START TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (START I) Signed: 31 July 1991 carry long-range nuclear ALCMs (defined as having Entered into Force: 5 December 1994 maximum range of 600km or more), up to a total of Duration: 15 year duration with option to extend for 180 bombers, counts as eight warheads toward the unlimited five year periods, if all parties agree. 6,000 warhead limit, even though existing Russian Parties: United States, Russian Federation, Belarus, heavy bomber types can carry between six and 16 Kazakhstan and Ukraine. ALCMs. Each Russian heavy bomber above the level of 180 has its actual number of ALCMs counted to- Treaty Text ward the 6,000 warhead limit. Similarly, each US long-range nuclear ALCM-carrying heavy bomber, Treaty Obligations: The treaty limits the total num- up to a total of 150 bombers, counts as 10 warheads ber of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for United toward the 6,000 warhead limit, and each bomber in States and Russia to 1,600 each, the total number of excess of 150 has the actual number of ALCMs it can accountable warheads to 6,000 each, total number of carry counted toward the warhead limit. Bombers not warheads mounted on ballistic missiles (ICBMs and equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs are SLBMs) to 4,900 each, total number of warheads counted as one warhead. mounted on mobile ICBMs to 1,100 each, and the Verification and Compliance: START I contains total ballistic missile throw-weight for each party to extensive provisions for verification, including the 3,600 metric tons (t). Additionally, START I permits use of National Technical Means, missile test teleme- Russia to have no more than 154 so-called "heavy" try tape exchanges, periodic data exchanges, monitor- ICBMs (defined as having launch weight greater than ing activities, and on-site inspections. 106t or a throw-weight greater than 4,350kg), spe- cifically the R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan,' START designation RS-20] ICBMs, and no Developments: more than 1,540 warheads mounted on these missiles. 2009: On 13 January, Secretary of State Clinton The treaty also bans the construction of new types of stated during her confirmation hearing that the U.S. heavy ICBMs and SLBMs, although it permits mod- was committed to working with Russia to extend ernization programs and, in exceptional cases, new essential monitoring and verification provisions of silo construction. the START treaty and towards an agreement for fur- START I also bans the testing of missiles with a ther reductions. greater number of warheads than declared in the trea- On 6 February, Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister ty, and bans any new ballistic missiles with more Ivanov stated at the Munich Security Conference that than 10 warheads. Parties to the treaty may also re- Moscow was committed to continuing the START duce the number of warheads attributed to a specific negotiations process but maintained concerns regard- missile. However, no more than three existing missile ing uploading procedures and the U.S. planned mis- types may have the number of warheads reduced, and sile defense system in Europe. At the same confer- the total reduction may not exceed 1,250 warheads. ence, U.S. Vice President Biden stated that Russia New missile types or heavy ICBMs may not be and the U.S. should cooperate “to renew the verifica- downloaded. tion procedures in the START treaty.” While the treaty counts each ICBM and SLBM reen- On 7 March, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and try vehicle as a single warhead, counting rules for her Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, noted that as warheads attributed to heavy bombers are more com- part of their effort to rebuild bilateral relations they plicated. Each Russian heavy bomber equipped to START-1 Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes Center for Nonproliferation Studies Last Updated: 7/27/2009 START would try to reach an agreement on a new strategic March and May 2008 under the provisions of the arms reduction treaty by the end of 2009. START I treaty. On 1 April, at the G-20 meeting in London, Presi- On 11 September, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov dents Obama and Medvedev emphasized the need for stated Russia was still awaiting concrete proposals lower levels of strategic offensive arms, including from the U.S., a statement confirming Russian delivery vehicles and warheads, than those deter- sources contending that the U.S. had not supplied mined by the SORT agreement, and including verifi- necessary working papers to move the negotiation cation measures “drawn from the experience of the process forward. Parties in implementing the START Treaty.” Both On 29 September, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov leaders underlined their plan to conclude the agree- stated that the bilateral negotiations on the future of ment before the START I expiration date in Decem- START were "not so far heading anywhere." ber 2009. 