BARBARA DE POLI Arab Revolts and the ‘Civil State’ A new term for old conflicts between Islamism and secularism he Arab revolts that erupted in late 2010, forcing ing with the Egyptian Hassan al-Banna, who in 1928 from power the rulers of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and founded the Muslim Brotherhood (Mitchell 1969, TYemen, and dragging Syria through a fer ocious Kepel 2004). Opposing the leadership of his time – civil war, reactivated the public debate on government which he saw as Westernized and corrupt – al-Banna in Islamic countries. In all those countries, after remov- aimed at re-Islamifying society and institutions ing the authoritarian regimes (or fighting against them), by updating a supposed original political model, the political arena saw a division into two main camps: exempli fied by the authority of the Prophet and of Islamic parties and secularists; both claiming to stand the first four rāshidūn caliphs. On the opposing side, for democracy. Within the political discourse of both the qādī of the Islamic University of al-Azhar, ‛Alī sides a new concept began to play a pivotal role: that of ‛Abd al-Rāziq (2000), conferred legitimacy on the the ’civil state’ – dawla madaniyya – a term which, how- secular state: in Islam and the Foundations of Author- ever, renders different semantic interpretations accord- ity, published in 1925, he stated that since the Qur’an ing to the political actors involved, meaning both ‘no and Sunna were lacking in any clear instructions con- military or theocratic (but Islamic) State’, and ‘secular cerning possible forms of Islamic power, the death of State’. We’ll especially analyse the usage of the term the Prophet could only be followed by a secular (lā ‘dawla madaniyya’ in Tunisia and Egypt since the be- dīnī, non-religious) government, and hence Muslims ginning of the Arab revolts and up until 2014 and, for had always been free to govern themselves according the same time period, the political practices of Islam- to the needs of their times. ist and secularist parties (government experiences, These two irreconcilable positions mark the spe- constituent assemblies) focusing on the effectiveness cific polarization of the modern doctrinal debate on of the dawla madaniyya paradigm for building a demo- the relationship between state and religion in Mus- cratic state. lim regions, revolving basically around the function of sharia (Al-Ashmawy 1989, Arkoun 1991, Arkoun 2005, Bencheikh 2005, Benzine 2004, Charfi 1998, Secularism vs. Islamism Férjani 1991, Filali-Ansary 1997, Ghalioun 1998, The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 – the first step Lamchichi 1994, Ramadan 1998, Talbi 1998, Hanafi in the secularization of Turkey – was the high point 1996, Abu Zayd 2002, Zakariya 1991). Since the iden- in a process of reform which had been affecting all tifying factor for all Muslims is not religious authority, the Islamic regions since the nineteenth century but Qur’anic law, the debate on laïcité/secu larism – (Bozdémir 1994). It marked a symbolic watershed already ambiguous in Europe1 (Rémond 1998, Taylor between pre-modern Muslim states and the new nation states forged, at least formally, on the Euro- 1 Laïcité is a politological category of French origin, pean model; but especially, it opened the way to new used to define a separation between the institutions ways of thinking concerning government in the land of the state and those of the church according to a of Islam, which would turn out to be decisive for law of 1905. In Protestant and Anglican contexts, where religious institutions have become subordin- later history. On the one hand, innovative ideologists ate to political ones, the term secularism is current, conceptualized the terms of the Islamic state, start- also in political use, and does not indicate as such a Approaching Religion • Vol. 4, No. 2 • December 2014 95 2007, Norris and Inglehart 2004) – did not revolve so These regimes – often wrongly defined as secular, much around the separation of powers as around the since they were run by a non-religious and often mili- separation of contexts, on the degree of integration tary leadership – mostly took on an outwardly repub- between the religious and the political discourses, lican appearance, but those holding power exercised and especially around the degree of implementation it in an authoritarian fashion (Luizard 2008), pre- of sharia in the government of the state and society, a venting any kind of authentically democratic dialec- crucial element in the most bitter of current politic al tic and with a contradictory attitude towards Islam: conflicts (De Poli 2007, Al-Masīrī 2009, Bozdémir sometimes promoting a secularization of society 1996, Roy 2006, Tamimi and Esposito 2000). (like Bourguiba in Tunisia), at other times seeking As is well known, after the modernizing reforms political approval from Islam (like Sadat, in Egypt). which were launched in the nineteenth century, in the However, in the seventies, Islamist movements