College of William & Mary Law School William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans 2007 Devolution of Implementing Policymaking in Network Governments Charles H. Koch Jr. William & Mary Law School Repository Citation Koch, Charles H. Jr., "Devolution of Implementing Policymaking in Network Governments" (2007). Faculty Publications. 49. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/49 Copyright c 2007 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs THE DEVOLUTION OF IMPLEMENTING POLICYMAKING IN NETWORK GOVERNMENTS Charles H. Koch, Jr.* An undeniable, but often lamented, reality of modem government is that substantial policymaking must take place at the implementation stage. Legislative and executive authorities simply cannot resolve all policy issues, and they often find it politically inadvisable to do so. The danger, of course, is that efficiency or expediency will overwhelm the legitimate allocation of responsibility between the political authorities and the administrative authorities. The balance between democratic legitimacy and effective government thus dictates the delegation of the implementing authority. The more complex the society and the more complicated the demands on government, the more elusive this balance becomes. Legal principles regulating delegations of authority suggest that authority should be delegated based on hierarchy. Yet even in hierarchical systems, influence moves not only up and down but also horizontally among the decisionmakers and institutions within the system. Moreover, policy is made at the lower levels of the hierarchy without the participation of the hierarchy's upper reaches. Regardless, not all governments, especially supranational ones, can be understood as mere hierarchies. Instead, the realities of governmental policymaking are complicated by questions of legitimacy. Even more complexity is added when several governmental systems combine in some sort of federal organization. Recently, there has been a strong movement toward such organizations. Regions and ethnic groups in established nations and emerging nations alike are insisting on more autonomy. Nations are coming together to form a variety of supranational organizations, some quite broad in their mandates. These coordinated governments raise increasingly complex implementation and devolution issues. Traditional federal systems, such as the United States, have allocated shared authority • Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. B.A., University of Maryland, 1966; J.D., George Washington University, 1969; LL.M., University of Chicago, 1975. I would like to thank the organizers of and participants in the 2007 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, Emory University School of Law, and the Emory Lnw Journal. 168 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57 through a divided federalism in which central and subunit administrative hierarchies are formally segregated and their respective powers are more or less clearly defined. 1 In contrast to this traditional federal organizational concept, the European Union (E.U.) is built around commingled responsibilities. 2 From the beginning, the member states have been integrally involved in the policymaking from the foundational legislation to implementation. 3 Their engagement has only increased over the years, as E.U. institutions tend to give the member states implementing discretion through framework measures and "soft" laws.4 For these reasons, the E.U. system is most accurately characterized as a network, comprised of webs of interrelationships among E.U., national, and non-governmental institutions. Walter van Gerven observed, "While public authority was traditionally organized pyramidally along hierarchical lines, it is now also organized through numerous networks of public and private nuclei of power, making power move both vertically and horizontally."5 Policymaking influences may combine in a nearly infinite variety of forms with policy moving down from the central authority, up from the member state governments, and horizontally among the member states and their institutions. Even within the E.U. and national institutions, policy development is not necessarily hierarchical.6 1 See John C. Reitz, Political Economy and Separation of Powers, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PRoss. 579, 618 (2006) ('The United States ... has a legislative system that divides lawmaking powers among two legislative houses and the President, who has little ability beyond his veto power to control legislation. It also has robust judicial review and is a federal state in which the states retain extensive lawmaking powers"). 2 See J.A.E. Vervaele, Counteifeiting the Single European Currency (Euro): Towards the Federalization of Enforcement in the European Union?, 8 CoLUM. J. EuR. L. 151, 151 (2002) ("As opposed to Nation States, in the European Union there is no complete separation of powers along the lines of the trias politico doctrine. The European Union is based on shared governance between the European Community/European Union and the Member states, being an integrated community legal order."). 3 DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION 56-57 (2004). 4 See Peter L. Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages of Globalization and Information: What America Can Learn from Europe and Vice Versa, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 645, 676 (2006) ("When the EU has issued a "directive," setting framework standards that require implementing measures, these measures are commonly­ but not invariably-taken by Member States subject to EU controls for their adequacy."). 5 WALTER VAN GERVEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POLICY OF STATES AND PEOPLES 159 (2005); see also id. (noting recognition of this fact by the E.U. Commission). 6 For example, the E.U. Council has nine configurations in which the relevant national ministers represent the member states in approving E.U. legislation. Thus, the E.U. policy that is imposed on the member states is to some extent created by the common member-state ministers, and perhaps more importantly, the combination of the staffs of the member-state departments, the permanent Council staffs, and the relevant Commission staff. PETER STRAUSS ET AL., NORM CREATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 16-17 (2007), http://www .abanet.org/adminlaw/eu/Reports_Rulemak:ing_06-07-2007 .pdf. 2007] POLICYMAKING IN NETWORK GOVERNMENTS 169 The E.U. network system requires innovations in the concepts and strategies of federalism. It exposes challenges in carrying out a unified, effective, and legitimate implementation of shared programs. Even though the U.S. Constitution aspired to a "more perfect union" among the several states,7 it has been held to establish an adversarial relationship between the central government and its states.8 This divided federalism combined with the generally hierarchical allocation of authority presents a useful contrast to the E.U. network federalism. Network organization might have advantages and, regardless, may best describe many existing and emerging federal systems, both national and supranational.9 Hence, the E.U. and U.S. experiences and mechanisms offer insights into how to design other federal systems. 10 I. IMPLEMENTING POLICYMAKING Beyond the separation of powers issue, governmental entitles must also consider the legitimacy of delegations from the political bodies to the implementing bodies. The E.U. has somewhat paralleled the U.S. in accepting the necessity of delegating implementing policy. The evolution of the U.S. acceptance of that necessity goes back some distance and probably presages the ultimate development of E.U. delegation doctrine. 7 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 8 See Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the Constitutional Role of Self­ Interest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 381 (2001) ("While adversary theory plays a central role in the history and philosophy of American political theory, its premises also pervade fundamental provisions of the United States Constitution."). 9 Anne-Marie Slaughter developed the idea of network government. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter & David T. Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update (Washington & Lee Pub. Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-12, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=960484 (providing a literature review of the impressive and growing study of network governments). 10 Much of the discussion in this Article is informed by the study of and experience with U.S. administrative Jaw. As society grows outside national borders, so too do government and, consequently, administrative Jaw. A "global administrative law" is under construction and is recognized as a contributor to the study of network governments. Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 9, at 221-22. The leaders of that movement observed, 'The construction of a global administrative law is inevitably shaped and constrained by existing institutions and principles as well as the shifting patterns of international ordering and the normative foundations . Within these constraints, many strategies of institutional design are possible." Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. IS, 53 (2005). However, these leaders also cautioned: "Many of the emerging mechanisms of global administrative law stem from northern and western initiatives, and any attempt at justifying the need for such a body of law