6949 RCOMP 16th PHILOSOPHY_Aacg_adapted 7x10 29/09/2016 11:43 Page 225 1111 2 3 10 4 5 6 THE POMPONAZZI 7 8 AFFAIR 9 1011 1 The Controversy over the 2 3111 Immortality of the Soul 4 5 Leen Spruit 6 7 8 9 20111 1 The issue of the immortality of the soul involves several disciplinary fields, including 2 natural philosophy (psychology as a part of natural science), theology (afterlife), and 3 ethics (individual responsibility of human actors). Although different and contradictory 4 answers have been given to this question in the Western tradition, four doctrinal strands 5 can be traced. 6 First, materialists affirm that man, inasmuch as his body is an organized aggregate of purely 7 material elements, disappears completely when the elements that compose him are dissolved. 8 This is the answer of some Presocratics, Epicurus, the Stoics, and, in the early moden period, 9 Thomas Hobbes, who reduced mental acts to organic functions or to epiphenomena of 30111 matter. 1 Second, for Plato, the soul is a substance in itself that exists prior to being joined to the 2 body, which it moves. It dwells in the body for a certain time but departs at death to take 3 up residence in other bodies, until, thoroughly purified, it is able to return to the world of 4 the ideas. Some of Plato’s later followers viewed the human soul as a particular expression 35 of the cosmic Soul, or as a particle of the World Soul. These authors admit the immortality 6 of the soul, but this immortality is not seen as specifically personal. The substantiality of 7 the soul and its separability of the body were also emphasized by fifteenth- and sixteenth- 8 century Neoplatonics, and then by Descartes and his followers. 9 Third, Aristotle defined the soul as the first act of an organic body, but he also made a 40111 distinction between an intellect that makes everything and one that becomes everything, 1 suggesting that only the former was “separate” and “eternal.” As is well known, his wordings 2 triggered a host of, often divergent, interpretations (see the next section). 3 Finally, the Christian tradition affirms, with few exceptions,1 the personal immortality 4 of the human soul. Some of the early Fathers, including Justin Martyr and Arnobius, rejected 45 the doctrine of natural immortality and made it contingent upon God’s grace, but the 46 majority of the later Fathers viewed immortality as rationally provable. For example, 225 1ST PROOFS: NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 6949 RCOMP 16th PHILOSOPHY_Aacg_adapted 7x10 29/09/2016 11:43 Page 226 LEEN SPRUIT Augustine demonstrated the immortality of the soul by showing that it possesses truth. Truth is immortal, because it can never be untrue; therefore the soul, in which truth dwells, cannot die.2 From Augustine, through the Middle Ages, and until the rise of early modern Aristotelian philosophy, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul was more or less taken for granted and only rarely challenged.3 As a rule, immortality was defended with theological (afterlife, resurrection), ontological (substantialty of the soul), and ethical (dignity of man, morality) arguments.4 At the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, this situation changed radically. In 1492, the Bishop of Padua issued an edict against discussion on the unity of the intellect. This disciplinary event had surprising consequences, as it pushed the Paduan Aristotelians Nicoletto Vernia (d. 1499) and Agostino Nifo (c. 1469–1538) to a remarkable shift in their thought. Initially, they were defenders of Averroes’s theory of the unity of the intellect, but, from loyal followers of Averroes as a guide to Aristotle, they became careful students of the Greek commentators and, in their late thought, both Vernia and Nifo attacked Averroes as a misleading interpreter of Aristotle, believing that personal immortality could be philosophically demonstrated. Then, in 1513, at the Fifth Lateran Council, the papal bull Apostolici regiminis was issued that decreed that the immortality of the soul could and should be proved philosophically; this bull therefore obliged all philosophers to produce the appropriate demonstrations. And finally, in 1516, Pietro Pomponazzi published his Treatise on the Immortality of the Soul, which provoked a host of attacks and deeply influenced all later disputes and treatises. In his Treatise on the Immortality of the Soul, Pomponazzi rejected the view that the immortality of the soul was provable with philosophical arguments. He did not accept that the intellect, defined as the substantial form of the body, could also be considered as a self- subsisting entity. Arguing from the Aristotelian text, Pomponazzi maintained that proof of the intellect’s ability to survive the death of the body must be found in an activity of the intellect that functions without any dependence on the body. In his view, although the intellect does not need any