Giovanni Arrighi Lineages of Empire I Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire is a powerful antidote to the gloom, suspicion and hostility that have characterised the predominant reaction of the radical Left to the advent of so-called globalisation. While excoriating its destructive aspects, Hardt and Negri welcome globalisation as the dawn of a new era full of promise for the realisation of the desires of the wretched of the earth. In the same way that Marx insisted on the progressive nature of capitalism in compari- son with the forms of society it displaced, they now claim that Empire is a great improvement over the world of nation-states and competing imperialisms that preceded it. Empire is the new logic and structure of rule that has emerged with the globalisation of economic and cultural exchanges. It is the sovereign power that effectively regulates these global exchanges and thereby governs the world. Unlike empires of pre-modern and modern times, the singular Empire of postmodern times has no territorial boundaries/frontiers or centre of power. It is a decentred and deterritorialised apparatus of rule that incorporates the entire global realm. Historical Materialism , volume 10:3 (3–16) ©Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2002 Also available online – www.brill.nl 4Giovanni Arrighi The establishment of this new logic and structure of rule has gone hand in hand with ‘the realization of the world market and the real subsumption of global society under capital’. 1 The world of nation-states and competing imperialisms of modern times ‘served the needs and furthered the interests of capital in its phase of global conquest. At the same time, however, it created and reinforced rigid boundaries. ..that effectively blocked the free ow of capital, labor and goods – thus necessarily precluding the full realization of the world market’. 2 As capital realises itself in the world mar- ket, it ‘tends toward a smooth space dened by uncoded ows, exibility, continual modulation, and tendential equalization’. 3 The idea of Empire as a ‘smooth space’ is a central theme of the book. The smoothing does not just affect the division of the world into nation-states and their empires, merging and blending the distinct national colours ‘in the imperial global rainbow’. 4 Most signicant, it affects its division into First, Second and Third Worlds, North and South, core and periphery. While the Second World has disappeared, the Third World ‘enters into the First, establishes itself at the heart as the ghetto, shanty town, favela’. 5 The First World, in turn, ‘is transferred to the Third in the form of stock exchanges and banks, transnational corporations and icy skyscrapers of money and command’.6 As a result, ‘center and periphery, North and South no longer dene an international order but rather have moved closer to one another’. 7 As in most accounts of globalisation, Hardt and Negri trace its origins to the new power that the computer and information revolution has put in the hands of capital. By making it possible ‘to link together different groups of labor in real time across the world’, the revolution enabled capital ‘to weaken the structural resistances of labor power’ and ‘to impose both temporal exibility and spatial mobility’. 8 Speculative and nancial capital strengthen the tendency by going ‘where the price of labor is lowest and 1 Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 332. 2 Ibid. 3 Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 327. 4 Hardt and Negri 2000, p. xiii. 5 Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 254. 6 Ibid. 7 Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 336. 8 Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 337. Lineages of Empire 5 where the administrative force to guarantee exploitation is highest’. 9 As a result, ‘the countries that still maintain the rigidities of labor and oppose its full exibility and mobility are punished, tormented, and nally destroyed’. 10 In contrast to most accounts of globalisation, however, Hardt and Negri do not conceive of the forces of labour as the more or less reluctant recipi- ents of the tendencies of capital. On the one hand, proletarian struggles ‘caused directly’ the capitalist crisis of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and thus ‘forced capital to modify its own structures and undergo a paradigm shift’. 1 1 If the Vietnam War had not taken place, if there had not been worker and student revolts in the 1960s, if there had not been 1968 and the second wave of the women’s movements, if there had not been the whole series of anti-imperialist struggles, capital would have been content to maintain its own arrangement of power.... It would have been content for several good reasons: because the natural limits of development served it well; because it was threatened by the development of immaterial labor; because it knew that the transversal mobility and hybridization of world labor power opened the potential for new crises and class conicts on an order never before experienced. The restructuring of production ...was anticipated by the rise of a new subjectivity ...was driven from below, by a proletariat whose composition had already changed. 12 On the other hand, this new proletariat – or ‘multitude’, as Hardt and Negri call it – promptly seized the new opportunities of empowerment and liber- ation created by globalisation. The key practice in this respect has been migration. ‘The multitude’s resistance to bondage – the struggle against the slavery of belonging to a nation, an identity, and a people, and thus the desertion from sovereignty and the limits it places on subjectivity – is entirely positive.. ..The real heroes of the liberation of the Third World today may really have been the emigrants and the ows of population that have destroyed old and new boundaries’. 13 The multitude is thus both protagonist and beneciary of the destruction of boundaries that marks the coming of Empire. 9 Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 338. 10 Hardt and Negri 2000, pp. 337–8. 11 Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 261. 12 Hardt and Negri 2000, pp. 275–6. 13 Hardt and Negri 2000, pp. 361–3. 6Giovanni Arrighi Moreover, the very globalisation of capital’s networks of production and control empowers each and every point of revolt. Horizontal articulations among struggles – and hence the mediation of leaders, unions and parties – are no longer needed. ‘Simply by focusing their own powers, concentrating their energies in a tense and compact coil. ..struggles strike directly at the highest articulations of imperial order’. 14 As Hardt and Negri recognise, this double empowerment of the multitude under Empire leaves open the fundamental question of what kind of political programme can enable the multitude to cross and break down the limits that imperial initiatives continually re-establish on its desire of liberation. All they can say at this point is that global citizenship ( papiers pour tous !) is a rst element of such a programme, followed by a second element: a social wage and a guaranteed income for all individuals. ‘Once [global] citizenship is extended to all, we could call this guaranteed income a citizenship income, due each as a member of [world] society’. 15 This is probably the most optimistic picture of the nature and consequences of globalisation proposed thus far by the radical Left. The authors’ endeav- our to do away with any nostalgia for the power structures of an earlier era of capitalist development is, in my view, commendable. And so is their endeavour to show that the emerging logic and structure of world rule is both a response to past struggles of the exploited and oppressed and a more favourable terrain than previous structures for ongoing struggles against new forms of exploitation and oppression. There are, nonetheless, serious prob- lems with the way Hardt and Negri pursue these commendable endeavours. Most problems arise from Hardt and Negri’s heavy reliance on metaphors and theories and systematic avoidance of empirical evidence. While many readers will undoubtedly be taken in by the erudition deployed throughout the book, more sceptical readers will be put off by statements of fact unbacked by empirical evidence or, worse still, easily falsiable on the basis of widely available evidence. I will limit myself to two crucial examples, one concerning the ‘smoothness’ of the space of Empire, and the other concerning the role of the contemporary mobility of labour and capital in equalising conditions of production and reproduction across that space. 14 Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 58. 15 Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 403. Lineages of Empire 7 It is hard to question that the disappearance of the Second World makes it anachronistic to continue to speak of a First and a Third World. There is also plenty of evidence that the signs of modernity associated with the wealth of the former First World (the ‘icy skyscrapers of money and command’) have proliferated in the former Third World; and it may also be the case that the signs of marginalisation associated with the poverty of the former Third World are now more prominent in the former First World than they were twenty or thirty years ago. Nevertheless, it does not follow from all this that the distance between the poverty of the former Third World (or South) and the wealth of the former First World (or North) has decreased to any signicant extent. Indeed, all available evidence shows an extraordinary persistence of the North-South income gap as measured by GNPper capita. Sufce it to mention that, in 1999, the average per capita income of former ‘Third World’ countries was only 4.6% of the per capita income of former ‘First World’ countries, that is, almost exactly what it was in 1960 (4.5%) and in 1980 (4.3%).