Perspective & Analysis Focus Asia No. 21 August 2017 The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor: An India-Japan Arch in the Making? Jagannath Panda This paper examines the prospects of the ambitious Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) – a collaborative vision between India and Japan to promote develop- ment, connectivity, and cooperation between Africa and Asia as part of a “liberal and value-based order.” While still nascent with few concrete details, Dr. Jagan- nath Panda argues that the genesis of this proposition draws from India’s and Japan’s increasing convergence of economic and strategic interests in the broader Indo- Pacific region, whereby concerns over China’s growing strategic influence, in particular through its Belt and Road Initiative, is one of the major factors. ndia’s and Japan’s co-envisioned Asia-Africa meeting had led many to speculate that the announce- Growth Corridor (AAGC) was announced at the ment of the AAGC is a calculated effort of India, along 52nd Annual Meeting of the African Develop- with Japan, to counter-balance China’s Belt and Road Iment Bank (AfDB) summit in Gandhinagar, India, on Initiative, in particular its outreach programs in Africa May 22-26, 2017. During the announcement, Prime and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).3 Minister Narendra Modi stated that both India and Ja- pan aim to achieve closer developmental cooperation Indeed, many comparisons have been drawn between in Africa.1 The presence of African and Japanese repre- the AAGC and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, since sentatives at this meeting made the announcement sig- both encompass Africa and the Indian Ocean as key nificant. Noteworthy too was that it was made amidst constituents. Chinese strategic circles have respond- the backdrop of China’s Belt and Road Forum (BRF) ed critically to the AAGC initiative,4 arguing that the meeting held on May 14-15, 2017, in Beijing. AAGC is a “duplication of the freedom corridor” that Many countries, including Japan, attended Beijing’s BRF meeting. While Tokyo remains cautious of Chi- Dr. Jagannath Panda is a Non-Resident Senior Research na’s initiative, Liberal Democratic Party secretary-gen- Fellow at ISDP and heads the East Asia Centre at the eral Toshihiro Nikai participated in the event. Signifi- Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in New cantly, however, India did not take part, with New Delhi. He is the author of India-China Relations: Politics Delhi releasing a statement regarding India’s non-par- of Resource, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar World ticipation.2 India’s decision not to attend the BRF Order, which was published by Routledge in 2017. Institute for Security & Development Policy 2 – No. 21 August 2017 was originally proposed by Japanese Prime Minister With its extensive contact network with part- Shinzo Abe during his 2016 meeting with Modi in ner institutes in Asia, each year ISDP invites Tokyo.5 a number of visiting researchers as well as guest authors from the region to participate In order to more potently examine the AAGC, this in research, discussion, and exchange with paper is structured as follows. The first part examines European scholars and policy officials. ISDP’s how the AAGC is an outcome of India’s and Japan’s Focus Asia series serves as a forum for these coordinated Indo-Pacific vision of 2025. It then pro- researchers as well as guest authors to provide ceeds to survey both countries’ growing interest in and clarify their viewpoints on the contempo- Africa more generally, including the necessity of es- rary issues and challenges concerning their tablishing linkages between Africa and Asia. The next countries, adding a much-needed Asian per- part outlines the strategic challenge of China which spective to the policy and research debate. has led, albeit not exclusively, to the growing conver- gence of interest between Japan and India to accumu- Cover photo: Abe meets Modi in 2014, Wiki- late strategic advantage in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, the media Commons conclusion offers some thoughts on the future outlook of the AAGC. For editorial correspondence please contact A “New” Strategic Vision [email protected] Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this pa- The initial idea of the AAGC was discussed between per are those of the author/s only and are in no Prime Ministers Modi and Abe at the India-Japan an- way endorsed by ISDP or its sponsors. While nual summit meeting in Tokyo in 2016. In light of efforts are made to ascertain facts, quality this meeting, an India-Japan Joint Statement, released control is not as stringent as for other series. on November 11, 2016, indicated that both India and Japan should develop cooperation in Africa, and must aim “to promote industrial corridors and industri- al networks in Asia as well as in Africa.”6 Since then, brief, the AAGC vision document promotes an in- premier policy institutions such as the Research and ter-continental framework of cooperation between Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) Asia