The Springs Graduate History Journal “We trace out all the veins of the earth”1 Iberian Mining, Labor, and the Industrial Foundation of the Roman Empire: An Interdisciplinary Approach Donald Unger Abstract: By combining the critical analysis of ancient literature with archaeology and modern atmospheric data, this paper explores the limitations of ancient source material treating the topic of mining in Roman Spain from the beginning of third century B.C. during the outbreak of the second major Punic War (c. 218-201 BC) until the end of the first-century CE. By evidencing that historical treatments by ancient authors writing on the topic of mining were sparse and devoid of detail, this paper argues that an interdisciplinary approach combining ancient with modern empirical data is a viable method which can and should be used to overcome ancient source limitations on the topic of mining. Ultimately, this study supports the empirically founded notion that, in the case of the Roman mining enterprise, a proto-industrial revolution occurred at about 100 B.C. in Spain that would not be rivaled in size and scope until the modern industrial revolution. —Introduction— When Hannibal crossed the Mediterranean for the first time in 235 BC at the age of nine, he travelled North with his father Hamilcar Barca to Spain.2 After shoring up his position in North Africa following a mercenary revolt and the loss of the strategic isle of Sicily in the first Punic War against the Romans, the most pressing order of business for Hannibal’s father was to secure his position in Southern Iberia so as to gain control of the peninsula's resources. The first Punic War had been a triumph for Rome and a disaster for Carthage, and the struggle for power in the Mediterranean was far from resolved. Hamilcar needed Spain for its resources, specifically metallurgic resources needed to produce the war debt now owed to Rome as a result of Carthage’s defeat. In his discussion of the causes of the second Punic War, Polybius writes that in the wake of defeat at Sicily, “[Hamilcar Barca] at once threw all his energies into the conquest of Spain with the object of using these resources to prepare for a war against Rome. The success of the Carthaginian enterprise in Spain must be regarded as the third cause of the [second Punic] war, for it was the assurance which they drew from this increase in their strength which enabled them to embark on the war with confidence.”3 This move, 1 Pliny. Historia. 4.3. 2 Polybius. Rise of the Roman Empire. (New York: Penguin Classics, 1980). 3.11 and 1.26. Polybius is apt to point out that Hamilcar Barca is a different person entirely than Hamilcar the Carthaginian General who replaced the famed Carthaginian General Hanno after the defeat of Agrigentum in Sicily around 262 BCE at the end of the 1st Punic War. While Polybius only mentions Hamilcar Barca twice—once in reference to Hannibal’s upbringing in Spain, and on the other occasion—Polybius characterizes Barca’s role in instilling hatred for Rome into Hannibal and his brothers at an early age due to the eindemnities forced upon Carthage following the defeat of the 1st Punic War. Hannibal’s brothers Magon and Hasdrubal were known for their exploits in the 2nd Punic War. 3 Ibid. 63 Fall 2018 Vol. 1, No. 1 thought Hamilcar, ensured Carthaginian dominance in the greater Mediterranean, especially in a period of rapid expansion for the Roman Empire.4 Figure 1 The areas in blue represent Carthage and its allies during the 2nd Punic War. The areas in red represent Rome and its allies. Made by Javier Fernandez-Vina of Florida International University in 2011. Accessed through Wikimedia Commons. Creative Commons—Attribution, Share Alike. Off the southern coast of Iberia, on the island of Gades (modern-day Cadiz, Spain) Hamilcar Barca quickly established Carthaginian dominance on the Iberian peninsula, securing his interests in the region in preparation for the upcoming contest with Rome.5 Here at Gades, he and young Hannibal lived for nearly a decade whilst working fervently to expand Carthage’s grasp on the Iberian mainland until Hamilcar’s untimely death c. 229.6 Even though Hamilcar would never live to see the second and third Punic engagements, Gades and greater Iberia were important to Hamilcar not only because of their geopolitical value in the Mediterranean, but also because they contained abundant metallurgical resources that he needed to sustain Carthaginian wealth and dominance in Iberia and abroad.7 Especially amidst the rise of Roman power in the Mediterranean, Hamilcar’s presence near the Iberian silver mines assuaged the massive 4 Henceforth, we will refer to modern-day Spain and Portugal as Iberia. See fig. 1 for a visual illustration of the region prior to Roman conquest. See Appian. The Foreign Wars. 1.3. “This fruitful land, abounding in all good things, the Carthaginians began to exploit before the Romans. A part of it they occupied and another part they plundered, until the Romans expelled them from the part they held, and immediately occupied it themselves 5 Stanley Arthur Cook, F. E. Adcock, and M. P. Charlesworth, eds., The Cambridge Ancient History. 