The London School of Economics and Political Science ‘Muddling Through’ Hasbara: Israeli Government Communications Policy, 1966 – 1975 Jonathan Cummings A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, December 2012 ‘In this and like communities, public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who moulds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed. Abraham Lincoln ‘By persuading others, we convince ourselves’ Junius ii Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. iii Abstract This thesis is the history of an intense period of Israeli attempts to address the issue of how the state should communicate its national image, particularly on the international stage. Between 1966 and 1975, the Eshkol, Meir and Rabin governments invested far more time and energy in the management of Israel’s international image than the governments before or after. Those responsible for this policy were informed by a developing Israeli national political culture that bore the strong influence of pre-independence Jewish history and which reinforced the simple and pervasive concept of hasbara (literally ‘explaining’) as Israel’s communications strategy. At the same time external factors, particularly the wars of 1967 and 1973, made government information efforts and Israel’s international image far more politically important. Yet, by the end of the period, nothing much had changed. This thesis examines why that should be the case. Using newly-released archive material, personal interviews and existing research, this thesis presents a new assessment of the domestic determinants that shaped the formulation, institutionalization, and execution of Israeli policy in the period under review. Three themes emerge from examining the domestic sources of Israeli government communications strategy in the period under question. Together, they explain why such an intense period of activity should produce such limited results. Firstly, the political culture of hasbara, an instinctively defensive, tactical, persuasive and Jewishly-rooted approach to generation and maintenance of international iv support for Israeli foreign policy aims, itself a residue of the pre-state period, proved an imperfect lens through which to view the world, and was an obstacle to cogent policy-making. Secondly, structural features of Israeli politics contributed to the lack of substantive progress in addressing the perceived failures of hasbara. The ruling Mapai party was split between the dominant ‘activist’ camp, which broadly dismissed the pursuit of international legitimacy in favour of the ‘practical Zionism’ of David Ben-Gurion, and the ‘diplomats’ who attached a much greater value to it. However, whilst the Mapai ‘diplomats’ were sometimes strong enough to limit ‘activist’ policy, they lacked the power to articulate or pursue a real alternative. Given Mapai’s unchallenged leadership at a national level, the sporadic bursts of opposition – in parliamentary or public debate - on this issue in the period under review produced very little real change. In addition, the environment in which these issues were discussed accentuated the role of personality in foreign policy decision-making. Finally, in the absence of clear political leadership, policy was often decided by bureaucratic ‘muddling through’, a model that describes incremental change from a limited set of options, an already-familiar feature of Israeli political culture. v Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been written without the indefatigable efforts of my supervisor, Dr Kirsten Schulze. Wielding both carrot and stick, she guided, cajoled and wheedled this thesis out of me. She has my deepest thanks for doing so. This thesis could not have been written without the generous support of a number of scholarship funds. I was fortunate to be awarded a Chevening Scholarship by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as well as to receive funding from the AVI Foundation, the Anglo-Israel Association and the Anglo-Jewish Association. I thank the trustees for their assistance. During my time in London I was fortunate to contribute to the work of the Portland Trust, which also supported my studies, and I thank Sir Ronald Cohen and Lord Kestenbaum for their kindness and their support. The research for this thesis is based in a series of interviews and conversations I had with many of the participants and observers in the episodes described here. The opportunity to talk to these people was an extraordinary privilege. I thank them all, but particularly Professor Meron Medzini and David Landau, whose wise counsel has enriched my understanding of these issues immeasurably. I am grateful to those who shared private collections of documents with me, some of which were not to be found in the archives, particularly Alouph Hareven, Moshe Yegar, Shlomo Gazit and Elad Peled. I would also like to thank the archivists and librarians at the various repositories in Britain and Israel I consulted for helping me find material that I found interesting, particularly if no-one else did. vi The frontispiece, a cartoon by Kariel Gardosh (‘Dosh’) from his 1969 collaboration with Ephraim Kishon, ‘Woe to the Victors!’ (Tel Aviv: Maariv Library, 1969), is reproduced with the kind permission of the Gardosh family, and I thank them for it. My family – Orli, Nomi, Tomer and Ella – has accompanied this project across continents and decades. Their love, faith and toleration of this meshugas have been constant in our ever-changing lives. For that, I can find no words to fully express my love and thanks. London-Kfar Saba-New York vii Table of Contents Declaration .................................................................................................................................... iii Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... vi Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... viii Abbreviations and Glossary .......................................................................................................xi Introduction ...................................................................................................................................1 The limits of Hasbara ......................................................................................................4 Structural weaknesses: ‘activists’, ‘diplomats’ and the role of personality ...... 14 The political culture of ‘muddling through’ ............................................................ 21 The existing literature and historiography ............................................................. 24 Sources and methodology .......................................................................................... 29 Structure ........................................................................................................................ 34 Chapter 1: The Genesis of Hasbara ....................................................................................... 37 The inheritance: from Diaspora to the birth of Zionism .................................... 39 ‘Seek no intimacy with the ruling power’ ............................................................... 43 Hasbara in practice: From the inception of the Zionist movement .................. 51 Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 80 viii Chapter 2: Government Information Policy under the Minister without Portfolio, 1966-1967 .................................................................................................................................... 83 Appointment of Galili to take responsibility for information efforts ............... 84 Waiting for Nasser....................................................................................................... 93 Israel’s international image after the Six Day War: the ‘debacle’ .................... 108 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 120 Chapter 3: Breach Birth: The Introduction of Television to Israel .............................. 122 Early discussions on introducing television .......................................................... 124 On the offensive: government information policy in the wake of the Six-Day War ..............................................................................................................................