The retreat of the west LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103871/ Article: Trubowitz, Peter and Burgoon, Brian (2020) The retreat of the west. Perspectives on Politics. ISSN 1537-5927 (In Press) Reuse Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item. [email protected] https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ The Retreat of the West Peter Trubowitz London School of Economics [email protected] Brian Burgoon University of Amsterdam [email protected] Under review at Perspective on Politics August 2019 – Abstract – The West is turning inward. Donald Trump’s presidency, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, and the spread of populist parties in Europe are the most visible signs of this retreat. The shift is not as recent as these examples suggest, however. In this paper, we show that Western governments’ support for liberal internationalism has been receding in important ways for over fifteen years, and argue that this trend is best understood as part of a larger “hollowing out” of the political center in Western democracies. Drawing on an array of cross-national data for industrialized democracies and for hundreds of political parties in those democracies, we document the erosion of Western government and party support for liberal internationalism from its Cold War apex, through the 2008 global economic downturn, and to the present. We show that this erosion in Western governments’ support for liberal internationalism corresponds to a steady weakening of mainstream parties’ electoral strength across OECD countries, and hence, to their declining policy-making influence. The erosion of the “vital center” has opened up political space for radical-right and radical-left parties which have been the vehicles of the current backlash against liberal internationalism. We discuss the implications of these trends for the future of the Western liberal international order and strategies now on offer to repair it. Is the West in retreat? Is the era of Western liberal dominance led by a preeminent America over? While it is premature to declare that the era of Western ascendancy is over, domestic support for liberal internationalism is weakening across the West. On issues ranging from immigration, to international trade, to national security, new political parties on the left as well as the right are rejecting core principles of liberal internationalism that have long united Western democracies. Radical-left and the radical-right parties are offering alternative, divisive foreign policies and party platforms. Established mainstream political parties – social democratic, Christian democratic, and conservative and liberal – long the backbone of the West’s defense against illiberalism from abroad, are now on the political defensive. Older parties are groping for answers to challenges to the liberal international order that are home-grown, and that show little sign of easing anytime soon. Few international relations scholars or foreign policy analysts imagined such scenarios even a few years ago. Much of the debate over the West’s future has focused on recent changes: Donald Trump’s presidency, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, and the surge of nationalist sentiment in France, Germany and other Western democracies. We show that the decline in support for liberal internationalism is not as recent as these examples suggest. An array of cross-national data on thirty countries and hundreds of political parties shows clearly that Western government support for liberal internationalism has been receding for over twenty years. In this paper, we analyze changes in the level and nature of Western support from the Cold War apex of liberal internationalism in 1970 through the 2010s and interrogate the domestic political and partisan causes and consequences of the decline that set in during the 1990s. We show that Western democracies’ commitment to liberal internationalism was far more dependent on mainstream political parties’ electoral clout than previously understood. As these parties weakened, so did Western governments’ support for liberal internationalist foreign economic policy and security policies. The populist backlash against mainstream parties that we see today represents an intensification of a process that has been visible across the OECD since the 1990s. In making this argument, we model Western democracies’ commitment to liberal internationalism along two separate but related foreign policy dimensions, which we call “power” and “partnership.” By power, we mean national governments’ policy commitment to invest domestic resources in national militaries and defense capabilities in cooperation with other countries of the West. By partnership, we mean investment in a shared commitment to economic openness, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral governance. Using this two-dimensional model, we show that the defining feature of liberal internationalism during the Cold War was Western democracies’ commitment to both power and partnership. It is this 2 double commitment that has unraveled since the Cold War ended. Western democracies’ support for power and more recently, for partnership, has weakened. We track this erosion of support for liberal internationalism and show that what is true of Western democracies in general is also true of the West’s preeminent power: America. A variety of cross-national data characterizing the foreign policy orientations of Western democracies support these arguments about the erosion of support for liberal internationalism. These include indicators measuring national spending on guns and butter, as well as various indices measuring the degree to which national policies promote international economic openness, membership in international organizations, participation in collective security missions, among others. We rely on party manifesto and electoral data to measure political party and electoral support for these liberal internationalist policies across more than five decades and over two-dozen OECD countries. Taken together, these measures allow us to track correlations between the erosion in Western governments’ policy commitment to liberal internationalism and the electoral decline of the mainstream political parties that have been the institutional locus and agents of liberal internationalist commitments and policies. The analysis reveals two important patterns. First, we show that Western governments’ support for both power and partnership has weakened and that this process began shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. It accelerated in the 1990s. In the Cold War era, most of the advanced industrial democracies of Asia, Europe, and North America shared a vision of liberal international order that rested on a commitment to investing in both military power and international partnership. By contrast, since the end of the Cold War, Western democracies have relied increasingly on economic openness, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral governance or what we call here “globalism” to solidify gains, and to expand the West’s influence into new regions and territories of the globe (e.g., China). Western reliance on globalism peaked in the early 2000s. Since then, and especially since the 2008 economic crash, Western governments’ investment in globalism has also slowed and, as we show, in many cases weakened and declined. Second, our analysis shows that the strength of mainstream parties is a leading indicator of the liberal international order’s vigor and wellbeing. Strong mainstream party support was essential to sustaining the Western liberal international order built after World War II. Mainstream parties were committed to investing in both power and partnership. Their electoral dominance made it politically possible for Western leaders to advance the liberal internationalist project. However, since the end of the Cold War mainstream parties across the West have steadily lost electoral ground to non-mainstream parties that oppose investing in 3 international partnership or military power, or both. As this process has intensified, Western leaders’ willingness and ability to invest in liberal international order-building has weakened. In short, we show that the erosion of Western democracies’ institutional capacity goes far in explaining their retreat from liberal internationalism. The paper is organized into five sections. The first section sketches out our framework for analyzing Western domestic support for liberal internationalism. It describes our methodology for measuring changes in that commitment at the level of government policy over time and across space. In section two, we show that overall government support for liberal internationalism in the Western democracies has stalled and in important ways has declined over the past twenty-five years. In the third section, we examine Western party support for liberal internationalism by party type. We show that party support for liberal internationalism is consistently higher among mainstream political parties than it is among parties on the radical left and radical right. Section 4 examines the hollowing out