218-133 B.C., vol. VIII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 115, 311, 323-25. 6 Ibid. 7 Polybius, Ian Scott-Kilvert, and F. W. Walbank, The Rise of the Roman Empire (London: Penguin, 2003). 64 The Springs Graduate History Journal war debt Carthage owed to Rome, while at the same time positioning the Carthaginians for the upcoming second and third Punic Wars (218-146 BC). As the second century Greek historian Appian recounted regarding the Carthaginian expectations of material gain from the territory: “The Carthaginians, enjoying the gains they had received from Spain, sent another army thither and appointed Hasdrubal, the son-in-law of Hamilcar [Barca], who was still in Spain, commander of all their forces there. He had with him in Spain Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar and brother of his own wife, a young man zealous in war, beloved by the army, and who soon after became famous for his military exploits.”8 Hamilcar’s understanding of the value of Iberian metallurgy as essential for sustained military dominance and societal wealth, would be a lesson young Hannibal soon learned as he struggled to maintain Carthaginian control over the Iberian peninsula against the onslaught of Roman encroachment during the second Punic War (218-201 BC).9 Even though Sicily would be the first strategic Roman province outside of Latium following Carthage’s defeat, in terms of Rome’s long-term dominance and sustained wealth in the Mediterranean, Iberia was much more valuable to Rome because of its metallurgic abundance.10 Using the limited ancient sources extant, this paper will examine the ancient writing on the enterprise of mining in Iberia from the first Punic War to the end of the Roman Republic.11 First, I will illustrate how aristocratic Roman discourse concerning mining has continued to influence our understanding of the value of the mining industry to the ancients, and second, I will present new empirical data which helps to reconcile shortcomings of the ancient literature on this topic.12 As we shall discuss, this topic has been distorted by reliance (almost exclusively) on Pliny the Elder to recreate events. The impact of this unchecked reliance on Pliny has been the silencing of the history of the impact of the enterprise in Iberia and the perpetuation of a bias against the labor-class and the mining enterprise in the region. This will help to shed light on a subject which, as we shall discuss, has been distorted by reliance (almost exclusively) on Pliny the Elder to recreate events. The impact of this unchecked reliance on Pliny has been the silencing of the history of the impact of the enterprise in Iberia and the perpetuation of a bias towards the labor-class and the mining enterprise in the region. 8 Appian. Foreign Wars: 2.6 9 The History of Rome, p. 137-81 10 Shepherd, Robert. Ancient Mining. London: Elsevier Applied Science for the Institution of Mining & Metallurgy. (U.K: Cambridge Univ. Pr.: 1993). 11 The Punic Wars occurred in three major phases from 264 B.C. to 146 B.C. and ultimately led to the sack of Carthage and the rise of Rome as hegemon in Mediterranean for the next six centuries. 65 Fall 2018 Vol. 1, No. 1 In conclusion, I will discuss the effect the industry must have had on the people and the environment while ultimately refuting the notion that mining was an ancillary enterprise that had little effect on the people or the environment at this time. I believe this ground-level approach, which Marie Grace Brown very effectively expressed as paying “attention to that which is closest in gives new shape to large, familiar stories,” is critical in understanding the impact of mining on society in Iberia.13 Borrowing from Brown for this analysis, I preface this argument by stating that, while considering the archaeological evidence from this time and space is critical to understanding what occurred at mining sites throughout the region during this Roman occupation, it is certainly not the only source of reliable information on the topic.14 In addition, using numismatic research, atmospheric data, and literary evidence, I will also look at the structure of the Roman mining enterprise over the course of its rise and fall from 200 BC until roughly 500 CE.15 In sum, analysis of ancient source material with empirical evidence in this manner has implications which reveal the need for new interdisciplinary historiographic methods concerning this subject, especially with the considerable empirical data now available.16 In addition to the approach I advocate, I contend that contrary to what our ancient sources alone reveal “or dismiss” both Carthaginian and Roman mining enterprises were widely perceived by rulers as necessary for the sustained vitality of the metropole because the industry was so necessary for these empires to sustain themselves.17 As I shall discuss, the evidence for such a claim lies in the conclusions gleaned from modern empirical research discussed below in section IV.