View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by SHAREOK repository UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE LOOKING BEYOND THE HIJAB: AN ANALYSIS OF MUSLIM ADAPTATION TO FRENCH CULTURE A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By STEPHEN MICHAEL CROUCHER Norman, Oklahoma 2006 UMI Number: 3206178 UMI Microform 3206178 Copyright 2006 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 LOOKING BEYOND THE HIJAB: AN ANALYSIS OF MUSLIM ADAPTATION TO FRENCH CULTURE A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION BY ii © Copyright by STEPHEN M CROUCHER 2006 All Rights Reserved. iii Acknowledgements There are many people I need to thank for making this dissertation and my work here at the University of Oklahoma successful. First, I want to thank Dr. Eric Kramer and Dr . Todd Sandel for serving as my advisors and chairs of my dissertation committee. I want to thank Dr. Kramer for encouraging me to succeed in this endeavor, and for allowing and pushing me to conduct research that is not “frivolous” but a true benefit to the discipline of communication, and other scholarship as well. I want to thank Dr. Sandel for encouraging me to look outside of the box, to think critically, and to never lose faith in myself. Second, I want to thank the remainder of my committee. Thank yo u Dr. Michel Lantelme for serving as my outside member. Having you on this committee facilitated a greater understanding of French culture, and open my eyes to what it means to be “French.” Thank you Dr. Sandra Ragan for serving as a voice of reason throug hout this project and during my time at the University of Oklahoma. Thank you Dr. Dan O’Hair for providing consistent encouragement on this project and for making me realize there is always room to grow as a writer. Third, I want to thank my family and fr iends. Without the love and support of my mother and father I know I would not have been able to accomplish this task. I also want to thank my friends who would always listen to me as I babbled on about this project and sought counseling (mentally and professionally). You all know who you are and that I appreciate your friendship. iv Last, I must thank the men and women who made this project come to life, my participants. Without their trust, candor and guidance I would not have been able to collect this data and complete this research. I hope that someday some of them will read parts of this dissertation, and if that day comes I hope I served them well and represented their lives to the best of my abilities. It is my sincerest hope that this work not only ente rs the dialogue surrounding immigrant adaptation and rights, but that this work changes one person’s beliefs about the struggle of this particular Muslim community. v TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 1 II. Review of Literature 9 III. Method 40 IV. Cultural Adaptation 57 V. Identity Negotiation 105 VI. Ideology 154 VII. Discussion 182 VIII. References 208 IX. Appendices 241 vi ABSTRACT This dissertation examines Muslim cultural adaptation to French culture. Specifically, this project asserts the Muslim symbol hijab, or headscarf, is a religious and cultural symbol of Islam that is in direct clash with the French concept of secularism. In 2004 the French government passed a resolution forbidding the wearing of the hijab in French public schools. In response to this resolution Muslim men and women protested and have begun to argue for the establishment of a French -Muslim identity. Thus, this analysis closely examined the 2004 law in regard to how it has potentially impacted Muslim cultural adaptation into French culture. The results of this study reveal cultural adaptation has failed in France, the Muslim and non-Muslim French populations are in an identity crisis and that in response to mounting pressures to assimilate, the French -Muslim community (ummah) has responded by closing its doors to outside influence. Moreover, this examination reveals how Islam is in a transformation stage, from a magic/mythic religion into a more perspectival religion. Ultimately, this analysis calls fo r a communicative society, one where all members of the culture will meet together and discuss the issue of Muslim immigration and French integration practices. vii CHAPTER 1 Introduction The co -existence between Muslims and non-Muslims in France has alwa ys been a precarious relationship (Silverstein, 2004). From the time of the Algerian conflict to protests at the end of the Algerian conflict, and also in the riots of 1968, race and religion have been key factors of contention. In 2005 this precarious rel ationship exploded in weeks of rioting and violence that gripped the French nation, causing the French government to issue a state of emergency, a provision allowed under an amendment to the French Constitution in 1958, and nationwide curfews (Rotella, 2005). The following picture shows the violence and destruction in Clichy - sous-Bois. QuickTime™ and a TIFF (LZW) decompressor are needed to see this picture. The proximate cause of these riots in October 2005 in the Paris suburb of Clichy -sous-Bois was the electrocution of two Muslim youth who were hiding from police (Graff, 2005). Their deaths started riots in the town, and those riots later escalated when police fired tear gas into a mosque. This act sparked more than two weeks of rioting, car burning and violence throughout French suburbs, cities and in the countryside. The Fr ench government had to declare a state of emergency, a 1 provision added to the French Constitution in 1958 during the war between France and Algeria. This state of emergency was the first since 1968 when student riots gripped more than 300 towns across Fran ce (Mulrine, 2005). The purpose of the state of emergency in both 1968 and 2005 was to bring immediate stability to the cities and countryside. While the 2005 state of emergency did put out the flames of violence and quell the rioting (at least temporaril y), the underlying problems causing the uprising were not addressed. French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin said the root of the problem underlying the rioting and violence is more than the recent rioting, but the result of France's failure to provide hope to thousands of young people, most of them French citizens, the children of Muslim immigrants from northern Africa (Keaten, 2005). This includes the hope of getting a decent paying job, and being considered part of the French state. In December 2005 de Villepin proposed a plan to provide more job training and opportunities to youngsters living in suburbs, generally ethnic enclaves (Fontanaud, 2005). While these measures intend to address economic differences in France, the much larger issue of integr ation remains unaddressed by the de Villepin government. De Villepin has stated the Republic, and its model of integration, which was founded on the equal recognition of all citizens is also at the root of the current violence and uprisings because the model does not specifically allow immigrants to have a co -cultural existence (Graff, 2005). His sentiments were echoed by Muslims in France who argue they want to be considered “French,” while at the same time, these Muslims want to maintain aspects of their Muslim heritage (Mulrine, 2005). The 2 balancing act between being French and Muslim is where most of the tensions stem from (Geary & Graff, 2005). France does not keep official statistics of ethnicity or religious affiliation, due to the principle of laïci té and the 1905 law mandating the separation of church and state. Because of this 1905 mandate, and because of the rising sense of urgency for a unified national French identity in France (Flynn, 1995) the state does not provide or recognize religious or ethnic communities and groups as entities separate from the general population (Hargreaves, 2000). Therefore, estimates of the Muslim population in France are just that, estimates. The International Helsinki Federation (2005) estimates between 4-5 million Muslims reside in France, roughly 7-8 percent of the total population (Dilanian, 2005) Moreover, the Muslim population is reported to be the fastest growing ethnic group in France (Roy, 2005). The overwhelming majority of these Muslims live in suburbs near large metropolitan areas such as Paris, Lille, and Marseille (Islamic Institute for Human Rights, 2004; International Helsinki Federation, 2005). Thus, as the Muslim population continues to grow and as tensions continue to mount, both Muslims and non-Musl ims in France have said something needs to be done to ease the tension and to create a more cohesive, yet diverse French state. The French government has recently announced its solution to mounting ethnic tensions, and to bring the integration problems under control. The executive plan has many facets. De Villepin in November 2005 announced the plan would tighten immigration regulations (Fontanaud, 2005). The plan also involves extending the waiting period for citizenship to immigrants who marry French citi zens, tougher selection 3 procedures for international students wanting to study in France, and decreased immigrant quotas from nations outside the European Union. The purpose of this legislation is to quell the violence by initiating “selective immigration.” Furthermore, the Lower House passed an anti -terror bill in November 2005, and this bill has clauses that pertain to surveillance in Mosques and other civic organizations (Picot, 2005).