POLICY REPORT 15.04.2021 Local Security Governance in Yemen in Times of War The Cases of al-Hudayda, Ta‘iz and Aden by Mareike Transfeld, Mohamed al-Iriani, Maged Sultan and Marie-Christine Heinze funded by Acknowledgements The research for this Policy Report was designed and im- plemented by the YPC team consisting of Yemen Polling Field- work Director Kamal Muqbil, Qualitative Research Officer Hakim Noman, and Yemen Policy Director Mareike Transfeld with input from Marie- Christine Heinze at CARPO. Ahmed al-Shargabi designed the maps and graphics. We also want to thank Debra Lichtenthäler and Charlotte McGowan- Griffin for their diligent copy-editing and Sabine Schulz for layouting this pub- lication. Last but not least, we want to thank YPC President Hafez al-Bukari for facilitating the research for this report. This research was made possible by the generous support of the Government of Canada provided through Global Affairs Canada. Local Security Governance in Yemen in Times of War 2 Table of Contents Acronyms 0 033 Introduction 04 The Security Committees in al-Hudayda 16 The Security Committee in Ta‘iz 35 The Security Committee in Aden 53 Security Committees and Political Stabilization 68 Literature 79 About the Authors 87 About the Project 88 Table of Maps Map of al-Hudayda 17 Map of Ta‘iz 37 Map of Aden 54 Table of Charts Communication Between Institutions and Forces in al-Hudayda 30 Communication Between Institutions and Forces in Tai‘z 46 Timeline of the Aden Security Committee 59 Local Security Governance in Yemen in Times of War 3 Acronyms GPC General People’s Congress IRG internationally recognized government LAL Local Authority Law MoD Ministry of Defense MoI Ministry of Interior NMSC National Military Security Committee NRA National Resistance Army NSA National Security Agency PTM Peaceful Tihama Movement PSO Political Security Organization SSC Supreme Security Committee SSF Special Security Forces STC Southern Transitional Council TPR Tihama Popular Resistance UAE United Arab Emirates Local Security Governance in Yemen in Times of War: Introduction 4 Introduction Mareike Transfeld and Marie-Christine Heinze After six years of war, Yemen and its state institutions have undergone dramat- ic changes, having fragmented along multiple fault lines. The security sector is no exception. In the northwest, Ansar Allah took over the capital Sana‘a by force in September 2014, before seizing large parts of the highlands: from the Saudi border in the north, to the Red Sea in the west, Marib in the east and al-Dhali‘ in the south. Ansar Allah consolidated its control over the state, systematically weakening tribal structures and using security forces to crush any space for dissent or opposition (Nevola & Carboni 2019). Due to the escalation of hostilities southwest of Sana‘a in 2015, security institutions collapsed in heavily embattled areas, particularly in Ta‘iz and Aden (Transfeld & al-Sharjabi 2020; Sultan, Transfeld & Muqbil 2019; bin Othman & Transfeld 2020). The re-establishment of security institutions under the internationally recognized government (IRG) in early 2017 brought some stability; but eventually, instead of unifying the troops under the ‘National Army’, the local- ized recruitment processes have resulted in more state fragmentation. Exemplary of this is the expulsion of the IRG from Aden in August 2019, after which the Southern Transitional Council (STC) gained full control over police and para- military forces (Saleh & al-Sharjabi 2019). What many seem to neglect is that this is, de facto, a building block for what the STC wishes to achieve: an independent South. While the Riyadh Agreement seeks to mend these fractures and re-unite these institutions under the banner of the Yemeni state, the agreement has up to date failed to do so. Regional support to the state security sector, as well as other non-state actors, has created a mosaic of military and para-military formations with conflicting missions and motivations (Nagi, Ardemagni & Transfeld 2020). Rather than coming together, the gravitation forces from the region appear to be pulling the institutions further apart. As a consequence of the deadlock on the national level, mobilizing opportu- nities for stabilization on the local level are now paramount. Most literature on the Yemeni security sector, with few exceptions (Jerrett 2017; Al-Qodasi & Al-Jarbani 2021), looks at military structures on a national elite level, with a special focus on patronage networks and tribal loyalties (Seitz 2017; Fat- tah 2010; Barany 2016). While the Yemen Polling Center has researched popular perceptions of security institutions (Heinze & Albukari 2017; Heinze & Albukari 2018; Soudias & Transfeld 2014), as well as the specific security concerns of girls and women (see below), to date not much research has been done on the security Local Security Governance in Yemen in Times of War: Introduction 5 institutions themselves, particularly at the governorate and district levels. In fact, the literature often neglects institutions in favor of informal politics, highlighting family or tribal relationships, while leaving the