Liberal Realism The Foundations of a Democratic Foreign Policy. G. John Ikenberry & Charles A. Kupchan. HE UPCOMING presiden- First, we illuminate the contrasting logics tial election represents a that inform policy choice, hopefully con- Tdefining moment for the tributing to a richer public debate. United States and its engagement in global Second, we contend that liberal realism affairs. The foreign poHcy of the Bush has clear advantages over the approach of Administration represents a radical depar- the Bush Administration; a Democratic ture—in principle as well as practice— foreign policy guided by it would enhance from the tradition of liberal realism that both U.S. security and international sta- guided the United States throughout the bility. We examine the five core issues second half of the 20*^^ century. The that provide a conceptual foundation for a Democratic Party promises to reclaim lib- U.S. grand strategy: the operation of the eral internationalism, restoring a centrist balance of power; terrorism and its impact foreign policy guided by ideals as well as on the international system; the role of power realities. On offer are two contend- rules and institutions in maintaining ing visions of America's role in the world. order; the connection between legitimacy In one, international order arises exclu- and international governance; and the sively from U.S. pre-eminence, with management of deficits, trade and the America wielding its unchecked power to global economy. We first outline how keep others in line and enforce interna- each of these issues affects U.S. policy and tional hierarchy. In the other, internation- global politics, next describe and critique al order arises from the coupling of the Bush Administration's approach to America's pre-eminence with its liberal each issue, and then go on to examine our founding principles, with the United Democratic alternative and its advantages. States wielding its power to craft consen- sual and legitimate mechanisms of inter- national governance. Which vision pre- Operating the Balance of Power vails will have enormous consequences for ELIEFS ABOUT the dynam- global politics. ics of power balancing and the We have two principal objectives. B effects of polarity on system stability play a central role in the formula- G. John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor tion of grand strategy. Three sets of ques- of Politics and International Affairs at tions are at issue. What are the systemic Princeton University. Charles A. Kupchan is effects of unipolarity, and, in light of professor of international affairs at those effects, how should the United Georgetown University and senior fellow at States wield its primacy in order to pro- the Council on Foreign Relations. mote stability? How durable is unipolarity. 38- -The National Interest—Fall 2004- and what strategy should the United military superiority and the presumed States pursue to shape the emerging maintenance of that superiority due to geopolitical environment? Should U.S. ongoing investment in capability as well power be measured primarily in material as research and development. The lever- terms, or does a multi-dimensional age provided by such pronounced materi- approach offer a more accurate measure al advantage, coupled with the impor- of America's relative power position? tance of demonstrating U.S. resolve, To its credit, the Bush Administration makes it both possible and desirable for has taken a clear position on each of these the United States to act in a unilateral and vital questions in the aftermath of 9/11, unconstrained fashion; allies are not need- articulating its views in its National ed to tame enemies that are no match. Security Strategy and supporting docu- ments and speeches. For the Bush team, HESE GUIDING supposi- international order is a direct by-product tions are fundamentally of U.S. primacy. System stability increases Tflawed. Basing America's in step with U.S. power; the starker the grand strategy on them triggers exactly asymmetries, the less likely it becomes what the Bush Administration is seeking that any nation will even consider chal- to forestall: balancing against U.S. power. lenging the U.S.-led order. The United The Bush Administration is correct that States should demonstrate its political the current international system is unipo- willingness to use its preponderant power lar and that U.S. primacy is uncontested. as it sees fit—especially after 9/11 — It is also correct that in the post-9/11 enhancing its ability to dissuade potential world, America must vigilantly protect challengers and to counter unconvention- itself against the threats posed by Islamic al threats before they compromise U.S. extremism, international terrorism and security. In sum, uncontested U.S. prima- WMD, when necessary using its military cy coupled with unmistakable resolve will superiority to do so. forestall balancing in the international It is misguided, however, to assume system, instead establishing stable hierar- that America's preponderant power, when chy. As President Bush stated in a speech combined with an assertive unilateralism, at West Point in June 2002, promotes stability as a matter of course. As the record of the past four years makes America has, and intends to keep, military clear, the unfettered exercise of U.S. pri- strengths beyond challenge . thereby, mak- macy has not led to deference and band- ing the destabilizing arms races of other eras wagoning, but to resentment and incipi- pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and ent balancing. The problem is not unipo- other pursuits of peace. larity per se, but changes in the exercise of U.S. power that have in turn changed for- This strategy is predicated upon the eign perceptions of U.S. intentions and assumption that unipolarity is sustainable how the United States will use its prepon- for the foreseeable future and should be derant strength. A dominant America that preserved for as long as possible. reassures others and deploys its power to American preponderance will discourage secure public goods induces systemic sta- potential challengers from seeking the bility; unfettered primacy deployed in the resources needed to contend for primacy, exclusive pursuit of national self-interest and even if dissuasion fails, no state could does the opposite. conceivably pull even with the United The Bush Administration's grand States for decades to come. Such confi- strategy rests on a second geopolitical dence is based primarily upon America's misconception: that U.S. primacy is -Liberal Realism- -39 durable. To be sure, America's economic coalition that blocked UN authorization and military might ensures that it will of the Iraq War denied the United States remain the world's leading nation for the legitimacy of international approval, decades to come. But current power substantially raising the economic and asymmetries will inevitably diminish in political costs of the war. Allies bore 90 the years ahead. The European Union's percent of the costs of the Gulf War, but wealth already rivals that of the United the American taxpayer has financed most States, and it may well forge a more inde- of the current operation, and Washington pendent and unified security policy as this has been unable to convince key allies to decade proceeds. Over the course of the send troops to Iraq. If the United States next decade, Japan may tire of always fol- continues on its current course, it will lowing America's lead, China will emerge enjoy military supremacy, but little else. as a major power, and Russia, India and Brazil are poised to become stronger and ROM THE perspective of lib- more assertive players. It will be impossi- eral realism, management of ble for the United States to sustain cur- Fthe global balance of power rent power asymmetries. Indeed, if would be based on three propositions. America seeks to preserve unipolarity and First, the United States must wield its its attendant sway over global affairs, it superior strength in concert with others will only ensure that other centers of to ensure that it forestalls rather than power, as they rise, array their strength invites balancing behavior. Re-establishing against the United States. America's bona fides as a benign hegemon Einally, the Bush Administration has necessitates resuscitating the alliances, overestimated the advantages of mihtary institutions and consultations that have superiority and mistaken brute strength eroded under Bush's watch. The United for influence, producing adverse conse- States should of course reserve the right to quences on a number of fronts. In Iraq, act alone as a last resort, but Washington Washington was correct that Saddam must rediscover that the costs of unilateral Hussein's regime would crumble under action usually far exceed the costs of seek- the U.S. onslaught, but it failed to appre- ing consensus. ciate that the invasion would spawn a dan- Second, liberal realism entails moving gerous mix of nationalism and religious with—rather than against—the secular extremism, leaving the United States diffusion of global power. The scope of struggling against a guerrilla insurgency American primacy will wane as this centu- that effectively neutralized America's mili- ry progresses; the ultimate objective tary might. In similar fashion, the Bush should be to channel rising centers of Administration is aware that its unilater- strength into cooperative partnerships alist bent has provoked anti-American with the United States. Furthermore, sentiment in many quarters, but it has strength elsewhere, even if it comes at the discounted the discontent because coun- expense of America's relative power, need tries opposed to U.S. policy do not have not come at the expense of its influence the military wherewithal to stand in and security. If rising centers of power are America's way. integrated into a rule-based order, they Although it is correct that other promise to be net contributors to interna- countries are not forming alliances against tional stability.