CHAPTER X LAGNICOURT-THE GERMAN COUNTER-STROKE THEFifth Army, as G.H.Q. had noted, was “ weak.” As the result of the policy with which Haig met the German with- drawal-that of saving at least as many divisions as the enemy saved-the Fifth Army had for some weeks maintained only three divisions to hold its front of 18,750 yards. Thus, in order to concentrate the force for striking at the Hindenburg Line on his left, Gough had entrusted the safety of his right and centre to a single division, the 1st Australian. On April IIth, when the 4th Australian Division for its attack on Bullecourt was concentrated on a 2,750 yards’ front, and the 62nd Division on the left held about 4,000, the 1st Australian Division was responsible for over 12,000 yards, from a point south of Riencourt to the Canal du Nord opposite Havrincourt Wood -two- thirds of the front of the army. The extension of one division over so wide a sector in close proximity to the crucial front was only possible by reason of the enemy’s withdrawal in that sector having barely ended. The Germans still maintained small outposts in front of their lines, and, though on its flanks the 1st Division was within 700-1,200 yards of the Hindenburg Line or its I‘ balcony ” trenches, in the centre, where these receded in a semicircle, the Australian outposts were still 2,700 yards away. In accordance with the British tactics throughout the advance, the division was disposed ‘I in depth ” -that is, with outposts in front and supports and reserves stationed in elaborate succession at wide intervals behind them-thus : 355 356 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Apr., 1917 I m ui L. a0 v1 C z;a sp AV., 19171 LAGNICOURT 357 The rear lines of defence, except where they coincided with lines of old German wire or trench, were but partly complete, and only a fraction of the troops camped or billeted near them were specially allotted for their defence.’ A very powerful resistance could nevertheless have been put up there. But the main function of the reserves was to support the troops in front of them. To the enormous front held by the 1st Australian Division this system could be applied only if the outpost-line was reduced to the thinness of a light screen. With the division relying on two of its brigades to hold the line each with two battalions, each battalion holding its 3,000 yards sector with three companies,2 and each company holding its post with three platoons, the front would be held, first by a line of sentry posts (4-7 men) 166 yards apart, whose duty would be to warn-and, if necessary, fall back upon-a line of picquets (15 to 20 men and, normally, a Lewis gun) 330 yards apart. Behind these, from a quarter to half-a-mile distant, would be the general line of the support platoons-one platoon to 1,000 \ .E? 9 .+ yards. In addition, about a third of 00’. - the sixty-four machine-guns of the Rerane,&%nt = a, divisionS were stationed, about three to %’.” a mile, beside, or a little in front of, \. the supports. From most of the front 1. posts, which were unapproachable by lR”&y Soy Rercrve Pl2hn’ day,’ the neighbouring posts could be W&& ’ seen, if carefully looked for-a couple of steel helmet^,^ visible against a distant tuft of gorse, or a streak of newly-turned parapet appearing not unlike a small dam in the corner of a large paddock.e From the supports ~~ ~~ ~ As it was obviously advisable to retain some definite garrison in the rear lines, it was eventually ordered that, if the reserves had to be sent forward, the particular companies allotted to the defence of the rear lines must remain. This provision, however, did not come into force until after the events which form the main subject of this chapter. ’Or their equivalent. The northernmost battalion (12th) had four companies in line, but each with two platoons in reserve. ‘The British had now formed a machine-gun company (16 guns) for each division as well as for each brigade. The German establishment of heavy machine-guns was, roughly speaking, about the same. ‘By day, in order to show that they were still there, the outposts of the 3rd Battalion used to hold up a rifle at stated times. 8 Painted green or khaki, or, to deaden the ‘I high lights,” covered with hessian #See Val. XII. #late 309. 