Grand Valley Journal of History Volume 7 Issue 1 Article 1 September 2019 The Russian Revolution Chang-Dae Hyun University of Toronto, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh Part of the European History Commons Recommended Citation Hyun, Chang-Dae (2019) "The Russian Revolution," Grand Valley Journal of History: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1 , Article 1. Available at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol7/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Grand Valley Journal of History by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Russian Revolution Cover Page Footnote Bibliography Ascher, Abraham. “The Kornilov Affair.” The Russian Review 12, no. 14 (1953): 235-252. Buttar, Prit. Collision of Empires: The War on the Eastern Front in 1914. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2014. Christman, Henry M. Essential Works of Lenin: What is to be done? And other writings. New York: Dover Publications, 1966. Harrison, Mark and Andrei Markevich. “Russia’s Home Front, 1914-1922: The Economy” University of Warwick, 2012. Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. The February Revolution, Petrograd, 1917. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981. Keep, John L.H. Keep. The Russian Revolution: a study in mass mobilization. New York: Norton, 1976. Knox, Alfred. With the Russian Army, 1914-1917. London: Hutchinson, 1921. Lincoln, Bruce W. Passage through Armageddon. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. Markevich, Andrei and Mark Harrison. “Great War, Civil War, and recovery: Russia’s national income, 1913 to 1928.” Journal of Economic History 71, no. 3 (2011): 672-703 Mavor, James. The Russian Revolution. London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1928. Merriman, John. A History of Modern Europe, Volume II. New York: W.W Norton, 2010. Schapiro, Leonard. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. New York: Random House, 1970. Showalter, Dennis E. Tannenberg: Clash of Empires. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1991. Siegelbaum, Lewis H. The Politics of Industrial Mobilization in Russia. 1914-17. London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1983. Silverman, Saul N. Lenin. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1972. Wade, Rex A. The Russian Revolution, 1917. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Wildman, Allan K. The end of Russian Imperial Army. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. This article is available in Grand Valley Journal of History: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol7/iss1/1 Hyun: The Russian Revolution The Russian Revolution: Bolsheviks’ Path to power Chang-Dae David Hyun University of Toronto Department of Political Science [email protected] Published by ScholarWorks@GVSU, 2019 1 Grand Valley Journal of History, Vol. 7 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 1 1 Introduction The Russian Revolution was caused by the consequences of World War I: economic crises, and demotivated soldiers. In both cases, governments – the Romanov Dynasty and the Provisional Government that first seized power from the Tsar – were unable to resolve these problems. But these factors alone were not sufficient enough to cause the Russian Revolution, rather they should be understood as preconditions. What was also needed was a strong party – the Bolshevik Party – willing and able to capitalize on such preconditions. First, this paper will argue that economic crises such as food shortages, inflation, and poor working conditions triggered mass discontent with the Tsar and the Provisional Government. Second, soldiers who were demotivated by war weariness, were disinclined to protect the political order during the February Revolution and the October Revolution. Finally, in the midst of crises, Kornilov Affair led to the defeat of elites – former members of zemstvo, bourgeois professionals, and military officers – by proletariat and peasants. The Bolshevik Party positioned itself to build on these preconditions and turned them into revolution. Economic Crises Economic anxiety greatly undermined public faith in the Tsar and then the Provisional Government. World War I stagnated Russia’s economy, which influenced mass population to mobilize and participate in the Russian Revolution. In prior to World War I, Russia was one of Europe’s fastest growing economies with economic activity expanding at a rate of four percent annually.1 Industrial sectors were growing, social welfare budgets– health care and education – were expanding, while the debt-to-GDP ratio was declining.2 However, the peasants grew weary of the Tsarist government after the government failed to manage the famine of 1891. By the autumn, 1 Mark Harrison, and Andrei Markevich, “Russia’s Home Front, 1914-1922: The Economy” (University of Warwick, 2012), 1. 