Istituto Affari Internazionali IAI WORKING PAPERS 11 | 08 – April 2011 Italy’s Love Affair with the EU: Between Continuity and Change Michele Comelli Abstract Once a renowned Euro-enthusiastic country, Italy has experienced a decrease in public support for European integration. Many are the reasons, including the emergence of a less idealistic vision of the EU, a general disaffection vis-à-vis politics, particularly at the domestic level, and the increasingly more vocal Euroscepticism of some political forces within the centre-right ruling coalition. The current Berlusconi government does not show the same degree of interest for European integration as previous centre-left governments. This is not to say that Italy’s love affair with Europe has come to a bitter end. Italians continue to trust European institutions significantly more than national ones and would like the EU to acquire more competences. In addition, the vocal anti-EU rhetoric of some political forces within the governing coalition, and especially the Northern League, is often not matched by deeds, largely because EU policy-making is generally used as a source of leverage to obtain concessions in other policy domains. Tellingly, the Treaty of Lisbon was speedily ratified by the Italian parliament by unanimous vote - something unthinkable in most EU countries. Keywords : Italy / European Union / Public opinion / Elites / Euroscepticism / Lisbon Treaty © 2011 IAI IAI Working Papers 1108 Italy’s Love Affair with the EU: Between Continuity and Change Italy’s Love Affair with the EU: Between Continuity and Change by Michele Comelli ∗ 1. Introduction Once amongst the most Europhile people in Europe, Italians - elite and public alike - have apparently become more lukewarm towards European integration as of late. Many are the reasons, including the emergence of a less idealistic vision of the EU, a general disaffection vis-à-vis politics, particularly at the domestic level, and the increasingly more vocal Euroscepticism of some political forces within the centre-right ruling coalition. The current Berlusconi government does not show the same degree of interest for European integration as previous centre-left governments and some of its components frequently indulge in anti-EU rhetoric. This is not to say that Italy’s love affair with Europe has come to a bitter end. Italians continue to trust European institutions significantly more than national ones and would like the EU to acquire more competences. In addition, the vocal anti-EU rhetoric of some political forces within the governing coalition is often not matched by deeds. Tellingly, the Treaty of Lisbon was speedily ratified by the Italian parliament by unanimous vote - something unthinkable in most EU countries - although it was the target of anti-EU discourse, particularly by the populist and devolutionist Northern League, which is part of the ruling coalition. In fact, the Northern League tends to align itself, albeit grudgingly, with the country’s established foreign policy choices in exchange for concessions on domestic issues. 2. Italian public attitudes towards the EU Italy has traditionally been amongst the keenest supporters of European integration, both at the popular and government levels. However, public support for the EU in Italy has fallen in recent years, although this trend does not appear to be irreversible as indicated by the latest figures. Government support for the EU during the so-called Second Republic (since 1993), 1 has also not been constant, particularly within centre- Paper prepared for the Istituto affari internazionali (IAI), April 2011. ∗ Michele Comelli is Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome. The author would like to thank Sofia Chiarucci and Marco Nozzoli for their help with the figures. 1 The so-called “Second Republic” is the supposedly new political system that emerged in Italy in the early 1990s after the introduction of a mainly first-past-the-post electoral law and the dissolution of the principal parties that ruled the country after World War II (Christian Democrats and Socialists). These events unfolded following a number of anti-corruption investigations, the so-called “Clean Hands” operation. Though welcomed by many citizens as a better functioning and less corrupt political system, it ended up frustrating many expectations. The characteristics of the Second Republic are a mainly bipolar political system, with deep cleavages within both coalitions, and the highly confrontational tone of the political debate, that is often characterized by populism and largely revolves around political leaders themselves, first and foremost Silvio Berlusconi. © Istituto Affari Internazionali 2 IAI Working Papers 1108 Italy’s Love Affair with the EU: Between Continuity and Change right coalition governments, which have included Eurosceptic parties like the Northern League, which has a wide following in Northern Italy. As far as public support is concerned, Eurobarometer data reveal a drop in Italian support for the EU since 2006, to an unprecedented low of 39% in Spring 2008. 