358 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Apr., 1917 it was in many places impossible to detect the forward posts; a visiting officer could merely be shown their direction- “600 yards out there, to the right of those trees,” “on the forward slope,” “ on those cross-roads.” To hide the posts from the enemy, the earth from each little excavation was carefully smoothed out and covered with cut grass. Wire- entanglement had of late seldom, if ever, been erected in front of the posts, partly because, though favoured by head- quarters, this step had not been specially ordered, and was hated by the troops as betraying their positions ;’ partly because no wire had been supplied, and the field companies and pioneers, which would ordinarily have been sent to supervise the work, were engaged in making roads and rail- ways necessary for the Bullecourt offensive.s The supporting field artillery-that of the 5th Australian Division8-had two groups of guns on the left behind Morchies, so that one could help the Bullecourt attack,lO and the third behind Hermies ; but even had it been evenly distributed, with a front so extensive it could have provided only one field-gun or howitzer to each 170 yards. The order of corps headquarters was that, if the enemy attacked, the picquet line must be held to the last; but it was obvious that so thin a line must be penetrated by any serious thrust, and could only be maintained by employing reserves to retake any part temporarily lost.ll It has been seen that the operations against the Hindenburg Line also necessitated that the right and centre groups of field The artillery artillery supporting the division allotted for thrust forward the attack should be thrust respectively far ‘The danger to these small posts if their osition was indicated to the enemy, was a very real one. On March 3; General 8olmes. in pursuance of his policy of yonally reconnoitring each part of his line, visited one of inem north of agnicourt. Accompanied by his aide-desamp, Lieutenant K. A. Ferguson (of Sydney) and wearing, as usual, his staff ca with red band he walked out by day to it. Though sniped at, he returned sa.fe?y: but his aide-&-camp was bit and had to be left in the post, waiting until nightfall. Shortly aftcrwarda. doul~tlesr in consequence of all this movement the post was shelled and hit, hravy casualties being caused to its garrison and Lieutenant Ferguson being wounded a second time 8The light railway, on which the 1st Division’s pioneers were engaged, bad now reached Frkmicourt. OBesides its own hrigadcs (13th and 14th). the 5th Divisional Artillery had temporarily attached, the 3rd (Army) Brigade, A.F.A., and the 106th Howltie; Battery Each brigade formed a grou ’OTh; 106th Battery belonged to tRis group. Some of the machin-guns of the 1st eivision also were sited solely to help the Byllecourt operations. 11 I alwajs impress upon every commander. Birdwood wrote, after April 15. “ that I shall never say a word if small posts are overwhelmed by supeiior numbers. so long as they have arrangements ready for launching a counter-attack at once.” br., 19171 LAGNICOURT 359 down the Lagnicourt and Noreuil valleys, which ran direct towards the enemy. The left group was emplaced mainly in sunken roads on the plateau behind Ecoust-Longatte, but was barely concealed ; indeed, the 43rd Battery was so near the crest that its guns were ordered to avoid, if possible, ‘ firing by day. The Lagnicourt and Noreuil valleys being obvious ~ channels of communication, were G, regularly shelled, but, soon after ,ficMMwm s?ulUlloC~ the guns opened there, those in the Noreuil valley came under counter-battery fire such as Aus- tralian artillery had not yet experienced in the war.’* The shelling of the Lagnicourt valley was less severe, but harassing. The lines of battery positions, one behind the other, down the depressions, were enfiladed, as were the roads by which the drivers brought ammunition. More- over, a proportion of the enemy’s 5.9-inch shells were now fitted with “ instantaneous ” fuses, which burst them before they penetrated, so that fragments skimmed the earth’s surface almost with the speed of a bullet for 400-800 yards around. The result was that the batteries in these valleys began to suffer a steady succession of casualties which, though com- paratively few in daily total, were constant, the artillery’s loss for the tour thus approaching that of the infantry. On April 7th 2 officers and 13 men were hit, mainly in Noreuil valley; on the Sth, an officer and IO men, mostly behind Lagnicourt. On the 9th 11 men were killed and 19 wounded,l* mostly near Lagnicourt. On the 10th 11 were killed, including the commander of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Watts,” and his staff,*&and 7 were wounded. ”The duels with the Turkish guns at Anzac had oftcn been sharp, but the Turks had neither the guns nor the shells to maintain a constant bombardment.