2 Ibid, 3-4. https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol7/iss1/1 2 Hyun: The Russian Revolution 2 famine spread to seventeen provinces with a total population of thirty-six million people. 3 Peasants “lived on ‘famine bread’ made from rye husks mixed with the weed goosefoot, moss and tree bark, which made the loaves turn yellow and bitter.”4 Outbreaks of Cholera and typhus resulted in killing half a million people by the 1892, but the Tsarist government was too slow to respond, and the transportation system was unable to cope.5 Furthermore, the government banned using a word famine from newspapers which fueled public anger.6 In the midst of peasant misery, aristocrats enjoyed huge estates with well-furnished manors, and its banquets and concerts were carried on as usual.7 The outbreak of World War I in 1914 further contributed to peasants’ despair. Between 1913 to 1917, Russia’s average income per person, reduced by eighteen percent while the inflation rate increased significantly.8 By March 1917, the price level of 1913 had multiplied by a factor of 3.15.9 But by November 1917, the price level of 1913 had multiplied by a factor of 10.2.10 This significant inflation rate reflected Russia’s continued war effort: industries prioritizing producing war products over manufactured goods increased the price of commodities, and it depleted resources such as raw materials and fuel. Consequently, cost of production increased, and they were losing trade partners due to the continental war. Food shortages were one the biggest economic challenges during the Russian Revolution when the war directly undermined Russian agricultural industries by reducing the supply and increasing the demand of grain. Military mobilizations disturbed the supply chain of agricultural 3 Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924 (London: Pimlico, 1996), 157. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid, 160. 8 Andrei Markevich, and Mark Harrison, “Great War, Civil War, and recovery: Russia’s national income, 1913 to 1928,” Journal of Economic History 71, no. 3 (2011): 680. 9 Mark Harrison, and Andrei Markevich, “Russia’s Home Front, 1914-1922: The Economy” (University of Warwick, 2012), 28. 10 Ibid. Published by ScholarWorks@GVSU, 2019 3 Grand Valley Journal of History, Vol. 7 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 1 3 production because most of the fifteen million men and millions of horses joined from the countryside that was previously in charge of grain production.11 Furthermore, by the end of 1915, Russian agricultural production decreased by nearly six percent, due to conceding large farmlands of Poland, Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic to the Germans.12 Meanwhile, demand significantly increased because fifteen million soldiers who joined the war, needed food supplies. Moreover, refugees who fled conceded Russian territories also put significant pressures on the food demand. The poor transportation system made food shortages even worse. The already poor railway system, due to Russia’s slow industrialization, was further disturbed by the military transports taking priority over the commercial traffic.13 Foods produced in the countryside could not reach cities, which created further shortages. In addition, governments were unable to resolve food shortages. Even after the February Revolution that started after large demonstrations demanding bread, the newly created Provisional Government exacerbated the problem. On March 1917, the Provisional Government introduced the food procurement plan, which imposed fixed prices of grain with state’s monopoly over agricultural products.14 Under the food procurement plan, the government attempted to take control of supplying cheap agricultural products to the urban population and possibly resolve food crises. However, peasants disagreed with such a policy because the food procurement plan required their sacrifice. Peasants could not afford to sell grains at a low and fixed price because the cost of living was increasing. At the time, most industries prioritized war products over manufactured goods, which inevitably increased the price of commodities. Not only did the fixed prices not include the 11 Ibid, 6. 12 Andrei Markevich, and Mark Harrison, “Great War, Civil War, and recovery: Russia’s national income, 1913 to 1928,” Journal of Economic History 71, no. 3 (2011): 680. 13 Lewis H. Siegelbaum, The Politics of Industrial Mobilization in Russia, 1914-17 (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1983), 87-96. 14 Rex A. Wade, The Russian Revolution, 1917 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 131. https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol7/iss1/1 4 Hyun: The Russian Revolution 4 inflation rate of the living cost, but also peasants believed the food procurement plan served the interest of the urban population and