TEE PROBLEM OF A SCIENCE OF ETHICS IN TEE PHILOSOPHIES OF JOHN DEvŒÏ AND BERTRAND RUSSELL Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of tlie Requirements for tire Degree Doctor of PtLilosophy in tlie Graduate Sclaool of Tiie Ohio State University By John L* McKenney, B.A., The Ohio State University 1952 Approved by: Adviser Th.e beginning of ptillosophy is this : tbe being sensible of the disagreement of men witb each other; an enquiry into the cause of their disagreement; and a disapprobation and distrust of what merely seems; a careful examination into what merely seems, whether it seems rightly; and the discovery of some rule which shall serve like a balance, for the determination of weights; like a square for distinguishing straight and crooked. Epictetus, Discourses 11:11 SS0SS6 Preface To Professor Albert E. Avey % owe a great debt of gratitude for bis patient, critical, and scholarly guid­ ance not only during the writing of this present work, but throughout the past four years of graduate study. During those years I never once failed to receive from him a sympathetic hearing for my views or problems, ac- *Companied by guidance and clarification wherever such was possible. By holding up an ideal of scholarship guided by the true philosophic spirit. Dr. Avey is responsible for v/hatever merit this present study may possess. I also wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to all the other members of the Department of Philosophy and particularly to those who have served on my graduate com­ mittee, Professors D. Luther Evans, Albert R. Chandler, William H. Reither, and Virgil G. Hinshaw, Jr. It was in seminars conducted by Professor H. G. Hullfish that my understanding of John Dewey’s philosophy developed, and I am grateful to Dr. Hullfish for this fact. Profes­ sor Hinshaw’8 interest in philosophical analysis encour­ aged me in my study of Bertrand Russell. Whatever faults there may be in extending the methods of analysis to ethics, however, cannot be attributed to him. ^t was Professor Robert S, Hartman’s work in axiology that served as an example for me of the fruitful results to be obtained ii by analytic metbocL in ethics. My wife aided me greatly in the compilation of the bibliography and in the countless editorial details that were involved in the preparation of the final draft of this study. If it had not been for T^niversity Scholarships granted to me by the Graduate School during 1948-1951, I would not be completing my graduate work: at this time. My three years as a University Scholar provided the opportunity for full time, uninteiypted study which was * ^ so necessary a part of my graduate program. I am truly grateful to Dean N. Paul Hudson and the Graduate School for this assistance. August 15, 1952 John L. McKenney ill Table of Contents Page Preface1 . ..... .. .......... 11 Key to Abbreviations in Footnotes............... vi Part I - Tbe Setting of tiie Problem ... .. .. 1 Chapter 1 - Introduction: the Nature of the Problem ..... 1 Chapter 2 - Dewey’s Position Regarding a Science of Ethics................... 9 Chapter 3 - Russell’s Position Regarding a Science of Ethics. ............ 54 Part II - The Disagreement between Dewey and Russell over the Possibility of a Science of Ethics............. 75 Chapter 4 - The Problem Viewed in the L l ^ t of the Wide Areas of Agreement between Dewey and Russell ... .... .. ... .... 75 Chapter 5 - Russell’s Criticism of Dewey’s Epistemology as the Source of Their Disagreement concerning a Science of Ethics........ 107 Part III - The Possibilities of Reconciling Their Disagreement. ...... 146 Chapter 6 - The Irreconcilable Nature of Their Eplstemological Differences..... 146 Chapter 7 - The "Dnacceptabllity of Russell’s Ethical Position to Dewey........... .. 166 Chapter 8 - An Attempt to Find within Russell’s Position a Basis for an Enç)lrlcal Science of Ethics...... 174 iv Table of Contents (Continued) Page Part IT - Conclusions*• 236 Cliapter 9 - A Review of the Prohlem and Con­ clusions of This Study*••««••«••«••••••••« 236 Bibliography* ..... 258 Autohiography. ..... 265 Sey to Abbreviations in Footnotes A&I............Auth.orlt7 and the Indlvidnal (Russell) EScN Rxpegjence and ^ature (Dewey) G&B* .... "Good and Bad" (Russell) HWP............ -^13tory of Western Piiilosopliy (Russell) HS. ........Human Knov/ledge (Russell) IMP......... «Introduction to Mathematical Plallosophy (Russell) IMT. « Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. (Russell) IMff ..... Intelligence In the Modern World (Dewey) E&K.... .......Zhowlng and the Known (Dewey and Bentley) M&L»......... ««Mysticism and Logic (Russell) OEZEW« « « « .Our Knowledge of the External World (Rus— sell) PBR« «««««««««PMllosophy of Bertrand Russell PJD*........... Philosophy of John Dewey PofM« ..«.«.««««Problems of ^ n (Dewey) R&S............ Religion and Science (Russell) "Reply," PER.