Feeling, Emotion, and Imagination: In Defence of Collingwood’s Expression Theory of Art In The Principles of Art ( !"#), %& '& Collingwood arg(es that art is the imaginati)e expression of emotion& *o m(ch the worse, then, for Collingwood& The theory seems hopelessly inade+(ate to the tas, of capt(ring art’s extension: of encompassing all the wor,s that we generally s(ppose sho(ld -e ro(nded (p (nder the concept& .(mero(s artwor,s, and se)eral art forms, ha)e no o-)io(s in)ol)ement with emotion& /(t it wo(ld -e s(rprising were Collingwood philistine eno(gh to thin, that art is always and only concerned with +(otidian affecti)e states s(ch as anger, fear, or lo)e& 1ost li,ely, he has some more sophisticated notions of emotion and expression in mind& And I’ll arg(e that those sophisticated notions can be mo(lded into an extensionally ade+(ate version of the expression theory& If we interpret Collingwood as saying that expression is a partic(lar application of imagination, that imagination is the fac(lty that re23nes ideas of emotions, and that 4emotions5 are the phenomenal feels of experiences, then his expression theory can accommodate apparently pro-lematic artwor,s& That’s plenty for one paper, so I won’t -e concerned with Collingwood’s (alleged$ idealism abo(t artwor,s, nor with se)eral +(estions one might ha)e abo(t the expression theory that emerges&6 I aim only to meet the extensional challenge, and in so doing, to explore Collingwood’s tho(ghts abo(t imagination, expression, and, especially, emotion& . Collingwood in context Collingwood’s expression theory is of7en treated alongside those of se)eral near-contemporaries, incl(ding Tolstoy ( #!9), Croce ( !:6), and Dewey ( !";$&" Despite their differences, some 23nical, some s(-stantial, these theories all commit to two theses: f3rst, that art essentially in)ol)es expression< second, that what is expressed is an artist’s state of mind& Any relati)ely faithf(l interpretation of Collingwood’s theory m(st respect these two commitments, -(t only in the senses he intends them to -e respected& =is 23rst commitment is easy to expo(nd, -(t his second is more complicated, and -est explored in relation to a history of expression theories r(nning from Plato to Kant and his Romantic followers& Collingwood and contemporaneo(s expression theorists claim that wor,s of art essentially, or at least normati)ely, express things& Expression theories so (nderstood contrast with, for example, mimetic or representational theories of art, according to which artwor,s imitate or represent the world& The gl(t of expression theories in the 23rst half of the 6:th cent(ry was perhaps the last serio(s, concerted mo)ement to attempt an essentialist de23nition of art—a speci23cation of what art is in terms of something intrinsic to artwor,s& Anti-essentialism has dominated post-war aesthetics, owing in large part to the practice of artists (see A6 -elow$&; Insofar as contemporary aesthetics is interested in expression, it’s interested in the expressiveness of art: the +(estion of how some artwor,s might (seem All unattri-(ted page references are to this boo,& 6 E&g. whether an artwork, being mindless, can really express anything (Da)ies 19!;$& " Hospers ( !9 $ presents a nice selection& ; Anti8essentialism has two versions& One, inspired by Wittgenstein, arg(es that def3ning art is impossi-le: it’s a family resem-lance concept (CeitD 19EF$. The other gi)es def3nitions in terms of extrinsic properties of works, s(ch as their relations to artworld instit(tions or to historical exemplars (Dic,ie 19#;< Le)inson 1!!:$& to$ express things s(ch as emotions, independently of whether the artist e)er felt the rele)ant feelings, and absol(tely not as a de23nitional feat(re of art&E A faithf(l interpretation of Collingwood m(st preser)e his intention to define art, not merely to descri-e a +(ality of some art& Certainly, there’s plenty of text(al e)idence that this is his aim& F =owe)er, Aaron %idley arg(es that Collingwood offers a de23nition that’s deli-erately 4(ninformati)e5 (%idley !!#, ";$& It says that all artwor,s are expressions—expression is not a property they ha)e, -(t the (or a) ,ind of thing they are& .othing m(ch general can -e said abo(t which things will fall (nder that ,ind, or what properties they’ll fall (nder it in )irt(e of: we can’t say anything de23niti)e a-o(t how things might manifest expression, or which things (or sorts of things$ might -e a-le to do so& *o if essentialists aim to gi)e a r(le for determining the art stat(s of o-Hects, or to say what ,inds of o-Hects can -e artwor,s, Collingwood isn’t an essentialist& %idley is pro-ably right, -(t e)en if Collingwood isn’t an essentialist in that sense, he’s all the same aiming to de23ne art, and a faithf(l interpretation sho(ld