to demon- Interfield and intrafield violent rivalries strate the plausibility of the argument in contexts as Between 1987 and 2005, about 15% of terrorist groups diverse as Colombia and Northern Ireland. The empiri- had a violent rival at some point. These relationships take cal section introduces new global data on terrorist group a variety of forms. One distinction that can be made violent rivalries, 1987–2005, and explains quantitative involves the relative goals of rivals. Some violent rivals tests. Results suggest that having a violent rival is asso- tend to support substantially different primary goals, ciated with a reduced likelihood of the group ending. such as a left-wing group and a right-wing group, or Additional analysis suggests that the longevity-enhancing groups representing competing ethnic communities. benefits of rivalry only occur for competitors with sub- These can be referred to as interfield rivals, drawing on stantially different political goals, interfield rivals, and not the notion of a ‘field’ of organizations making up a wider for rivals from the same broader movement, intrafield riv- social movement.3 The second category of violent rivals, als. The article concludes with suggestions for future intrafield rivals, includes pairs of competitors that sup- research. port the same primary goal, such as a communist revolu- tion or rights for the same ethnic community. This can also be thought of as infighting (Bakke, Cunningham & Terrorist groups, violent rivalries, and Seymour, 2012: 273). Examples are the Shining Path vs. consequences the Tu´pac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, and Hamas Terrorism is the use or threat of violence by non-state vs. Fatah. actors for the purpose of inciting fear in a much wider audience, to bring about political change (e.g. Enders Effects of violent rivalries & Sandler, 2012). Terrorist groups are subnational polit- Lichbach (1995: 208–210) notes that the literature is ical organizations that use terrorism (Phillips, forthcom- divided on the question of whether competition between ing). These groups, like other violent political groups, dissident groups should ultimately help or hurt them. face what Lichbach (1995: 16) calls ‘the rebel’s dilemma’ Crenshaw (1985: 483) argues that when terrorist groups or ‘the improbability of extensive collective dissent’. Dis- face stress from competing with each other, group mem- sident groups want sympathetic individuals to join them, bers might defect or the group might splinter. Consistent but costs to the individuals can be high. These groups with this, Staniland (2012) shows that in certain cases of ethnic conflict, intergroup ‘fratricide’ leads members to 2 Recent exceptions include Driscoll (2012), Cunningham, Bakke & Seymour (2012), and Staniland (2012). 3 Ithankananonymousreviewerforsuggestingthisterminology. Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at Queens University on August 12, 2015 64 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 52(1) defect to join pro-state militias. Beyond internal issues, vio- terrorist groups leads to innovations (Bloom, 2004), lent rivalries could lead to the destruction of one group at consistent with research on firms (Porter, 1985) and the hands of another. This happened in Sri Lanka in the social movements (Tarrow, 1989). 1980s (Bush, 2004). The potential for these outcomes is Violent rivalries should also contribute to terrorist part of the reasoning behind government and popular group longevity by providing new incentives for group apathy when terrorists target each other. It is also why some members and potential members. Crenshaw (1985), states have at least indirectly supported certain terrorist drawing on Wilson (1973), argues that non-material groups. However, my