extant albeit weak institutions un- derresearched.1 This report seeks to fill this gap. Given their role as central nodes of the security governance structure, this report explores governorate-level Secu- rity Committees in three governorates that have been particularly affected by vio- lence and institutional fragmentation: Ta‘iz, al-Hudayda and Aden. Next to seeking to understand the institutional set-up and functions of the Committees, questions guiding this inquiry are how the Committees have evolved in the context of state fragmentation and what, if any, capacities they have to play a potential role in local-level mediation (for instance, regarding humanitarian access) or transitional security governance arrangements. State Institutions in a Context of Informality Informality is a cross-cutting factor in all three locations. The Yemeni state has never possessed the monopoly over the legitimate use of force, a criterion of statehood as defined by Max Weber. In the past, the lines dividing state and non- state actors had already blurred: tribal structures permeating the military; tribal shaykhs distributing the salaries of formal troops; and sectarian or tribal militias fighting in battles next to formal militaries (Brandt 2013). However, with the take- over of state security institutions by Ansar Allah, the boundary between state and non-state virtually collapsed, and this happened not only in territories controlled by Ansar Allah, but throughout the entire country. Security institutions either fell into the hands of non-state actors through violent means as opposed to a politically legitimate process; went rogue and joined Ansar Allah; or simply collapsed. In this context, new local security actors emerged in the form of armed resistance forces. These groups – such as the Southern Popular Resistance, the Resistance in Ta‘iz or the Tihama Popular Resistance – represented local identifications and thus lo- cal grievances, granting them a kind of legitimacy that security institutions of the central state never possessed. In the course of the war, many of these non-state actors formalized to the degree that they do not differ much from state institutions in terms of organization, habitus and appearance. At the same time, many of these non-state actors either took control of state institutions in a bottom-up manner af- ter they had been recruited into various position within the security sector by the IRG, or they were integrated as groups into state hierarchies. As a result, a complex institutional landscape developed, in which categories such as state or non-state, informal or formal no longer are useful. Today, Yemen is fragmented into areas with various power dynamics: areas where legitimacy does not rest exclusively with state institutions; areas where state institutions are run by non-state actors 1 For an assessment of such institutions, see Transfeld, Muqbil, bin Othman and Noman (2020). Local Security Governance in Yemen in Times of War: Introduction 6 considered legitimate by some and illegitimate by others; areas where informal ac- tors were formalized through integration into state hierarchies, but where integra- tion has not created loyalties to the state among non-state state actors; and areas where state institutions are considered illegitimate. Given their normativity, this research avoids the use of terms such as ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ or ‘formal’ and ‘in- formal’ as analytical categories. Unfortunately, however, an analysis of security in- stitutions is hardly possible without considering the state or non-state. Therefore, these terms will be used only descriptively when referring to the structures and hi- erarchies under the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) operating under the IRG, while understanding that some of these state institutions are occupied by non-state actors. Thus, institutions are viewed distinct from who is in control. The Security Committees as institutions exist in this context of infor- mality. And although this report shows that institutions and their legitimacy did and continues to matter in this context, our research also shows that institutions are weak and have only limited capacities to transcend informal political loyalties. The vague legal framework of the Committees is a case in point. The context of establishment of both the national-level and governorate-level Secu- rity Committees, as well as their legal framework, remain unclear. What is striking is that there are neither publicly available documents that help in determining the precise time and circumstances of their establishment, nor an agreement amongst security officials on the exact context. Based on the interviews with security of- ficials, it could be inferred that the Supreme Security Committee on the national level was established per presidential decree by former-President ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih in the 1990s. This presidential decree, most likely stored in an archive in the capital Sana‘a, was neither available to security officials interviewed, nor accessi- ble to YPC researchers.