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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES CSC 33 / CCEM 33 MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES The Court Martial of Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw: Lessons on Culture, Leadership, and Accountability for the CF By /par Cdr M.E. Clark This paper was written by a student La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion opinion of any agency, including the d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le ministère Canadian Department of National de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il Defence. This paper may not be est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de released, quoted or copied, except with reproduire cette étude sans la the express permission of the Canadian permission expresse du ministère de la Department of National Defence. Défense nationale. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. ii List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. iv List of Tables ................................................................................................................................... v Acknowledgement .......................................................................................................................... vi Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………......vii Chapter 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 Literature Survey ..................................................................................................................... 5 2. Organizational Culture Theory and Application to the Canadian Submarine Service ............. 14 Towards a Definition of Military Culture .............................................................................. 14 The Layers of Organizational Culture ................................................................................ 16 Application to CF Organizational Culture .......................................................................... 19 Organizational Culture: Application To The Canadian Submarince Service ........................ 21 Historical Development of Canadian Submarine Culture ................................................... 21 Autonomy: A Cultural Distinction of the Canadian Submarine Service ............................ 26 Organizational Culture and CF Effectiveness: The Marsaw Case ......................................... 29 The Role of the Leader ....................................................................................................... 29 The Leader as Principal Agent of Embedding Culture ....................................................... 30 The Marsaw Impact on Culture: ‘Reign of Fear’ ................................................................ 33 3. Dominant Influences on Canadian Submarine Culture and Command Style ........................... 39 Historical Influences on Submarine Culture - 1960-1990 ..................................................... 39 External Influences – A Cultural Revolution within the CF ............................................... 39 An Internal Cultural Revolt: The Reaction of CF Subcultures ........................................... 45 Canadian Naval Command Style and Submarine Culture ...................................................... 49 Leadership Competency Defined ........................................................................................ 49 Command Style in the Canadian Navy and Submarine Service – Rooted in Tradition...... 53 Application to Marsaw ........................................................................................................ 56 4. Accountability and CF Effectiveness: Is the CF On-Mark or Astern of Station? ..................... 66 Towards a Definition of Accountability ................................................................................ 68 iii The Failure of Internal Accountability Mechanisms ............................................................. 70 Deficiencies at the Individual Level ................................................................................... 70 Deficiencies at the Unit Level .............................................................................................. 80 Deficiencies at the Corporate Level ..................................................................................... 86 The Requirement for External Accountability Mechanisms................................................ 89 The Public Matters .............................................................................................................. 89 The Media Matters .............................................................................................................. 90 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 94 Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 98 iv LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3.1 – Naval Command Style: the Canadian Navy ................................................. 56 v LIST OF TABLES Table 4.1 – Accountability and CF Effectiveness – a robust definition ........................... 93 vi ACKOWLEDGEMENT When the Canadian public learned of atrocities committed in Somalia in the early 1990s by the Canadian Airborne Regiment, lurking in the shadows was a similar case of abuse, bullying, and harassment - not towards foreigners - but towards the submarine crew on board HMCS OJIBWA. The events surrounding the court martial of OJIBWA’s Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw, failed to focus on similar issues that beleaguered the Airborne Regiment: culture, leadership, and accountability. The focus of this paper has been made possible through permission granted by the Royal Military College of Canada’s Research Ethics Board to conduct interviews of those persons who had served during Marsaw’s reign as OJIBWA’s CO, and so I am indebted to Captain(N) Laurence Hickey, Commander (Retired) Peter Kavanaugh, and Commander Mike Craven, who gave hours of their time to discuss the events and offer their perspective on what they believe had happened to a tremendously talented submarine officer who, as one officer stated, “lost his anchor on reality.” There are many others, as well, who assisted in writing this paper – their names can be found in the plethora of court martial transcripts. These were the brave officers and submariners who testified against Marsaw. Reading between the lines of those several thousand pages, one can grasp their painfulness to truth-tell and thus betray their loyalty to their CO. Had they not been candid and honest, this paper would not have been possible. Thanks as well to Karen Davis at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Maj Lynn Bradley, and Maj Lisa Noonan. Finally, many thanks to the Chief of the Maritime Staff’s naval historian and Gulf War shipmate, Dr. Rich Gimblett, who suggested the topic of Dean vii Marsaw’s court martial; and to my academic advisor, who was patient enough to read the draft and offer his advice. viii ABSTRACT Between 1995 and1996 Lieutenant-Commander Dean Marsaw underwent court martial proceedings over the alleged abuse of his crew on board Her Majesty’s Canadian Submarine OJIBWA. Allegations ranged from verbal to physical abuse and included an alleged incident of sexual abuse of a subordinate on board the boat he commanded. While the media focused on weaknesses in the Canadian Forces (CF) military justice system throughout Marsaw’s court martial, this paper examines the ‘lost story’ concerning the court martial – how key lessons can be identified for the Canadian Forces in the areas of organizational culture, leadership and accountability.