TO DETECT, TO DETER, TO DEFEND: THE DISTANT EARLY WARNING (DEW) LINE AND EARLY COLD WAR DEFENSE POLICY, 1953-1957 by JAMES LOUIS ISEMANN B.A., Truman State University, 1991 M.A., Truman State University, 1992 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2009 Abstract The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, a key program under President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy, prepared the United States defense posture for “the long haul” in the Cold War. Eisenhower wanted to prevent the escalation of military costs while still providing an adequate defense. Eisenhower emphasized a retaliatory capability and improved continental defenses, the so-called “sword and shield,” which are key features of the New Look. The DEW Line would prove to be a vital component of both. Whereas the initial emphasis of the DEW Line was to warn against attack providing for both active and passive defense measures, soon there was a definite “counter-offensive” role for the DEW Line as well—the protection of the primary retaliatory capability of the United States: the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The place of the DEW Line in the history of the Cold War has been an underappreciated topic. With the exception of the scholarship from the 1950s and early 1960s, only recently have continental defense and particularly the DEW Line been removed from the shadows of other Cold War events, strategies, and military programs. This doctoral thesis is an account of the DEW Line’s conception, implementation, and position in Eisenhower’s New Look and deterrent strategy. The DEW Line proved to be a cardinal feature of Eisenhower’s New Look strategy: it strengthened overall U.S. defenses and defense posture as the one element of U.S. defense policy (“New Look”) that improved and connected both the active and passive measures of continental defense by providing early warning against manned bombers flying over the polar region; it bolstered the deterrent value of SAC; and it was instrumental in developing closer peacetime military cooperation between the United States and Canada. In fact, U.S.- Canadian diplomacy during the 1950s offers an important case study in “superpower- middle power” interaction. However, despite the asymmetry in their relationship, U.S.- Canadian defense policies proved to be analogous. All of these objectives could not have been accomplished without the technological and logistical abilities necessary to construct successfully the DEW Line. TO DETECT, TO DETER, TO DEFEND: THE DISTANT EARLY WARNING (DEW) LINE AND EARLY COLD WAR DEFENSE POLICY, 1953-1957 by JAMES LOUIS ISEMANN B.A., Truman State University, 1991 M.A., Truman State University 1992 A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2009 Approved by: Major Professor Dr. Mark Parillo Copyright JAMES LOUIS ISEMANN 2009 Abstract The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, a key program under President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy, prepared the United States defense posture for “the long haul” in the Cold War. Eisenhower wanted to prevent the escalation of military costs while still providing an adequate defense. Eisenhower emphasized a retaliatory capability and improved continental defenses, the so-called “sword and shield,” which are key features of the New Look. The DEW Line would prove to be a vital component of both. Whereas the initial emphasis of the DEW Line was to warn against attack providing for both active and passive defense measures, soon there was a definite “counter-offensive” role for the DEW Line as well—the protection of the primary retaliatory capability of the United States: the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The place of the DEW Line in the history of the Cold War has been an underappreciated topic. With the exception of the scholarship from the 1950s and early 1960s, only recently have continental defense and particularly the DEW Line been removed from the shadows of other Cold War events, strategies, and military programs. This doctoral thesis is an account of the DEW Line’s conception, implementation, and position in Eisenhower’s New Look and deterrent strategy. The DEW Line proved to be a cardinal feature of Eisenhower’s New Look strategy: it strengthened overall U.S. defenses and defense posture as the one element of U.S. defense policy (“New Look”) that improved and connected both the active and passive measures of continental defense by providing early warning against manned bombers flying over the polar region; it bolstered the deterrent value of SAC; and it was instrumental in developing closer peacetime military cooperation between the United States and Canada. In fact, U.S.- Canadian diplomacy during the 1950s offers an important case study in “superpower- middle power” interaction. However, despite the asymmetry in their relationship, U.S.- Canadian defense policies proved to be analogous. All of these objectives could not have been accomplished without the technological and logistical abilities necessary to construct successfully the DEW Line. Table of Contents List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ ix List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. x Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... xi Preface ........................................................................................................................................... xii CHAPTER 1 - Historiography of the DEW Line ........................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 2 - Strategic Bombing: The Developing Threat ....................................................... 10 CHAPTER 3 - U.S.-Canadian Defense Relations and Continental Defense ................................ 71 CHAPTER 4 - 1953: The Eisenhower Administration, Canadian Sovereignty, and Continental Defense ................................................................................................................................ 110 CHAPTER 5 - Canadian Concerns about Continental Defense ................................................. 159 CHAPTER 6 - The DEW Line and Public Opinion ................................................................... 177 CHAPTER 7 - Developing Defense Policy, 1953-1957 ............................................................. 207 CHAPTER 8 - Arctic Testing, Canada-U.S. Relations, and Approval of the DEW Line .......... 234 CHAPTER 9 - Construction and Operation ................................................................................ 278 CHAPTER 10 - Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 307 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 317 Appendix A - Acronyms ............................................................................................................. 332 Appendix B - National Defense Spending (Millions of Dollars) ....................................... 334 Appendix C - Department of Defense Personnel ........................................................................ 335 viii List of Figures Figure 2.1 An Arctic projection map (http:www.web.scavengers.net) ........................................ 15 Figure 4.1 The Pinetree Line (http://www.pinetreeline.org/boundary/canada.html ................... 121 Figure 7.1 The Dew Line with the projected seaward extension and supportin radar lines. (Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas) .............................................................................. 216 Figure 8.1 Radome example (http:www.ll.mit.edu/about/History/dewline.html ....................... 242 Figure 8.2 A radome under construction on the DEW Line (http:www.porticus.org/bell/images/ollie/ollie27.jpg ......................................................... 243 Figure 8.3 The experimental DEW Line station: Streator, Illinois ............................................ 246 Figure 8.4 Sector control stations of the Mid Canada Line (http://www.lswilson.ca/mcl.htm) . 248 Figure 8.5 The DEW Line (Ray, Thomas A History of the DEW Line, 1946-1964) .................. 258 Figure 9.1 Aerial view of DEW Line Main station, CAM-MAIN (http://www.lswilson.ca/cam- m-002.jpg) ........................................................................................................................... 282 Figure 9.2 CAM-MAIN site building layout diagram (http://www.lswilson.ca/layout-camma.gif) ............................................................................................................................................. 283 Figure 9.3 An example of an auxiliary site on the DEW Line (http://ll.mit.edu/about/History/dewline.html ..................................................................... 286 Figure 9.4 BAR-4 auxiliary site plan (http://lswilson.ca/bar4pics.htm ...................................... 287 ix List of Tables Table B.1 National Defense Spending (1948-1953) ..................................................................