2007: In March, U.S. and Russia commenced bilat- The U.S. and Russian negotiating teams, headed by eral consultations at the level of the deputy minister U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller to explore a post-START agreement, including a pos- and Ambassador Anatoly Antonov, director of the sible extension of certain verification elements of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Security and Disarma- treaty. ment Department, held their first “very productive” meeting in Rome on 24 April. The first round of ne- In July, statements were made at an informal meeting gotiations followed in Moscow 18-20 May. between U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kennebunkport, Maine, Both the second and the third round of negotiations expressing support for the replacement of START I, took place in Geneva 1-4 and 23-24 June. On 6 July, which expires at the end of 2009. While there were during a bilateral metering in Moscow, Presidents no direct talks pertaining to the START I treaty dur- Obama and Medvedev signed a Joint Understanding ing the meeting, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to guide the negotiations, committing their countries and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov com- to ranges of 1500-1675 for strategic warheads and mented that both countries were committed to reduc- 500-1100 for strategic delivery vehicles, and a treaty ing strategic arms levels to “the lowest possible level including effective verification measures drawn from consistent with their national security requirements.” the experience gained under START I. Supporters of the START treaty process expressed At the same 6-7 July summit, the two Presidents un- hope that the dialogue was to encourage a disarma- derlined their plans to continue the discussions re- ment discussion in the future. garding cooperative approaches in response to mis- sile proliferation. They noted that U.S. and Russian 2001: On 4 January, the Russian Defense Ministry experts were “intensifying dialogue on establishing accused the United States of violating it’s START I the Joint Data Exchange Center, which is to become obligations of disarmament in regards to the U.S. the basis for a multilateral missile-launch notification LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBM. The United States regime.” considered destroying the first stage of the Peace- keeper to be sufficient under START I guidelines. The fourth round of negotiations took place in Ge- However, the Russian Defense Ministry contended neva 22-24 July. that all stages of the missile must be destroyed under 2008: On 7 April, after a bilateral meeting in Sochi, START I. In response, the Pentagon claimed that the Russia, Putin stated that Russia was to continue second and third stages of the Peacekeeper are used working with the U.S. to maintain all the useful and for space launch vehicles, which are permitted under necessary parts of the START treaty. START I. On 9 April, the United States announced that the On 24 August the United States announced the de- Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program struction of the last Minuteman III silo at Grand completed the elimination of SS-24 “scalpel” ICBM, Forks, North Dakota. including their supporting components, in accordance to START I obligations. On 30 October, Ukraine completed its compliance On 29 May, Russia announced that it had dismantled obligation under the START I Treaty by destroying 36 outdated Topol mobile ballistic missile systems in its last SS-24 ICBM silo. 2007 and twelve in two consecutive operations in START-2 Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes Center for Nonproliferation Studies Last Updated: 7/27/2009 START On 13 November President Putin announced that in United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and late October the last Ukrainian nuclear warhead had Ukraine signed several agreements that will help to been destroyed in Russia. realize the multilateral obligations of START I. On 5 December the United States and Russia an- 1993: On 18 November the Ukrainian Parliament nounced that both parties had fulfilled START I re- ratified START I and the Lisbon Protocol. However, quirements. In particular, Russia announced that it given Ukraine’s serious reservations about the Trea- had reduced its deployed strategic delivery vehicles ties, doubts arose concerning Ukraine’s commitment to 1136 and its accountable warheads to 5518. This to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. accomplishment marked the largest arms control re- duction in history. On 2 July Kazakhstan ratified START I and subse- quently acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon 1997: In congruence with START I obligations, on state on 14 February 1994. 22 December the United States announced that the last Minuteman II silo was destroyed at Whiteman On 23 April, President Clinton announced an accel- Air Force Base.
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