and Africa with a focus on developmental coop- in India, the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN eration. It is therefore a “people-centric” proposition and East Asia (ERIA) in Jakarta, and the Institute of that focuses on the peoples of Africa and Asia. Developing Economies–Japan External Trade Organ- isation (IDE-JETRO), in consultation with their re- With an emphasis on “quality infrastructure” and spective governments, have worked on developing the “digital and regulatory connectivity,”8 the vision docu- idea. A vision document was released during the May ment further illustrates that the AAGC is an initiative, 2017 AfDB summit in Gandhinagar. based on a consultative mechanism, that aims to bet- ter integrate Africa by establishing strategic linkages This document unveils India’s and Japan’s strategi- with other regions such as India, South Asia, South- cally ambitious proposition in the Indo-Pacific region, east Asia, East Asia, and Oceania (see Map 1). In this factoring in Africa and the Indian Ocean. According mechanism, the African continent constitutes the cor- to the vision document, the AAGC will focus on four nerstone of the AAGC proposition.9 key target areas: 1) development and cooperation; 2) “quality infrastructure” and digital and institutional A reading of this vision document suggests that the connectivity; 3) enhancing capabilities and skills; and AAGC aims to attain three general objectives: first, 4) establishing people-to-people partnerships. The advancing both India’s and Japan’s individual and mu- overriding goal is to enhance “growth and intercon- tual outreach towards the African continent, focused nectedness between and within Asia and Africa.”7 In mainly on developing “quality infrastructure invest- Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu Jagannath Panda– 3 Map 1. Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (Source: GIS Lab, IDSA) ment”; second, linking Africa with the Indian Ocean which not only complements India’s Act East and Ja- Region within an intercontinental context of Asia-Af- pan’s Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure rica cooperation, whereby Japan and India are envis- (EPQI) initiative but, as argued later on in this paper, aged as playing leading roles, with African countries forms a strategic convergence between Japan’s and In- also becoming a part of the decision-making process; dia’s security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. and third, to shape a liberal and value-based Indo-Pa- cific order as per their proposed Vision 2025. Japan’s Growing Africa Interest Accordingly, the AAGC proposition fits within the As a resource centre and a continent of 54 countries, more overarching Vision 2025.10 Conceptualized be- Africa attracts significant interest and investment from tween India and Japan in 2015 as part of their “Special around the world, including Asia’s three major econo- Strategic and Global Partnership,” its main thrust is mies – Japan, China, and India. to develop a “deep, broad-based and action-oriented partnership” in the Indo-Pacific region. Affirming a Japan’s Africa policy first received meaningful at- commitment to a “peaceful, open, equitable, stable tention in 1993 during the Tokyo International Con- and rule-based order” in the region, Vision 2025 de- ference on African Development (TICAD). Tokyo’s mands for principles of sovereignty and territorial in- official position was that the decline of assistance from tegrity where the emphasis is on an “open global trade developed countries towards Africa represented an op- regime” along with “freedom of navigation and over- portunity for Japan. It was therefore contended that flight,” among other things. It stresses the focus on “re- Japanese foreign policy should pay serious attention liable, sustainable and resilient infrastructures” aimed to Africa.11 Since then, Japan’s economic interest in at enhancing connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region, Africa has been growing constantly, with TICAD in- Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 4 – No. 21 August 2017 strumental in institutionalising Japan-Africa relations. It can also be argued that the limited growth of Jap- Nevertheless, Tokyo’s last two decades of engagement anese aid to Africa is better explained by the rapid with Africa has also demonstrated important limita- emergence of China as an economic actor in Afri- tions. While Japan is a key investor in Africa, Japanese ca. This has discouraged Japan from offering higher Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa has amount of ODA to the continent as it previously did not increased significantly12 (see Charts 1 and 2). There in 2006-07.14 By comparison, Beijing’s current trade are many reasons behind this. Africa has hitherto not and economic contacts with Africa is impressive (see been a pivotal focus in Japanese policymaking, and Chart 3). Indeed, China’s attractive financial packages nor has Japan tried to implement a “comprehensive” and aid have been a challenging factor for Japan.