2 (EC Standard Eurobarometer 69, see Table 1). These figures were significantly lower than those during the 2003-2007 period, which varied between 59% and 51%. The record- low figure of 39% in Spring 2008 was lower than the EU average (52%), ranking Italy 22 nd out of 27 member states, a significant drop for a traditionally pro-European country. This figure is particularly striking when compared to the level of support only two years earlier in Spring 2006, when the percentage of Italians that considered EU positively was as high as 56%. Over the same period, the average EU citizen’s positive view of the EU decreased by only three percentage points, from 55% to 52%. Similarly, in Autumn 2008 only 41% of Italians believed that Italy had profited from EU membership as compared with an EU average of 56%. This percentage ranked 25 th in the EU. Since then, the percentage of Italians believing that their country had benefited from EU membership has risen, reaching 52% in Autumn 2009, 48% in Spring 2010 (EC Standard Eurobarometer 73) and 53% in Autumn 2010 (EC Eurobarometer 74). But these figures remain lower than the average EU percentages. Table 1: Support for the EU in Italy and EU-average nr (%) (%) IT EU 60 autumn 03 59 48 EU 15 61 spring 04 54 48 EU 25 62 autumn 04 57 56 63 spring 05 56 54 64 autumn 05 50 50 65 spring 06 56 55 66 autumn 06 52 53 EU 27 67 spring 07 51 57 68 autumn 07 50 58 69 spring 08 39 52 70 autumn 08 40 53 71 spring 09 48 53 72 autumn 09 49 53 73 spring 10 48 49 74 autumn 10 53 40 Table 1. Source: Elaboration of the author based on Eurobarometer data. 2 The question asked was “Do you consider the EU as a good thing?”. © Istituto Affari Internazionali 3 IAI Working Papers 1108 Italy’s Love Affair with the EU: Between Continuity and Change Table 2: Perceived benefits of EU membership in Italy and EU-average nr (%) (%) IT EU 60 autumn 03 49 46 EU 15 61 spring 04 49 47 EU 25 62 autumn 04 50 53 63 spring 05 52 55 64 autumn 05 48 52 65 spring 06 54 54 66 autumn 06 47 54 EU 27 67 spring 07 48 59 68 autumn 07 47 58 69 spring 08 37 54 70 autumn 08 41 56 71 spring 09 48 56 72 autumn 09 52 57 73 spring 10 n.a. 53 74 autumn 10 n.a. 50 Table 2. Source: Elaboration of the author based on Eurobarometer data. Accounting for the decrease in support for the EU since 2006 (despite the marginal rise since then) is not self-evident. Among the reasons that may explain this decline is the fact that the EU has progressively come to play a bigger and more visible role in a rising number of policy areas. As a result, the average Italian citizen tends to consider the EU as less of an abstract political ideal (Greco 2006: 69) and more of a potentially divisive issue, with a tangible impact on their daily life. The disaffection towards the EU may also have been the product of the crisis of European integration following the “no” vote of French and Dutch citizens to the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. The no votes were followed by a long stalemate, officially labelled as a “pause for reflection”, that came to an end only in October 2007, with the approval of the Lisbon Treaty. The EU’s image greatly suffered from the failure to adopt a Constitution, triggering a feeling of disappointment among Italians, who overwhelmingly supported the European Convention and the adoption of the Constitution. Such a step forward in European integration was viewed as essential in consolidating the EU’s role as the prime modernizing force in Italy. In fact, the EU has often been viewed in Italy, at both elite and popular levels, as an anchor to democracy, stability and prosperity, characteristics that Italians traditionally associate to other countries, especially in Northern Europe. The inclusion of Italy among the six founding members of the European Community was read in this way: through the EC, Italy could become part of a democratic and prosperous Europe. This idea was aptly described by Ugo La Malfa, a political leader of post-war Italy, who viewed European integration as a means to “incatenare l’Italia alle Alpi per non farla sprofondare nel Mediterraneo” [“chain Italy to the Alps, in order not to let it sink into the Mediterranean”] (Nucara 2007). This widespread view has lost sway in recent years for two reasons. First, the entry of Italy into the European Monetary Union and its adoption of the euro have decreased, among the broad public, the idea that Italy needs a European “vincolo esterno” © Istituto Affari Internazionali 4 IAI Working Papers 1108 Italy’s Love Affair with the EU: Between Continuity and Change (external constraint), at least in the monetary domain.