respect this aim&9 A faithf(l interpretation m(st also preser)e Collingwood’s commitment to the idea that an artwor, expresses an artist’s state of mind& *ome expression theorists arg(e that artists express something else& For example, %o-ert *tec,er ( !!6$ points o(t that, in Ion, >lato s(ggests that poets are literally 4inspired5 -y the m(ses or gods: they take in the di)ine -reath, and exhale it transm(ted into words&# This is an expression theory, insofar as it de23nes poetry (and, -y anachronistic extension, art$ as the expression of something& /(t what’s expressed doesn’t exactly -elong to the poet< she’s a cond(it, performing a comm(nicati)e role&! >erhaps, as >eter ?i)y ( !9#$ s(ggests, Thomas %eid 23rst proposed the idea that artists express their own states of mind, -(t Collingwood is closer to ?ant& As >aul '(yer ( !!;$ arg(es, despite the s(ggestions of formalism in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant’s settled view is that “23ne art5 is concerned with the expression of 4aesthetic ideas5, which are representations of imagination to which no determinate concept of reason is ade+(ate (?ant 1990, §49 3 "I;$& *o ?ant holds that artists express things that are, in some sense, (parts oJ$ their states of mind& And there are f(rther signi23cant similarities between ?ant’s )iew and Collingwood’s& For example, ?ant says that there can -e no r(le or techni+(e for expression (AA;9I#), and so does Collingwood: he arg(es in the 23rst part of the Principles that art isn’t craf7, a technical prod(ction process with a predetermined end& 'i)en this, it’s somewhat pec(liar that Collingwood doesn’t make more explicit reference to ?ant’s aesthetics& The reason he doesn’t, I thin,, is his preocc(pation with the version of the expression theory that Kant inspired in the Romantic poets, partic(larly Coleridge& : E S(Danne Langer arg(ably makes the f3rst steps away from expression towards expressi)eness in Philosophy in a New Key ( !;6$, tho(gh Feeling and Form ( !E"$ mo)es back towards expression. Q(estions a-o(t expressi)eness are of7en explored with reference to m(sic (e.g. Ki)y 19#:< Da)ies 19!;$& F “We m(st proceed to a def3nition of the term ‘art’” (p. 2$ is one of many telling examples. A referee s(ggests that Collingwood is o0fering a “norm” of art, not a def3nition. I belie)e the weight of text(al e)idence bears against this s(ggestion, b(t if yo(’re tempted by it, yo( can read e)erything I say as exploration of a ()ery important$ norm& 9 Ridley’s book is short and sweet: there’s m(ch to like a-o(t the readings o0fered& I hope that the present paper and %idley’s interpretation are mostly complementary& # Plato is of7en associated with a representational theory of art, in the context of his banishment of poets in the Republic. /(t Collingwood himself arg(es that this is a misinterpretation (ch. III §3$. Plato disting(ishes representational poets from others, and banishes only the former< so there m(st be some other class of poets& ! The cond(it idea reappears in the broadly Marxist theory that art is an expression of aspects of the artist’s society. Paul Taylor makes a con)incing case that W. E. B. D( Bois is an expression theorist in a similar sense (Taylor 2:15 ch. 3$& : Admittedly, the text(al e)idence in The Principles is circ(mstantial; this is beca(se, as Collingwood says, he gi)es “hardly any space … to criticiDing other people’s aesthetic doctrines5, e)en tho(gh he has “st(died them” (p. vi$. So we only ha)e intimations of his targets& B(t the tenor of the theory and the tone of his comments tell in fa)o(r of this anti8%omantic acco(nt of his moti)ation (see, e.g. ch. XIV §6)& 6 Collingwood pro-ably (nderstood ?ant’s aesthetics< Coleridge ass(redly didn’t& =is writings on imagination, mind, and art are conf(sed and conf(sing appropriations of ?antian ideas& =e holds that artists possess a partic(lar fac(lty which allows them to express things that the rest of (s can’t& It’s not +(ite apparent what Coleridge thin,s this fac(lty is, -(t his di)ision of imagination into primary and secondary ,inds, and attri-(tion of the second to artists only, gi)es (s some notion& This secondary imagination facilitates a ,ind of deep-di)ing into one’s own psyche& Therein, the artist, and the artist alone, 23nds things that are worth expressing: feelings of an especially sensiti)e mien, or (ni+(ely re)elatory insights into worlds and li)es& Exactly how this happens is something of a mystery, not least to artists themsel)es< the art po(rs forth in a torrent of inexplicable inspiration& Whether this is a legitimate reading of ?ant is open to +(estion& 6 /(t the point is that Coleridge’s )ersion of the expression theory attri-(tes to artists (ni+(e fac(lties, and special states of mind, o)er which they ha)e little or