PESCO and Security Cooperation Between the EU and Turkey Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Alessandro Marrone Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) and Sabancı University, Istanbul Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome September 2018 GLOBAL TURKEY IN EUROPE WORKING PAPER 19 PESCO and Security Cooperation Between the EU and Turkey Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Alessandro Marrone* EU PESCO CSDP Turkey Abstract Introduction: What is PESCO and how does it work? The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) aims The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is the to achieve more effective, efficient and synergic military latest development in terms of European collaboration capabilities through a series of ad hoc projects. It is legally and, eventually, integration in the defence domain. It rooted in the EU Lisbon Treaty, yet it is substantially aims to achieve more effective, efficient and synergic intergovernmental and much of its content and shape military capabilities through a series of ad hoc projects will be decided by the member states over the next on a number of military aspects. It is legally rooted in few years. As with all institutional designs incorporating the EU Lisbon Treaty and features an important role for differentiated integration, the onset of PESCO begs the the Union’s High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP), question of how this initiative relates to third countries yet it is substantially intergovernmental and much of its that are not full members of the EU such as Norway, content and shape will be decided by the member states Turkey and – in the future - the UK. The modality of over the next few years. these countries’ involvement in PESCO directly impacts on the future of EU–NATO collaboration. In principle, Following a reflection fuelled by the 2016 EU Global this involvement could be achieved by granting NATO Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), PESCO member third countries consultation rights in deciding was formally launched on December 2017 by 25 EU 1 on PESCO’s policy direction, and full participatory rights member states – all but Denmark, Malta and the UK. in PESCO’s capability and operational projects to which PESCO envisages two layers of governance: a higher one, they can participate. in which all participating member states are involved and decisions are taken by consensus; and a lower level * Senem Aydın-Düzgit is a Senior Scholar and the Research and Academic Affairs Coordinator at Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) and an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of Sabancı University. Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme and Senior Fellow in the Security Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Paper presented at the seminar “PESCO and Security Cooperation between EU and Turkey”, organized in Berlin on 14 May 2018 by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) and Stiftung Mercator under the Global Turkey in Europe V programme. 1 Council of the European Union, Defence cooperation: Council establishes Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), with 25 member states participating, 11 December 2017, http://www. consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/11/ defence-cooperation-pesco-25-member-states-participating. September 2018 WORKING PAPER 19 2 comprising specific projects. In the latter case, only those of maritime surveillance.6 European countries committed to a certain project decide on its implementation, budget, developments, etc. Such a low-profile start has underlined to two main weaknesses of PESCO. The first one relates to its balance PESCO activates a Lisbon Treaty provision by establishing between ambitions and inclusiveness.7 This (im)balance a legally binding framework deeply rooted in the EU’s was the result of intense negotiations in the run-up to the institutional “landscape”. As such, it is qualitatively launch of PESCO. In particular, France pushed for more different from declarations favouring enhanced European demanding commitments in order to make the initiative defence cooperation put forward by European summits ambitious and relevant both for crisis-management in recent years.2 Indeed, PESCO envisages binding and operations and defence procurement – and therefore a quite detailed commitments, coupled with accountability means to achieve European strategic autonomy.8 To this mechanisms such as national implementation plans and end, Paris was happy to have only a few willing and able the annual report presented by the HR/VP. Also, single member states joining PESCO. Conversely, Berlin aimed for participating member states can be excluded from a more inclusive initiative, one that would not lead to new PESCO in the event of their non-compliance; although dividing lines in Europe, as a way of politically reaffirming this constitutes a remote possibility, this risk of exclusion European unity and the viability of the EU integration will probably put member states under pressure to fulfil process vis-à-vis Brexit (Britain’s intended exit from the EU) their commitments.3 and anti-EU forces within and beyond the Union – a view that was also appreciated by Brussels institutions. The Moreover, EU institutions are strongly involved in PESCO resulting balance is clearly closer to Berlin’s stance than in various ways. The HR/VP is fully committed – having, for that of Paris. However, inclusiveness came with a price. instance, the aforementioned responsibility of overseeing If an initiative like PESCO, designed for a core group of the yearly evaluation of PESCO results. The European member states very close to each other in political and Defence Agency (EDA) acts as a PESCO secretariat military terms, is implemented through the participation together with the European External Action Service (EEAS) of 25 national governments there is a risk of diminishing – including the EU Military Committee, which is tasked its effectiveness, efficiency and ambitions – for example, with supporting the initiative’s operational aspects. Such because of the unanimity voting system required at the a legal and institutional framework constitutes another higher level of governance. strength of PESCO, since it contributes to keeping the project on the EU political agenda and encourages It is not by chance that, as mentioned above, the first wave further developments – as have occurred in a number of of 17 projects has, by mobilizing only modest resources, EU policy fields, including some in the defence sector as disappointed those expecting a breakthrough in terms a result of the drafting and implementation of the EUGS.4 of defence cooperation and integration. Actually, much has depended – and will depend – on the political will of 1. What are the challenges facing PESCO in major European countries and the actual determination the light of future scenarios? of others to follow up on their commitments. Noticeably, France and Germany are not participating in any of the The majority of the first batch of 17 projects endorsed five PESCO projects more directly related to capability within PESCO, in March 2018, has had little or no direct development, and have limited their involvement in the impact on the development of military capabilities – others in comparison with a strong commitment from, for the focus being rather on education, training, military example, Italy and Spain. In parallel, Berlin and Paris have mobility, medical commands and a cyber-response team.5 relaunched bilateral cooperation with their July 2017 The five PESCO initiatives directly focused on capability joint proposal for a number of cooperative procurement development deal with the armoured infantry fighting efforts.9 As a whole, it seems to be the case that PESCO vehicle, indirect fire support, maritime systems for mine has not been used thus far for the most ambitious level of countermeasures, harbour protection and the upgrading 6 Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/340 of 6 March 2018 establishing the list of projects to be developed 2 Alessandro Marrone, “Permanent Structured Cooperation: An under PESCO, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ Institutional Pathway for European Defence”, in IAI Commentaries, TXT/?uri=CELEX:32018D0340. No. 17|26 (November 2017), http://www.iai.it/en/node/8508. 7 On the level of ambitions of PESCO commitments, see among 3 Tomáš Valášek, “The EU’s New Defense Pact: Marginal Gains”, others: Olivier De France, Claudia Major and Paola Sartori, “How in Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, 16 November 2017, http:// to Make PeSCo a Success”, in Ares Group Policy Papers, No. 21 carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/74760. (September 2017), http://www.iris-france.org/notes/how-to-make- 4 On the whole EUGS process, see: Nathalie Tocci, Framing the EU pesco-a-success. Global Strategy. A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World, Cham, Springer- 8 Alessandro Marrone, “Permanent Structured Cooperation: An Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Institutional Pathway for European Defence”, cit. 5 Marcin Terlikowski, “PESCO: First Projects and the Search for (a 9 Alessandro Riccardo Ungaro, “Gli assi (fuori) dalla manica di Real) Breakthrough”, in PISM Bulletin, No. 65 = 1136 (8 May 2018), Francia e Germania”, in AffarInternazionali, 23 July 2017, http:// http://www.pism.pl/publications/bulletin/no-65-1136. www.affarinternazionali.it/?p=65772. September 2018 WORKING PAPER 19 3 capability development by those counties able to invest “incubators” of cooperative projects to be opened up in such projects. to other