Public Unreason: Essays on Political Disagreement by Aaron James Ancell Department of Philosophy Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Supervisor ___________________________ Allen Buchanan ___________________________ Wayne Norman ___________________________ David Wong Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Duke University 2017 ABSTRACT Public Unreason: Essays on Political Disagreement by Aaron James Ancell Department of Philosophy Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Supervisor ___________________________ Allen Buchanan ___________________________ Wayne Norman ___________________________ David Wong An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Duke University 2017 Copyright by Aaron James Ancell 2017 Abstract Why is political disagreement such a persistent and pervasive feature of contemporary societies? Many political philosophers answer by pointing to moral pluralism and the complexity of relevant non-moral facts. In Chapter 1, I argue that this answer is seriously inadequate. Drawing on work from psychology, political science, and evolutionary anthropology, I argue that an adequate explanation of political disagreement must emphasize two features of human psychology: tribalism and motivated reasoning. It is often assumed that disagreements rooted in bias and irrationality can be ignored or idealized away by philosophers developing ideal theories, that is, theories that aim to sketch the normative outlines of an ideal society. In Chapters 2 and 3, I argue that this assumption is mistaken because even ideal theories are subject to constraints, and idealizing away disagreements rooted in certain kinds of bias and irrationality violates these constraints. In Chapter 4, I turn to the ethics of political compromise, focusing specifically on compromises that involve making serious concessions to injustice. I consider and attempt to reconcile two seemingly inconsistent approaches to evaluating such compromises: one that emphasizes fundamental moral principles versus one that emphasizes pragmatic considerations. iv Dedication In memory of my dad. v Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... x Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 1. Partisan People and Motivated Morals: On the Nature and Causes of Political Disagreement ................................................................................................................................. 4 1.1 Divergent Values .............................................................................................................. 6 1.2 Disagreement About Non-Moral Facts ....................................................................... 14 1.3 The Divergent Judgments Account ............................................................................. 18 1.4 Why does it matter why people disagree? ................................................................. 20 1.5 Features of Political Disagreement .............................................................................. 24 1.5.1 Pervasive ..................................................................................................................... 24 1.5.2 Expansive .................................................................................................................... 25 1.5.3 Persistent ..................................................................................................................... 27 1.5.4 Obstinate ..................................................................................................................... 28 1.5.5 Can the Divergent Judgments Account explain these features? ........................ 29 1.5.6 Antagonistic ............................................................................................................... 30 1.5.7 Clustered ..................................................................................................................... 33 1.5.8 Polarized ..................................................................................................................... 38 1.5.9 Where does this leave the Divergent Judgments Account? ................................ 42 1.6 Political Ignorance .......................................................................................................... 43 1.6.1 Disagreement About Well-Established Facts ........................................................ 44 vi 1.6.2 Do people know what they are disagreeing about? ............................................. 49 1.6.3 The Illusion of Explanatory Depth ......................................................................... 52 1.6.4 Political Ignorance as a Problem for the Divergent Judgments Account .......... 54 1.7 Party Before Policy ......................................................................................................... 55 1.8 Political Tribalism ........................................................................................................... 65 1.8.1 Tribalism and Social Identities ................................................................................ 65 1.8.2 Tribal Politics ............................................................................................................. 69 1.9 Motivated Reasoning ..................................................................................................... 77 1.10 Conclusion: The Tribal Rationalizers Account ......................................................... 85 1.10.1 The Advantages of the Tribal Rationalizers Account ........................................ 86 1.10.2 The Limits of My Arguments ................................................................................ 89 2. Utopianism and Political Irrationality ................................................................................. 91 2.1 The Charge of Utopianism ............................................................................................ 94 2.2 Probability, Possibility, and Hopeless Aspirational Theory .................................... 97 2.3 The Limits of Estlund’s Argument ............................................................................ 102 2.4 Estlund Against Epistocracy ....................................................................................... 105 2.5 Thinking Straight is not like Dancing like a Chicken .............................................. 111 3. The Fact of Unreasonable Pluralism .................................................................................. 117 3.1 The Fact of Reasonable Pluralism .............................................................................. 123 3.2 The Sources of Unreason ............................................................................................. 127 3.2.1 How the Sources of Unreason Make Us Unreasonable ..................................... 128 3.2.2 Two Types of Unreasonableness ........................................................................... 131 vii 3.3 The Limits of Ideal Theory .......................................................................................... 134 3.3.1 Ideal Theory and Unreasonable Pluralism .......................................................... 137 3.3.2 The Constraints of a Realistic Utopia ................................................................... 139 3.3.3 Applying the Constraints ....................................................................................... 142 3.4 Can we Overcome the Sources of Unreason? ........................................................... 143 3.4.1 The Historical Record ............................................................................................. 145 3.4.2 The Pitfalls of Human Reason ............................................................................... 148 3.4.3 Am I an evoconservative? ...................................................................................... 152 3.5. Conclusion and Implications ..................................................................................... 154 3.5.1 Implications for Ideal Theory ................................................................................ 155 3.5.2 The Stability of a Liberal Society ........................................................................... 158 4. Making Dirty Compromises with Clean Hands ............................................................... 163 4.1 What is a dirty compromise? ...................................................................................... 164 4.2 An Example of a Dirty Compromise ......................................................................... 172 4.3 Three Problems for Dirty Compromises ................................................................... 174 4.3.1 Are dirty compromises ever morally acceptable? .............................................