The Call for America: German-American Relations and the European Crisis, 1921-1924/25 Mark Ellis Swartzburg A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History. Chapel Hill 2005 Approved by Advisor: Konrad H. Jarausch Reader: Gerhard L. Weinberg Reader: Michael H. Hunt Reader: Donald Reid Reader: Christopher R. Browning © 2005 Mark Ellis Swartzburg ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii Abstract Mark Ellis Swartzburg: The Call for America: German-American Relations and the European Crisis, 1921-1924/25 (Under the direction of Konrad H. Jarausch) This study examines German-American relations during the European general crisis of 1921-1924/5. After World War I, Germany’s primary foreign policy goal was to engage the United States, whose assistance was seen as essential for the economic and diplomatic rehabilitation of Germany. America recognized that the rehabilitation of Germany was necessary for its long range goal of aiding peaceful European reconstruction through private loans and investments. Having failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, America had to establish bilateral relations with Germany. However the complex interplay of domestic and international politics in each nation resulted in a relationship which proceeded in a series of steps characterized by expediency imposed by the domestic politics of the United States. Following this pattern were the Treaty of Berlin of 1921 (which established a separate peace with Germany), the Mixed Claims Agreement of 1922 (which was created to resolve war claims), and the Commercial Treaty of 1924. The American–German relationship was also central to the resolution of the complex international problem of war debts and reparations. Political conflict in Germany over distribution of the war’s costs among various social and economic groups kept it from making credible reparations proposals and engaging the United States, which disengaged further in response to the January 1923 French/Belgian occupation of the Ruhr and iii Germany’s reactive policy of passive resistance. Due to optimism over Germany’s ending of passive resistance and institution of domestic economic reforms together with concern about the chaos in Germany caused by the occupation, American opinion shifted and the Coolidge administration called for an inquiry into the reparation problem by a committee of experts. The resulting 1924 Dawes Plan and the London agreements established a reparations settlement and modification the Versailles Treaty on Anglo-American terms. This opened the way for American financial underwriting of German reconstruction and the resolution of the European crisis. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study began as a seminar paper for Gerhard L. Weinberg during my first year at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and it is to him that I owe my first debt. As my original Doktor Vater, Dr. Weinberg encouraged and guided me in my pursuit of understanding the role played by the German-American relationship in the European diplomatic relations of the 1920’s. He has always made himself available, opening his home to me and has shown me extraordinary kindness and support through out this long process. Even with Emeritus status, he stood by this work and was always there with invaluable insights and suggestions, reading draft chapters with exacting care which greatly strengthened the final work. I am very grateful for his friendship. Likewise, Dr. Konrad H. Jarausch has been tremendously helpful and supportive from the very beginning of this undertaking. He took over as my doctorial advisor in the writing stage and brought great energy and incisiveness to the project with his own insights into the German-American relationship and keen intellect. Taking an active interest in my topic, he provided the kind motivation which enabled this project to be brought to fruition. For this he deserves my deepest thanks and I am proud to also call him Doktor Vater. The other members of my dissertation committee provided thoughtful criticism and useful suggestions. Professors Donald Reid and Michael Hunt were there from the beginning and I thank them for their assistance and patience over the years. I would like to thank v Professor Christopher Browning for agreeing to join my committee when the writing was already well underway and providing his useful insights. Their comments have done much to strengthen the final work. Several organizations and institutions have made this research possible. I would like to thank the staffs of the National Archives at Collage Park, Maryland, the Library of Congress in Washington D.C., and the Houghton Library, Harvard University. A special thanks goes to James R. Houghton for granting me access to the private papers Ambassador Alanson B. Houghton and to Michelle Cotton, archivist at the Corning Glass Archives, Corning, New York, where the papers are held. A grant from the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association allowed me to complete my research at the Presidential Library in West Branch, Iowa. I would like to thank Patricia A. Hand of the Library Association as well as Matthew Schaefer and Lynn Smith, the extremely knowledgeable and friendly archivists at the Presidential Library for making possible my very fruitful research in the William R. Castle papers. My research experience in Germany was a pleasure and I would like to thank those institutions and individuals who helped make it so. Frau Dr. Maria Keipert and the staff and archivists of the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, then in Bonn, helped make the archive like a second home during my time there and provided me with innumerous assistance. Jens Fleischer, in particular, helped make my work in the PA-AA so productive. I would like to thank Frau Dr. Köhne-Lindenlaub and Herr Müther for making my visit to the Historische Archiv Krupp in Essen possible and making my time at Villa Hügel beneficial as well as enjoyable. The archival staff at the Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Bundesarchiv Berlin- Lichterfelde, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz and the Staatsarchiv in vi Freiburg all deserve my heartfelt thanks. I would also like to thank Frau K. Weiss of the Europäische Akademie Berlin for providing me with such splendid accommodations while in Berlin and the Wissenschaftliche Katholische Studentenverein Unitas Bonn, Freiburg and Winfridia Münster for the comradeship and support while in Germany. Numerous individuals have been very helpful to me over the years bring this project to conclusion. I would especially like to thank Paul and Susan Rozelle; Dr. June Nogle; Dr. Joseph and Marsha Caddell; Dr. Carolyn W. Pumphrey; Dan Shidlovsky; Matthew Peaple; Dr. Astrid Eckert; Kay Robin Alexander and Dr. Wendy Perry. Janet Weinberg deserves special mention for all the affection and moral support she has shown me over the years, as does Dr. Steve Chamberlin for his technical and formatting assistance. In Germany, I would like to acknowledge the following people for making my time there easier and productive- Philipp Hoppe; Brigitte Peine; Dr. Wolfgang Klein; Paul-Georg Garmer; Dr. Nicole Eversdijk; Dr. Birgit Ramscheid, Dr. Niels Joeres; Anton Niehoff and Bettina Mühlbauer. I also want to give special thanks to Gabriele Zimmermann for her patience, emotional support and for providing perspective, along with Sabrina Gerasch and all the Zimmermann family. My family deserves the highest note of thanks, especially to my father, Dr. Marshall Swartzburg, whose tremendous support, humor and forbearing made this all possible. I am very grateful. To my late Mother, Susan G. Swartzburg who inspired me, I dedicate this work. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page INTRODUCTION AND PROLOGUE ..........................................................................1 I. THE SEPARATE PEACE: THE MAKING OF THE TREATY OF BERLIN ............................................32 II. FROM BERLIN TO GENOA: SEPTEMBER 1921 - APRIL 1922...................................................................77 III. FAIREST AND MOST RIGHTEOUS TREATMENT: GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE ORIGIN OF THE 1922 MIXED CLAIMS AGREEMENT..........................................120 IV. WAR DEBTS AND REPARATIONS: THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY, JUNE 1922 - JANUARY 1923.......................................................................150 V. PASSIVE NEUTRALITY: THE RUHR CRISIS AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE, JANUARY - AUGUST 1923 .........................................................................213 VI. THE WAY TOWARDS INTERVENTION: AMERICA AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE RUHR CRISIS, AUGUST - DECEMBER 1923 ......................................................................271 VII. THE COMMERCIAL TREATY....................................................................338 VIII. THE DAWES PLAN: JANUARY - JUNE 1924................................................................................384 IX. THE LONDON CONFERENCE, JULY AND AUGUST 1924...........................................................................444 CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................504 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................525 viii Introduction and Prologue Introduction During the twentieth century the United States and Germany have twice been opponents in world wars. In both the United States played a decisive role in