bodily organ as an instrument, it nevertheless needs the body indirectly, because it needs phantasms, and therefore it cannot be separated from the body. Indeed, even the highest activity of the intellect, the attainment of universals in cognition, is always mediated by sense impression. Therefore, based solely on philosophical premises and Aristotelian principles, the conclusion is that the entire soul dies with the body. Pomponazzi’s On the Immortality of the Soul aroused violent opposition and led to a spate of books being written against him. After a summary view of the preliminaries and a succint analysis of Pomponazzi’s treatise (in this and the next sections), relevant replies are discussed (the following two sections). A caveat is due here. During the sixteenth century, a host of treatises on the immortality of the soul were written and published. Here, not all of these works are taken into consideration, but only those works and authors that can be connected in a significant way to Pomponazzi’s treatise and the ensuing polemics. The debate following the publication of Pomponazzi’s treatise led some authors to a more profound reconsideration of the intrinsic value of Aristotle’s philosophy. Crisostomo Javelli, for example, although certainly not adhering to any form of anti-Aritotelianism, came to the conclusion that Aristotle and philosophy were no longer the same. The sixteenth- century Italian controversy over the immortality of the soul influenced later discussions, both in Italy and abroad, on the corporeality and mortality of the soul.5 Pomponazzi’s position 226 1ST PROOFS: NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 6949 RCOMP 16th PHILOSOPHY_Aacg_adapted 7x10 29/09/2016 11:43 Page 227 THE POMPONAZZI AFFAIR 1111 even had echoes in the seventeenth century, because Marin Mersenne attacked Vanini 2 and his naturalism as based on the writings of Pomponazzi.6 3 4 5 Historical and Doctrinal Background: Aristotle to Pomponazzi 6 7 In De Anima,Aristotle defined the soul as the first actuality of a natural body potentially 8 possessing life. The soul is the form of the body, and both constitute the living being. This 9 apparently implies that, when the body dies, the soul too ceases to exist, just as an impression 1011 made on a wax tablet perishes when the wax melts.7 And yet, nothwitstanding his 1 commitment to a biological view of man, Aristotle suggested, on several occasions, that 2 the intellect or rational soul, unlike the vegetative and sensitive souls, might be “separable,” 3111 that it might survive the body. His statements are, however, never developed into a 4 consistent argument. He hinted that, “the intellect seems to be an independent substance 5 engendered in us, and to be imperishable,” or “something more divine.”8 And, in Book III, 6 he clearly qualified the active part of the intellect as immortal and eternal.9 By contrast, 7 at the outset of this work, Aristotle stated that, if we consider the majority of the soul’s 8 functions, “there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without 9 involving the body.” Thinking seems the most probable exception, but “if this proves to 20111 be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as 1 a condition of its existence.”10 2 For Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 AD), probably Aristotle’s most authoritative ancient 3 interpreter, the agent intellect was the First Cause, and he identified the “potential” or 4 “material intellect” as “only a disposition” in the human organism. Thus, the individual 5 rational soul is material and, hence, mortal. Alexander’s view became known in the Middle 6 Ages through a translation of his De intellectu11 and the quotes in Averroes. He was severely 7 criticized by William of Auvergne, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, but his views 8 influenced later authors, including John Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen, and Biagio Pelacani.12 9 The impact of Alexander’s position on the sixteenth-century debates owes much to the 30111 Latin translation of his De Anima by Girolamo Donato (1495) and to Pomponazzi’s 1 presentation of his opinion as the genuine Aristotelian position. 2 Many of the Neoplatonists undertook to explain or to paraphrase the writings of Aristotle 3 and attempted to show that Plato and Aristotle were in harmony with each other, including 4 on psychological issues. Cases in point are Themistius (c. 317–c. 388), Simplicius (c. 35 490–c. 560) and John Philoponus (490–570). Their views deeply influenced the Arabic 6 interpretations of Peripatetic psychology. 7 The Arab commentarors on Aristotle, including Alfarabi (c. 872–950), Avicenna 8 (980–1037), and Averroes (1126–1198), interpreted Aristotle’s doctrine of the active 9 intellect and the potential intellect in a broader cosmological context, that is, in the 40111 hierarchical order of intelligences that move the celestial spheres.