University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy Philosophy, Department of 2005 Kant on Duties to Animals Nelson T. Potter Jr. University of Nebraska - Lincoln, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, and the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Potter, Nelson T. Jr., "Kant on Duties to Animals" (2005). Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy. 18. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub/18 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Potter in Jarbuch für Recht und Ethik (2005) 13. Copyright 2005, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg. Used by permission. Kant on Duties to Animals Nelson Potter According to Kant we human beings are finite rational beings, who also have an animal nature. Kant occasionally speculates that perhaps on other planets there may be quite different sorts of finite rational animals. But of course we have no specific knowledge of any such. Given that fact, all of our duties are duties to other human beings. We can have no duties to God because he is not an object of possible experience. There are no human beings such that they have only duties and no rights - they would be slaves or serfs. And the apparent duties that we have to abstain from cruel treatment of (nonhuman) animals are, it turns out, not direct duties to such animals, but duties to ourselves, and merely indirect duties with regard to animals. "Duties to animals" in the Kantian context is an issue about the scope of moral­ i~y. Does our "moral community" include non-human animals or not? Kant's ver­ sI~n ~f the moral community seems to be the kingdom of ends, and it is clear that thIS kingdom includes only finite rational beings like you or me, dear reader. There are arguably two versions of the issue of duties to animals: the legal and the ethi­ cal. Perhaps there were no laws in Kant's day against cruelty to animals, but such laws since Kant's day have been widespread at least among European and Ameri­ can societies for well over a century. The ethical question would ask whether we h.ave ethical duties to abstain from cruelty to animals (apart from any legal provi­ SIOns) for which we should be moved to action by inner moral motivation. Such dul'Ies would be analogous to the ethical duties we have that underI'Ie I.aws agamst :sault or theft, or they could be analogous to the imperfe~t duties we. have ~o pro- ote the welfare ofothers and render assistance to others m need, dutIes WhICh are not enforced by laws. But there would be no direct duties to animals, either legal or ethical, if animals were outside the scope of morality. We will return to these two elements ofduties to animals at a later point. The answers to such questions of the scope of morality must b~ a part ~f our Un?erstanding of Kant's practical philosophy, alongside other such Issues as Impu­ tatIon, freedom, and criminal punishment that have been of concern to Professor Hru~chka in his many contributions to understanding that philosophy, and more partICUlarly Kant's philosophy of law. When Kant states his claim about our having only indirect duties to ani.mals, he makes similar statements about our having indirect duties also to beauty 10 plants Nelson in Jarbuch für 300 Nelson Potter and lifeless nature, neither of which should be wantonly destroyed. But in ,this paper I will confine my attention to his views on animals, for they raise qu~St1O~S that plants or lifeless beauty do not. And to further focus our attention, I wIll dis­ cuss Kant's duties to animals only in relation to what I'll call paradigm an~mals, i.e., animals to whom we surely have duties, if we have duties to any ammals. Most or all invertebrates would be excluded as non-paradigm, because they do not have nervous systems well enough integrated to undergo pain and suffering in the way that is all too familiar to us humans. Paradigm animals will be larger, more familiar animals, mostly mammals, whom we humans often deal with or make use of in one way or another: dogs, cats, cattle, horses, oxen, rabbits, mink, perhaps chickens, and so forth. If we have duties to any animals, we have duties to such as them, it seems reasonable to say, and the main extension of scope of duties w~ are interested in here is the extension from humans to these most promising ammal candidates for being bearers of such rights. How far we might seek to exten.d duties to animals beyond these animal paradigms is a complicated topic that IS beyond the scope of this paper. There is a further related complication I want to declare beyond the scope ,of this paper. There are certain non-human animals who are similar enough and m­ deed in an evolutionary sense close enough to us to raise questions about whether they might be in some significant way rational beings. Think of chimpanzees, bonobos, or perhaps dolphins, whales, or gorillas. It is sometimes argued that ?e­ cause some of these creatures are so similar to human beings, the constnunts against scientific experiments upon human subjects should also be applied to them, Or to take such even more difficult hypothetical cases about which our knowle~ge ct is limited: what should we say about our ethical relations with the various extm , f . deed have speCIes a Homo erectus or Homo neanderthalis? Such creatures may III , been semi-human, and limited in their capabilities in the way racists used to claUD that humans of other races were. Such creatures would have been similar enough to us humans to raise difficult questions about where to draw a line distinguishing between human and nonhuman, and yet they would be more different from us than any individual Homo sapiens. por This whole issue of duties to animals might seem like a peripheral and un!m ­ tant question for Kant's ethical theory. Kant himself only briefly and occaslOnally alludes to it. And there is not much substantive nonnative disagreement between Kant and moderate opponents ofcruel treatment ofanimals. Kant thinks it is wrong wantonIy to .mfl"lCt pam on alllmals., Some might say that given Kant's pOSI't'lOn that such duties are only indirect, it will not be possible for him finally to arrive at an adequately robust set of norms in opposition to animal cruelty. I have my doubts about this; that is, it seems to me that one might develop an adequately robust,th~O­ ry ~f opposition to animal cruelty based only on indirect duties, But again thiS IS a tOPiC that we will put to one side for the purposes ofthe present paper. Kant tells us that he thinks it is all right to raise animals for meat, and to ~se them for labor (drawing plows or wagons). He expresses his doubts about infhct- Nelson in Jarbuch für Kant on Duties to Animals 301 ing experiments on animals, but I suspect this is because such experiments as he heard of were idle and purposeless, and if this is correct then we should not be confident that he would oppose modem medical experiments generally. My own view is that it is morally acceptable to raise animals for human consumption - at least so far as any duties to such animals are concerned, provided they are raised in humane conditions and put to death as quickly and painlessly as possible. So I count myself as a moderate along with Kant on this issue. According to such a view there are duties to animals, and surely direct duties, but they are not broad enough to force us to be moral vegetarians, at least so long as we can have access to humanely raised and slaughtered meat. I call such a view "moderate," placing it between strontg animal rights views that ground opposition to the use of slaugh­ tered animals for their meat or other uses, and opposition to much experimentation using animals, and, on the other side, the Cartesian tradition, which regards ani­ mals as machines incapapble of the experience of pain. Another basis for a duty of moral vegetarianism that is unrelated to the moral status of animals may be that it is unjustifiably extravagant to feed grain and other foods to meat animals that might directly nourish humans who are in want of nutrition, because the luxury of some humans eating meat may deprive others of needed nutrition. But I mention these issues only to put them aside here, after having used them to explain what I mean by Kant's taking a moderate position on ethical treatment of animals. The Kantian main texts that I wish to consider are from his Metaplzysics of Morals. The first comes from the introduction to the first part of that work, the Reclztslehre. Kant offers a "Division in accordance with the relation of the subject imposing Obligation to the subject put under obligation." [MS, VI: 241. Notes to Kant's text will be given as references to the volume and page of Kants gesam­ melte Schrijten, herausgegeben von der Koniglich PreuBischen Akademie der Wis­ senschaften, Berlin, 1907 and later. MS abbreviates Metaplzysik der Sitten.