7 The Dieppe Raid n the morning of 19 August 1942 a During the first four months of 1942 British naval task force composed of 237 ships and American planners were trying to develop and landing craft, assisted by 16 a program for implementing the “Europe First” Ominesweepers, reached the coast of France strategy which had been agreed upon before Pearl at Dieppe. More than 6,000 soldiers, 4,963 Harbour. The American view was presented by Canadian, 1,075 British, 50 American and 15 General George C. Marshall, the US Chief of French nationals prepared to launch a raid against Staff, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Chief Nazi-occupied France. of the Operations Division. It called for the The origins of the raid are well understood. invasion of Europe, Operation Roundup, to take In October 1941 Lord Louis Mountbatten had place in 1943. A limited diversionary operation, been made Advisor on Combined Operations Sledgehammer, was also to be readied for with a mandate “to evolve the technique, policy September 1942, but was only to be implemented and equipment for the employment of the three if the possibility of a Russian collapse appeared services in combined operations to effect a landing likely, or the German position in Western Europe against opposition.” Staff officers at COHQ had became “critically weakened.” Marshall also called been at work on these problems previously but for “repeated Commando-type raids…to harass Mountbatten’s appointment signalled Prime the enemy and give experience to Allied troops.” Minister Winston Churchill’s desire to give The British Chiefs of Staff endorsed Roundup a higher priority to commando raids against and “raids…on the largest scale that the available “Fortress Europe.” equipment will permit,” but they were firmly The beach at Puys 7 8 opposed to Sledgehammer even as a contingency Spitfires and Hurricanes. The Luftwaffe would plan. If resources were allocated to Sledgehammer surely respond to such an attack and much could they would not be available to pursue new be learned about an amphibious assault against initiatives in the Mediterranean. Churchill was the kind of port everyone believed would be a committed to action in this theatre and persuaded necessary objective when the real invasion came. Roosevelt that Torch, the invasion of French North Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery was Africa, was the ideal joint operation for 1942. asked to select a division from his South-Eastern Churchill was willing to gamble that the Soviet Command to undertake the raid. Despite pressure Armies could withstand a renewed Nazi offensive. to employ a composite British-Canadian force he He insisted that no real purpose would be served selected 2nd Canadian Division as the troops “best by launching a premature “Second Front” in suited” to carry out the raid. Senior Canadian France. Hitler would be defeated by a strategy officers were enthusiastic. They had long been of “wearing down” Germany through blockade, anxious to gain experience for themselves and bombing, losses on the eastern front and defeat in their men. The outline plan was eagerly embraced the Mediterranean. Raids on the coast of France, and detailed preparation began immediately. The preferably large scale, might help in the “wearing Corps Commander, Lieutenant-General Harry down” process by luring the German Air Force Crerar, and Major-General J.H. “Ham” Roberts, into a major air battle. If Fighter Command could the divisional commander, were satisfied with inflict serious losses on the Luftwaffe, aircraft Rutter as the original version of the Dieppe raid would have to be diverted from the eastern front. was called. The plan also won Lieutenant-General All of these factors combined to make the Montgomery’s approval. “I am satisfied,” he wrote British Chiefs of Staff receptive to Admiral Lord “that the operation as planned is a possible one and Louis Mountbatten’s proposal of 13 May 1942 has good prospects of success given: a) Favourable to conduct a raid on Dieppe. The town was an weather; b) Average luck; c) That the Navy put important port within the effective range of RAF us ashore roughly in the right places and at the Major-General J.H. “Ham” Roberts (right) was the commander of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division for Operation “Jubilee,” the raid on Dieppe. Before the raid he told his troops, “Don’t worry men, it’ll be a piece of cake.” This unfortunate phrase was to haunt him the rest of his life as he would receive a stale piece of cake in the mail each year on the anniversary of the raid. Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) ZK 133A 9 Canadian troops from 2nd Canadian Infantry Division take part in an invasion exercise prior to the Dieppe raid, July 1944. LAC PA 116273 10 right times…The Canadians are 1st class chaps; if raid, was to be conducted as a separate operation anyone can pull it off they can.” with no provision for communication between the The Canadians and the Commandos men on the beaches and the air force. The navy’s underwent extensive training on the Isle of fire support was limited to six small destroyers. Wight for the operation and on July 2nd they A great deal of careful preparation had gone boarded their infantry landing ships. After several into the Dieppe raid. An elaborate “Confidential postponements the raid was cancelled and the men Book” with topographical detail, beach and returned to their bases. The weather prevented tide reports and information on defences was what surely would have been a military disaster constantly updated through photo-reconnaissance. from taking place. Rutter called for a frontal assault The guns in the cliffs of the eastern headland were on Dieppe, Puys and Pourville with tanks limited identified as were the road-blocks on the Boulevard to the main beach. The flanks at Varangeville de Verdun which prevented tanks from entering and Berneval were to be attacked by airborne the town and shielded anti-tank guns. No definite troops who lacked experience in such a complex information on guns in cave-like positions on night operation. The assault on Dieppe was to be the western cliffs was available but their presence carried out by infantry battalions imbued with must have seemed probable. Before Rutter was to the offensive spirit after two months of intensive be launched the decision to limit the operation training. Commando-like skills, high morale and to one tide, effectively eight hours ashore, was A convoy of landing surprise were to overcome an entrenched enemy. made as was the very sensible decision to cancel craft and escort vessels No supporting artillery was available and the Royal the bombing raid, the purpose of which was never en route to Dieppe, 19 Canadian Artillery personnel who embarked were clear. August 1942. Library and Archives Canada trained to use captured German weapons. The air How could professional soldiers have allowed (LAC) PA 171080 battle, which was one of the main objectives of the such a flawed scheme to go forward? The simple 11 truth is that in the summer of 1942 neither the divisional commander, Roberts, may properly be British nor Canadian army, not to mention the accused of inexperience and wishful thinking, but Americans, had a realistic idea of the kind of fire everyone was attempting to further the cause of support that was required in offensive operations the liberation of Europe and no one foresaw the against prepared positions. As C.P. Stacey, the disaster which occurred that day. official Canadian historian, has pointed out, all plans for large and small scale raids, including the “emergency” invasion of the Cherbourg Peninsula, Operation Jubilee Operation Sledgehammer, were based on surprise, speed and the promise of air cover. The artillery- he plan called for five assaults on a front of based battle doctrine which emerged in North Tten miles. No.4 Commando landed at Africa and which came to dominate Allied military Orange Beach west of Varangeville. Their task planning for the rest of the war was quite foreign was to destroy a coastal battery with one company to Allied generals in 1942. Senior British officers, engaging the position frontally while a second, including Montgomery, were still planning under the command of Lord Lovat, attacked from exercises in which armoured and infantry brigades, the rear. This attack was completely successful. without continuous artillery support, advanced At Berneval on the left flank, the Commandos over great distances rehearsing the “encounter” ran into a German coastal convoy and were badly battle. Montgomery, who left for North Africa scattered. Just seven of the 23 craft landed. At Petit before the Dieppe raid, adapted quickly once he Berneval the enemy overwhelmed the attackers examined the lessons learned by the 8th Army, but taking 82 prisoners. A second landing, a mile to the no one with any current experience was available west, was made by one landing craft. Major Peter to examine the Dieppe plan with a clear eye. Young with a force totalling 20 men advanced on The revival of the raid, as Operation Jubilee, the Berneval battery and neutralized it for two was strongly influenced by the need to offer the hours by sniping at all movement from a distance Soviets some evidence of our commitment to of 200 yards. sharing the burden as German armies were once again on the march in Russia. But pressure to Blue Beach – Puys remount the operation also came from Combined Operations, the RAF and from senior officers he planners who had designed the assault at of the Canadian army. Combined Operations TPuys, Blue Beach, must have read too many needed a major test of the enemy’s coast defences John Buchan thrillers.