This article was downloaded by: [Griffith University] On: 22 September 2011, At: 20:14 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Policing and Society Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gpas20 The evolution of police oversight in Australia Tim Prenzler a a Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Griffith University, Mt Gravatt Campus, Brisbane, Queensland, 4122, Australia Available online: 28 Jun 2011 To cite this article: Tim Prenzler (2011): The evolution of police oversight in Australia, Policing and Society, 21:3, 284-303 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2011.570866 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and- conditions This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. 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Policing & Society Vol. 21, No. 3, September 2011, 284Á303 The evolution of police oversight in Australia Tim Prenzler* Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Griffith University, Mt Gravatt Campus, Brisbane, Queensland 4122, Australia (Received 27 July 2010; final version received 25 November 2010) This paper reviews developments in police oversight in the last decade in Australia’s eight jurisdictions. Significant variation remains in the structure and responsibilities of oversight agencies, but there has been an ongoing trend towards replacing an ombudsman model with a public sector-wide commission model. There has also been a general convergence in terms of increased powers and an enlarged range of anti-corruption tactics. Change has been driven by ongoing revelations of misconduct or concerns about potential misconduct by police, public servants and politicians. Despite improvements it is argued that there is considerable room for better practice, especially in enlarging the scope of independent investigations and adjudication by integrity commissions. Keywords: police oversight; complaints against police; police corruption; police integrity Background ‘Civilian’ Á or ‘external’ or ‘citizen’ Á oversight developed in response to concerns that police internal investigations were compromised by the tendency to protect colleagues and cover up misconduct. The repeated failures of internal investigations and discipline drove the evolution towards civilian oversight mainly from the 1950s in English-speaking countries (Finn 2001). The powers and functions of these oversight agencies often vary significantly, but two basic models have been identified: (1) a ‘minimal review model’ where agencies audit police complaints investigations, recommend changes to procedures or disciplinary decisions and respond to appeals from dissatisfied complainants; and (2) a ‘civilian control model’ where agencies Downloaded by [Griffith University] at 20:14 22 September 2011 conduct independent investigations, deploy a variety of advanced investigative tools (including compulsory hearings and covert surveillance), have a role in disciplinary decisions and prosecutions and evaluate police internal corruption prevention strategies (Prenzler 2000, Seneviratne 2004). The civilian control model has frequently been resisted by police managers and police unions who wish to keep complaints processing in-house and by governments wishing to minimise costs and avoid embarrassing exposure of misconduct. Advocates typically include civil libertarians, academics, leaders of ethnic minority groups and progressive politicians concerned about police abuses. Public opinion and complainant surveys evidence strong support for a large role for independent agencies; while surveys of police show mixed opinions, including some support for *Email: [email protected] ISSN 1043-9463 print/ISSN 1477-2728 online # 2011 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/10439463.2011.570866 http://www.informaworld.com Policing & Society 285 the principle of independent investigations (Prenzler 2000). Despite this, the review model remains dominant, representing a political compromise between competing advocates. At the same time, internationally there is a slow ongoing trend towards the adoption of many features of the civilian control model. In England and Wales, the 1981 Scarman Report into the policing of race riots led to the establishment in 1985 of the Police Complaints Authority (Maguire and Corbett 1991). The 1999 ‘Stephen Lawrence Inquiry’ was critical of the Authority’s reliance on police investigators, and weaknesses in the disciplinary process were seen as exacerbating problems of minority dissatisfaction with police (MacPherson 1999). In response to these and other criticisms, the Home Office created the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) in 2004. The IPCC has a regional presence and is obliged to carry out independent investigations of serious incidents, such as deaths or serious injuries inflicted by police. It also investigates all allegations involving senior police and all serious allegations, such as those involving ‘organised corruption’ or process corruption, and responds to complainants dissatisfied with the police response to their complaint. Other matters may be subject to varying degrees of IPCC direct ‘management’ or more detached ‘supervision’, depending on their seriousness (Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) 2009, pp. 10Á 11, 2010). The Commission, however, remains a mixed model, with substantial reliance on police for investigations and limitations on input into disciplinary decisions (Seneviratne 2004, Smith 2009a). The Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, established in 2000, demonstrates most of the features of the civilian control model. It is a product of the Hayes (1997) and Patten (1999) Reports, both of which emphasised the particular need for independent scrutiny of police in a highly divided society. The Ombudsman investigates all public complaints using civilian dominated investigation teams. There is also a capacity to appeal police decisions to an independent tribunal or direct the Chief Constable to take disciplinary action (Seneviratne 2004). In Europe, ‘independent police complaints systems of any description are a rarity’ (Smith 2009b, p. 262). However, The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights (2009) has placed the issue on the agenda, describing an independent and effective police complaints system as ‘of fundamental importance for the operation of a democratic and accountable police service’ (p. 3). Across Canada, the expansion of civilian oversight has been driven by breakdowns in police-community relations and dissatisfaction with police handling of complaints, chronicled by Downloaded by [Griffith University] at 20:14 22 September 2011 various government-sponsored reviews (McDonald 1981, Oppal 1994, Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP 2010). The Canadian Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (2010) lists 22 police oversight agencies. In the largest province of Ontario, police are subject to scrutiny from a Special Investigations Unit, the Ontario Office of the Independent Police Review Director and the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services. Two major reports by the United States Commission on Civil Rights (1981, 2000) criticised the limited powers of review boards and exposed the way police investigators subverted legitimate complaints, highlighting the need for review boards to exercise independent powers. The landmark Knapp (1972) Commission of Inquiry in New York City and the Mollen (1994) Commission recommended greater independent input into police conduct issues. New York police are now subject to the scrutiny of the Commission to Combat Police Corruption and the 286 T. Prenzler Civilian Complaint Review Board. The US National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (2010) lists 122 police oversight agencies in the country. In Australia, similar processes of scandal and inquiry, and public dissatisfaction with complaints handling, led to the establishment of civilian oversight in all eight jurisdictions from the 1970s. A study by Lewis and Prenzler (1999) found four police departments were oversighted by ombudsmen, two were oversighted by an ombuds- man and a commission, one was subject to the scrutiny of an Ombudsman-style PCA and one was overseen by a public sector-wide commission. All agencies were mainly engaged in reviewing police investigations of complaints and only half had the power to compel testimony. The Australian case is notable for the growing inclusion of politicians and the whole public sector, alongside police, within the jurisdiction of oversight/anti-corruption agencies. This development has occurred incrementally,