DOI 10.20544/HORIZONS.A.27.4.20.P13 UDC 165.6 329.285 FEYERABEND’S IRRATIONALIST APPROACH TOWARDS EXPLAINING SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS1 Danka Joveva, MA SMS „Slavcho Stojmenski“ Shtip [email protected] ABSTRACT The subject of this scientific is Feyerabend’s revolutionary model of explanation of the growth of scientific knowledge. Feyerabend criticizes the positivism, forgery and all rationalist attempts for discovering the strict rules of the scientific method. His attitudes are significant because they add a different, avant-garde picture of the scientific development causing interest in the scientific and philosophical circles. The main thesis in this paper is that the Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism cannot answer the question of scientific development. There is no clear picture about the direction of the scientific process, and it cannot say whether the science goes forward or backward, whether there is progress or not. It appears that this comes mainly from his anarchist position. The progress of science, according to him, depends on irrational elements, and one can contribute to the progress of the science by counterproductive actions only. He declares that consistency is an unreasonable condition of science and prefers hypotheses which are not consistent with facts, nor with the observational or experimental results. Feyerabend uses the non-existence of “bare / naked” facts and the incommensurability of theories as arguments for making the conclusion that the new scientific theories triumph in a completely irrational way. Key words: scientific progress, immortality of theories, methodological pluralism, counter-inductance, methodological anarchism. 1 original scientific paper 159 INTRODUCTION Of the many contemporary theories that concern themselves with the problems of the philosophy of science, the ones that propose revolutionary sentiments in regards to the interpretation of methodological and epistemological problems appear to be the most interesting. This contemporary epoch, among other things, has also seen discussions regarding the issues of the rationality of scientific knowledge and the problem of progress in science. One of the most well-known representatives of contemporary philosophy of science, who at the same time concerned himself with these problems, was Paul Feyerabend. He has been a radical critic of almost all traditional positions in science and epistemology, and has attempted to provide a new model of the very process of epistemology, and especially scientific epistemology. His teaching insists on renouncing any pretensions for absolute knowledge, and that our entire epistemology is the result of man who is led by desires, hopes, interests, fears and other irrational elements. Feyerabend thinks that many scientific decisions are not rooted in rationality, and that the selection between competing scientific theories is often irrational. This position would imply that the idea of scientific progress is brought under question, and that we can never ascertain whether science progresses or declines. As Feyerabend would put it, “Regarding science, reason cannot be universal and unreason cannot be excluded” (Feyerabend, 2000, p. 218). Feyerabend is attempting to weaken the position of science; according to him, it is but one of many forms devised by man to deal with the world around him, but not the only one and certainly not the best one. He thinks that there is no knowledge without chaos, and no progress without frequent rejections of reason. The ideas that comprise the basis of science today exist thanks to the prejudices, vanities, passions and other irrational elements that have clashed against reason in the past. According to him, one must employ a clash of ideas, a plurality of methods, logical incompatibilities, intra-theoretical and inter-theoretical inconsistencies and other irrational elements in order to reach new knowledge. The main idea of this paper is that the methodological anarchism of Feyerabend cannot conceive of any idea of scientific progress. The existence of irrational elements in the realization of fundamental scientific change presents the problem of the incommensurability of theories. It means that we cannot establish criteria for the preference of one scientific theory over another, which leads to the impossibility of setting up exact, operative criteria for selection between rival theories. FAYERABEND’S METHODOLOGICAL ANARCHISM In his famous work Against Method, Feyerabend notes that „science is, in essence, an anarchist endeavor: theoretical anarchism is more human and is 160 more likely to aid progress than its alternatives of law and order” (Feyerabend, 2000, p. 13). Expressing this sentiment at the very beginning of his work, he highlights that there is no possibility of devising uniform rules that will determine scientific research and guide the development of science. As the subtitle of his book suggests, Feyerabend is espousing an anarchist theory of knowledge. He considers anarchism to be a cure for epistemology and philosophy of science. Human nature is complex and has an unpredictable character; there are no strict rules that can be applied as guidance in life.According to him, history of science isn’t only comprised of facts and conclusions derived from facts, but instead, of ideas, interpretations of facts, problems caused by competing interpretations, errors and so on. Science, he suggests, doesn’t recognize “bare facts”, but the “facts” that enter our knowledge have been already perceived in a certain manner; therefore it follows that facts are mediated by ideas (Feyerabend, 2000, p. 15). It is therefore nonsensical to establish a science that will be governed by immutable rules, expressed by a language of exactness with a unified outlook on the world. The world which man inhabits is an unknown entity, which necessitates a position of openness for all possibilities and a wariness of a priori limitations. Therefore, Feyerabend considers, all universal standards and rigid traditions need to be rejected, embracing, instead, an absolute freedom of discussion. According to him, we shouldn’t fear that this sort of anarchist methodology and science, which would weaken concerns for law and order in science and society, will bring about chaos. “The nervous system of man is organized too well for that to happen” (Feyerabend, 2000, p. 17). Of course, there may come a time when reason will have to be given a temporary priority, a time when the wise choice would be to uphold reason’s rules to the exemption of everything else, however, according to Feyerabend, we don’t live in such a time today. On the other hand, this anarchist conception of scientific progress is interesting because it advocates for: - free thought unburdened by prejudice; - liberation from given norms and rules; - valuing science for being able to adequately explain and predict phenomena within the bounds of available experience; - awards complete confidence to the scholars and their interests; - putting trust in the sciences to be efficiently applied in reaching important practical goals. (Sinđelić, 2005) 161 IS THERE A PLACE FOR SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS IN FEYERABEND’S PHILOSOPY? In regards to the meaning of words such as “progress”, “advancement” or “improvement”, he makes a point of saying that “anyone can interpret these terms in their own ways and in accordance to the tradition to which they belong” (Feyerabend, 2000, p. 26). For him, there is only one principle that needs to be upheld, the principle of anything goes. Experts and laymen, professionals and dilettantes, truth seekers and liars are all invited to take part in shaping the contents of theories and provide their contribution to the enrichment of our culture. Feyerabend rejects the notion that we can devise rational criteria for scientific progress, and that we can only talk about the advancement of scientific discoveries in the wider context of the historical circumstances in which scientists find themselves. Science advances only when it contributes to the realization of the opportunities intended for the free development of individuals. As was already pointed out, Feyerabend analyzes the progress of science and suggests that the only principle that doesn’t stand in its way is anything goes, which can be ascertained by inspecting historical episodes and by an abstract analysis of the relation between ideas and actions. According to him, “there has not been a single rule, regardless of how plausible or how rigidly rooted in epistemology, that hasn’t been violated in a point in the past” (Feyerabend, 2000, p. 22). Feyerabend maintains that during the course of scientific discovery, no rule has remained universally valid and that rules need to be broken, since it is exactly the breaking of rules that enables scientific progress. However, he doesn’t say that we should proceed without any rules or standards, but strongly suggest that all rules have their limitations and no rule possesses an all-encompassing rationality. To support this assertion, Feyerabend points out to the following examples: the discovery of atomism in ancient times, the Copernican revolution, the rise of modern atomism (kinesthetic theory, quantum theory), the gradual growth of the wave theory of light and other episodes from the history of science, where scholars decided not to be limited by certain methodological rules, or intentionally breached those rules. This liberal practice, Feyerabend considers, is a fact and absolutely necessary for the growth of knowledge. For