8 | THEMATIC ESSAYS 2.1 Thematic Essays Political Missions and Departures from Constitutional Order Charles T. Call n the past few years, Guinea, Madagascar, I Fiji, Niger, Mauritania, Togo and Kyrgyzstan have experienced unconstitutional changes of government, either through coups d’état or mass popular protests.1 Kenya, Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire have also recently experienced breaks in constitutional order by presidents committing electoral fraud in order to stay in office. In 2011, several Arab states experienced mass protests that sparked political negotiations over succession and in some cases the ouster of presidents. What unites these events is that they all represent constitutional crises over who legitimately rules a state. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) like the UN, regional and sub-regional organizations have been drawn into each of these crises by adopting political positions, providing mediation support, or offering electoral or other technical assistance. Because these events do not necessarily rise to the level of armed conflict or civil war, political UN Photo missions (in the form of standing regional offices, UNOWA chief Said Djinnit (right) arriving for political talks in Guinea with specially-appointed country envoys, or pre-existing ECOWAS Commission President James Victor Gbeho, 2010. peacebuilding presences) rather than peacekeeping operations have been the main vehicle for addressing and Kenya’s electoral dispute and related violence them.2 Based on recent trends, political missions and subsequent powersharing agreement in late are likely to be called upon increasingly in coming 2007 and early 2008. The essay offers neither a years to address challenges to constitutional order. comprehensive study of each mediation process nor This essay analyzes the role of political missions an analysis of the full range of the causes, character in providing mediation and other forms of support and consequences of each transitional arrangement. to transitions in three cases of departures from Instead, it contains the basic elements of the transi- constitutional order between 2007-2010, drawing tional arrangements and a brief account of the role lessons for the UN System and for regional and of various political missions. Based on the three sub-regional organizations. The cases are Guinea’s cases, it then identifies a number of lessons and 2008 coup, Kyrgyzstan’s 2010 political transition challenges for future response by political missions POLITICAL MISSIONS AND DEPARTURES FROM CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER | 9 to crises of constitutional order. that combines civilian-led street demonstrations Before proceeding, it is useful to clarify where the military either splits or sides with the terminology. The African Union (AU) and its sub- regime’s opponents. Its mediation was a tripartite regional organizations have adopted strong norms effort of the OSCE, the EU and the UN. These against what it calls “unconstitutional changes of “revolutions” are, in the eyes of some observers, government,” including coups, violent demonstra- unconstitutional changes of government, and the tions or unrest and nonviolent “revolutions” or mass international community will likely spend consid- protests. Heads of state who comprise intergovern- erable time in the next decade sorting through what mental organizations would logically be concerned criteria make such an ouster “legitimate” or not. about illicit attempts to change governments and The third case study, on Kenya’s electoral dis- oust them from power. However, constitutional pute with its associated mass violence and atrocities, order is also threatened by untoward attempts to represents a different category of departure from persist in office by unconstitutional means. Although constitutional order: the constitutionally contested sitting heads of state may be less enthusiastic about persistence in office of a sitting president who norms against unconstitutional persistence in office hangs onto power after a disputed election. It was through electoral fraud and other means, wide- mediated by an AU Panel of Eminent African Per- spread condemnation of the conduct of sitting sonalities, chaired by Kofi Annan. presidents in Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008 and Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 may signal the norma- tive extension of support for constitutional order Guinea’s 2008 Coup d’État to cover constitutionally questionable attempts to On 23 December 2008, six hours after the death cling to power, rightfully putting them on an equal of Guinea’s longtime ruler Lansana Conté, a footing with unconstitutional changes of govern- coup d’état was announced by Captain Moussa ment. In this essay, the concept “departure from Dadis Camara on behalf of the National Council constitutional order” refers both to unconstitutional for Democracy and Development (CNDD). changes of government (e.g., Guinea’s successful The military junta dissolved the institutions of 2008 coup and Kyrgyzstan’s ouster of President government, and suspended the constitution and all Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2010) and unconstitutional political and union activity. Negotiations between persistence of government (e.g., the alleged electoral the CNDD and the Forces Vives, a collection of fraud in Kenya in 2007). civil society and political groups, commenced with mediation led by the AU and ECOWAS, which co-chaired a large International Contact Group POLITICAL MISSIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL for Guinea formed during the AU Summit in CRISES: THREE EXAMPLES January 2009. Said Djinnit, the SRSG and head of UNOWA, was invited to that meeting and served This section presents three recent departures from as an active, unofficial third arm of the mediation. constitutional order involving different constellations The AU appointed Ibrahima Fall as Special Envoy, of IGO political missions. The cases were selected to and ECOWAS was represented by its president, represent diverse regions, a variety of constitutional Mohammed Ibn Chambas. The three mediators crises and different combinations of political met monthly in Conakry, assisted by an ECOWAS missions that changed over time.3 The first case study official based there. The Contact Group rejected on Guinea represents the most common departure the unconstitutional change of government and from constitutional order, a classic coup d’état. Its called for new elections and the exclusion of the mediation was co-led by the Economic Community CNDD members. of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU, In April, Dadis Camara seemed to renege on with the Special Representative of the Secretary- earlier pledges that members of the CNDD would General (SRSG) of the UN Office for West Africa not stand for elections, leading to protests. Gov- (UNOWA) playing a key facilitating role. ernment forces suppressed a demonstration in The second case study, Kyrgyzstan, represents September 2009 with violence, leading to mass rape, an increasingly common form of regime transition other atrocities and over 150 deaths, prompting the 10 | THEMATIC ESSAYS Review of UN Special Political Mission Funding and Backstopping At the end of its regular 2010 session, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution asking the Secretary-General to conduct a thorough review of special political mission (SPM) funding and backstopping, and to make proposals for alternatives.1 This represented a potentially significant step towards strengthening the contribution of the UN’s political missions to peace and security. As outlined in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report on SPMs, “SPM” is only a budgetary category.2 It now com- prises by default most peace and security activities not included in the rest of the UN programme budget (the regular budget), as well as anything that is not a blue-helmet peacekeeping operation. With no clear definition of an SPM other than a budgetary one, this category has come to include a wide range of entities, ranging from the missions and envoys described in this volume to sanctions panels (experts dealing with specific sanctions regimes). While SPMs keep growing into more numerous and complex formats – especially in the cases of larger UN special political missions such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan – there have not been any major improvements to their funding and backstopping arrangements. This means there are gaps in the support provided at headquarters to staff deployed in some of the world’s most dangerous environments including Somalia, Afghanistan and the Palestinian Territories. The challenges that the Secretary-General’s forthcoming SPM funding and backstopping review is likely to high- light include: • The UN financial rules and arrangements have effectively two separate and misaligned systems. The peace- keeping budget is set annually in the middle of each year, while the regular budget – including SPMs – is bian- nual and agreed at the end of every other year. This means that budgeting for SPMs requires a good deal of guesswork about future needs. Unsurprisingly, the UN Secretariat often has to request supplemental funds for SPMs that expand or face new challenges. • Exacerbating this problem, political missions receive less individual attention from member states than peace- keeping operations, as their financial requirements are wrapped up with other elements of the regular budget debate. That limits the oversight by Member States. Similarly, there is no inter-governmental entity equivalent to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (the “C34”) that reviews the state of peace operations