« «"Reply to Criticisms," In PBR (Russell) "Reply," PJB«««"Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejolndei', " In PJD (Dewey) Vi Key to Abbreviations In Footnotes (C ont.) RIP. .Reconstruction in Hiilosopliy (Dewey) SO ..............Scientific Outlook (Russell) TofV.......... .Theory of Valuation (Dewey) Kote; Citations to Dewey’s and Russell’s work, both, those using complete titles and those using this key, are given simply by title or abbreviation. The context identifies the author, if a lesser known work by Dewey or Russell is cited. References to other authors are given by surname and title. All sources are identified in full in the Bibliography when a complete reference is not given in the text. vii 1 THE PROBLEM OP A SCIENCE OF ETHICS IN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF JOHN DEVŒI AND BERTRAND RUSSELL Part I Ttie Setting of the Problem Chapter 1. Introduction: The Nature of the Problem If one were asked to name two philosophers who most nearly embodied the spirit and temper of our contemporary scientific age, John Dewey and Bertrand Russell would come readily to mind* There have been and are other men who in different ways have caught the spirit of the times, hut few have had such a wide audience of interested fol­ lowers as these two men. In part this wide hearing given to Dewey’s and Russell’s views is the simple result of the great number of years they had to devote to philos­ ophic pursuits. But the more important reason for the wide popularity of their writings has heen that their interests in science, democracy, education, and social reform have coincided with the developments of these fields in the 20th century. Whether this has been true because Dewey and Russell helped direct these tendencies, or whether they merely followed an already developing trend is not the issue at present. The problem to be discussed, however, takes its point of departure from the role Dewey and Russell have 2 played, in th.e fields mentioned. If John Dewey and Bertrand Russell are models of the contec^orary scientif­ ic philosopher, why do they disagree so radically over the possibility of a science of ethics? Dewey's position not only allows, but actually requires the methods of science to be extended to the sphere of values. Russell's stand to the contrary seems to prohibit science from treating the problems of ethics. To say that the two philosophers have different con­ ceptions of the nature of ethics does not answer the question asked, but rather restates the problem. From the standpoint of their general philosophical orientation, one would think they would agree on the relation of science to values. As a matter of fact they do not agree, and their views actually oppose one another. We are in­ terested here in discovering specifically and in terms of each man's philosophical orientation the cause of their disagreement over the possibility of a science of ethics, as well as examining the chances of resolving this disagreement. Other people have written separately on each man's ethical and scientific philosophy. It is a matter of common knowledge that their views are at variance on the issue of a science of ethics. However, no one seems to have asked exactly why do they disagree and whether their positions on the question at issue might be reconciled. 5 In answering th.e q-aestion of wh.y tliey disagree, each man*3 stand on the science of ethics will have to he investigated in terms of his own philosophical com­ mitments. Russell*s rejection of a science of valuation is particularly puzzling in view of the fact that he does not locate values outside the spatio-temporal world in some ontically objective realm. Dewey says that for the recognition of a science of valuation, "All that is needed is acceptance of the view that moral subject matter is also spatially and temporally qualified. Considering the controverted present state of morals and its loss of popular esteem, the sacrifice demanded should not seem threatening to those who are not moved by vested institu­ tional interest. Now either Dewey is wrong about the necessary and sufficient conditions for admitting a science of ethics, or Russell*s position should acknowledge the viewpoint which renders "the methods and conclusions of natural science serviceable for moral theory and practice. Certainly Russell does hold values to be spatially and temporally qualified. And he is just as definitely not "moved by vested institutional interest." Yet he does not accept Dewey's view on the possibility of making the methods and conclusions of natural science serviceable for moral theory and practice. Whatever reason he does have p. IS. % b l d . 4 for rejecting that possibility mast be located within his philosophy. Once the reason that Russell rejects a science of ethics has been examined in connection with Dewey' s reasons for the possibility of such a science, we will be in a position to see if there is any common point of reference for their respective stands. If there is some such frame of reference, it might serve as an avenue to reconciling their views.