great majority of countries positive law was extended began to gain strength. In the face of persecution, to cover almost the whole sphere of legal issues, consensual support for them increased among the modelled on, or imitating, European codes and tak- masses – also thanks to their welfare activities – and ing important sectors away from sharia, which was they attempted to enter the political arena by means mainly relegated to matters of family law. Islamists of democratic competition, undergoing, in different however reject this approach, seeing Islam as dīn countries, both phases of repression and cooption. and dawla, that is as religion and state, and since the Especially in the eighties, the post-colonial regimes, identity of these two dimensions is laid down by the having lost their political legitimacy and having partly Islamic law, this should be extensively restored and become hostages of the growing popular consensus become the first and indeed only source of legislation. for radical groups, gave in, in part, to their demands On the contrary, Muslim intellectuals and ideologists in order to contain their political advance. They thus who, in the wake of ‛Abd al-Rāziq upheld the separ- favoured the progressive Islamization of the juridic al ation of the political and religious spheres (De Poli field, issuing more sharia-compliant laws (De Poli 2010) believed that the very limited legalistic element 2007: 82–3). In 1980, for example, Egypt amended of the Prophet’s message was a precise point of refer- Article 2 of its Constitution, laying down that ‘the ence for the historic time in which he preached, but principles of sharia are the main source of legislation’ had no absolute or imperishable value. Sharia should – though this failed to make any significant change in not therefore be a juridical imperative but rather, as secularized legal practice.3 the term itself shows, a path of an ethical and spiritual The politically and culturally illiberal atmosphere nature for the individual conscience of Muslims. of authoritarian regimes – which gave in to Islamist Actually, political and institutional engineering of pressure and restricted progressive thought only in the new Muslim nation states was mainly established order to ensure their own continuity – failed to abol- in the first half of the twentieth century, in a prag- ish public discussion on government and the applica- matic fashion, without any doctrinal interpretation. tion of sharia, merely postponing it. While Islamist movements were harshly repressed and the theses of ‛Abd al-Rāziq censored, the great majority of these countries adopted modern forms The 2011 uprisings and the Democratic Civil State of government, subordinating religion to the state An unresolved ambiguity concerning the nature of and at the same time granting greater or lesser social, the state emerged immediately after the fall of the politic al and legal weight to Islam (Ascanio 2013a).2 regimes. Especially in Egypt and Tunisia,4 where conditions for democratic reconstruction appeared separation of powers – it should be remembered, for to be more favourable, the issue of the application of example, that the sovereigns of Great Britain are also sharia came to the fore in public debate. the heads of the Anglican Church. 2 Most countries restricted sharia basically to a more or less reformed family law, and only one third of 3 The High Constitutional Court limited itself to using countries with Muslim majorities chose to take the sharia to confirm sentences founded on positive law, path of laïcité, abolishing religious law, as did Turkey. interpreting it through a secularized reading (Bälz On the opposite front, sharia has been extensively 1998). applied in the four Islamic Republics (Iran, Pakistan, 4 Mutatis mutandis, similar evolutions can be found Afghanistan, Mauritania) and in the Kingdom of in other countries such as Libya and Syria (De Poli Saudi Arabia. 2013). 96 Approaching Religion • Vol. 4, No. 2 • December 2014 The new conflicts revolving around the option dawla madaniyya, the civil state (Katbeh 2012, Hill of either a secular or an Islamic state emerged with 2012, Chahanovich 2012). the upsurge of Islamist movements in the post-revo- A first meaning of dawla madaniyya is that of lutionary phase. Though it has been ascertained that a ‘secular state’ where politics and religion are kept the uprisings were of basically secular origin (Corrao separate, an interpretation shared by many left wing 2011, Amar 2011, Hamam 2011, Okasha 2012), and liberal intellectuals and politicians. Already in Islamically-oriented groups promptly grasped the March 2011, the Egyptian activist Ahmad Abū Ghāzī long-awaited opportunity to put their political ambi- remarked how the term dawla madaniyya was in fre- tions into practice. While the Muslim Brotherhood quent use, and defined it as follows: in Egypt quickly established its own Freedom and Justice Party (registered on 21.2.2011), on 30 Janu- A state built upon the principle of citizenship.