SLOVO, VOL. 28, NO. 2(SPRING 2016), 85-105 DOI: 10.14324/111. 0954-6839.047 Russian National Security Strategy: Regime Security and Elite’s Struggle for ‘Great Power’ Status PAVEL SHCHELIN University of Glasgow INTRODUCTION The most common premise concerning Russian foreign policy post-cold war is the assumption that its primary focus has been the restoration of the country’s influence in international affairs (Kanet, 2007; Trenin, 2011; Tsygankov, 2005, Stent, 2014). Following a realist approach, it is possible to claim that the quest for a ‘great power’ with global interests and the ability to protect them has been the cornerstone of Russian Foreign policy for centuries (Tsygankov, 2012). Decisions made by the Russian leadership across last two years at the time of writing, including undeclared war in Ukraine and declared war in Syria, seem to fit perfectly into that narrative since the country was trying desperately in that period to defend its borders from threats of terrorism and hostile military alliances (i.e NATO). Moreover, a realist perspective encompasses the matters of prestige that are traditionally in the domain of a constructivist paradigm of international relations. If the Russian leadership considers status as a means of soft power to promote its agenda in the international arena, then it is natural that foreign policy decision-makers seek to gain this valuable resource at all costs. It is possible to argue about the continuity of choices and to claim that the current Russian leadership— being as restrained by a ‘contradiction between overcoming economic backwardness and defending porous frontiers’ (Rieber, 2007, 225) as Tsarist and Soviet rulers had been in their foreign policy— has chosen the hard line in their foreign policy. However, a realist approach can be considered as an oversimplification for the investigation of Russian foreign policy under the Putin regime. The paper argues that a foreign policy driven exclusively by domestic needs has been conducted over a period of 16 years. In order to defend this hypothesis, this article suggests a close examination of the latest National Security strategy adopted on the 31st of December 2015 in the context of trends of internal development within the country. This article is structured in the following way. The first section will present an analysis of the updated security strategy doctrine, including the differences from the © School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University College London, 2016. 86 SHCHELIN – RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: REGIME SECURITY AND ELITE’S STRUGGLE FOR ‘GREAT POWER’ STATUS previous edition. The analysis points to a discrepancy between the doctrine’s mostly defensive nature oriented towards the regime’s domestic security, and claims of great power status against the background of decisive, if not aggressive, foreign policy and the country’s deteriorating economic development. The second section is divided into subsections, which will cover the relationship between status theory in international relations and the incentives of the Russian elite to pursue ‘great power’ status. The final section proposes a possible explanation of the paradox discussed during the discourse analysis of the strategy doctrine. This article concludes by providing a coherent argument on the incentives of modern Russian foreign policy, which cannot be assessed either by a purely realist or purely constructivist approach. I. THE PARADOXES OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY DOCTRINE The National Security strategy doctrine is one of several documents that defines Russian foreign policy by putting it in the broader context of security, both external and internal. On 31st December 2015, the fourth redaction of this document was issued. Whereas the previous doctrine appeared in 2009 after the Russian – Georgian war and was designed to remain in force until 2020, the recent strategy was issued against the background of the war in Eastern Ukraine and a deepening crisis in the relationship between Russia and the West. The very fact that a strategy intended to last 11 years was nevertheless revised is what leads to the conclusion that some fundamental adjustments were introduced. The new strategy doctrine only partially maintains the security narratives present in the previous version. By the doctrine’s definition, national security embraces the ‘protection of an individual, society and state from both foreign and domestic threats’ (art. 6)1. It is exactly the same definition from 2009. However, first major differences appear shortly thereafter. Following the previous document, the strategy proposes a broad understanding of security. In particular, it includes ‘primarily the state, social, informational, ecological, economic, transport, energy security, and security of the individual’ (art.6). In contrast to the short definition, such a framing of national security puts the well-being of the state as the top priority, with consideration for individual security falling last on the list. Unlike in the 2009 version, where there was no such contradiction since the promotion of the 1 All citations from the 2015 Strategy are taken from its official publication on “Rossiyskaya Gaseta” webpage and are accompanied with () brackets. Accessed (26.01.2016): http://www.rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html © School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University College London, 2016. 87 SHCHELIN – RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: REGIME SECURITY AND ELITE’S STRUGGLE FOR ‘GREAT POWER’ STATUS constitutional rights of an individual was placed first upon the list of objectives {art. 6}.2 At the same time, in both strategies there is a completely unquantifiable element of ‘spiritual’ security. In 2009, it was stated that ‘Russian traditional ideals, spirituality and proper attitude towards historical memory [are reviving]’ {art. 1}, and the 2015 document proclaims this thesis as well (art. 11). In contrast to the previous strategy, the 2015 redaction is much more moderate in evaluating the successes of the country in all areas except foreign policy. In 2009, its authors claimed nothing less than that the country ‘has managed to overcome the consequences of the systemic political and socio-economic crisis of the late XXth century’ {art. 1}. In 2015, as the main accomplishment of the county’s development, it is suggested that the country has demonstrated its ability to ‘defend sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity and compatriots’ rights abroad’ (art. 8). What is more, in comparison to 2009, the current strategy is oriented towards the ideas of stability and regime protection rather than development. In its first articles, the 2009 strategy set the goal of transforming the nation into ‘one of the leading powers judging by the level of technological progress, the quality of life of the population, and influence on global processes’ {art. 1}, and to becoming ‘one of the leaders in world economy through effective participation in the global division of labour, [and] increasing the global competitiveness of the national economy’ {9}. In the 2015 strategy doctrine, there is no clear image of any future goals. Instead it is focused from the very beginning solely on the stability and protection of the country in a dangerous external environment. The need to protect the country’s stability arises mainly from the threat posed by the global West, according to the new document. The new strategy doctrine appears much more explicit in this area when compared with the previous edition. Formerly, despite existing arguments such as debates about the US anti-missile program and NATO- enlargement, there was a goal to ‘build equal and strategic partnership with the USA on the basis of joint interests’ {18}. In the 2015 strategy doctrine, articles 12, 15, 16, 17 and 18 (disregarding any talk about economic, social or any other kind of internal development) provide an image of the hostile international environment the Russian state has to operate in. There is a long list of threats of conflict in modern international relations, according to which the main opponent to the Russian Federation is NATO and the USA. First and 2 All citations from the 2009 Strategy are taken from its official publication on “Rossiyskaya Gaseta” webpage and are accompanied with {} brackets Accessed (26.01.2016) http://www.rg.ru/2009/05/19/strategia-dok.html © School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University College London, 2016. 88 SHCHELIN – RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: REGIME SECURITY AND ELITE’S STRUGGLE FOR ‘GREAT POWER’ STATUS foremost, Russia is threatened by ‘the support of the US and EU of the anti-constitutional coup d’etat in Ukraine, which led to a deep schism of Ukrainian society and the onset of an armed conflict…framed Russia as an enemy among the Ukrainian people [and]…transformed Ukraine into a long-term breeding ground of instability in Europe and directly on Russian borders’ (art.17). It is particularly emphasized that ‘the practice of toppling down legitimate political regimes, provoking instability within a state’ (art.18) is becoming more and more widespread. Accordingly, the question of information security becomes of the utmost importance in view of the fact that communication technologies are used ‘by some countries’ in order to ‘achieve the geopolitical goals resorting to manipulation with public opinion and history falsification’ (art.21). In the context of being surrounded by various threats, the following long-term strategic interests