Sabina Vaccarino Bremner 1 Forthcoming in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. Please cite published version. ‘Until Art Once More Becomes Nature’: Culture and the Problem of Unity in Kant’s Critique of Judgment1 I In the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment (KU),2 Kant claims that his first two Critiques have left a problem unresolved: while the first Critique successfully showed that the coexistence of the sensible and supersensible domains can be conceived without con- tradiction and the second Critique that the supersensible can have practical reality, these conclusions have left open an “incalculable gulf” between the domain of nature and the domain of freedom (5:175). The first two Critiques left a point of tension by concluding both that theoretical cognition of the sensible world cannot be extended to the supersensi- ble, “just as if there were so many different worlds”, and that the supersensible “should have an influence on the [sensible]: namely the concept of freedom should make the end that is imposed by its laws real in the sensible world” (5:176). The possibility of the supersensible’s effect on the sensible must therefore inform our theoretical cognition of nature: the “law- fulness” in nature’s form must be conceived as “at least in agreement with the possibility of the ends that are to be realized in it in accordance with the laws of freedom” (5:176). Kant situates the project of the Third Critique as offering a response to this problem, showing how the power of judgment can think the “unity” of or “transition” from the supersensible grounding nature to the supersensible contained in the concept of freedom, constituting a “bridge”, “intermediary”, or providing a “mediating concept” between the two (5:176, 5:195, 5:177, 5:196).3 Making sense of how KU responds to this problem is complicated by the fact that the work is split into two seemingly disconnected halves, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (KaU) and the Critique of Teleological Judgment (KtU), which some scholars have taken to advance two distinct, largely unrelated lines of argument (White Beck 1969: 496-8, McFarland 1974, Guyer 1979: 65). Yet, in the Introduction, Kant appears to characterize the operations of both aesthetic and teleological judgment as contributing to a shared aim. In each instance, the task of the power of judgment is represented as singular rather than 1 Versions of this paper were presented at the Joint Conference of the Society for German Idealism & Romanticism and North American Kant Society at Stanford University in October 2017 and in a symposium session of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division in January 2019. I am grateful to the audiences on those occasions for their helpful comments, including Melissa Zinkin, Kate Moran, Allen Wood, Henry Allison, David Hill, Michael Friedman, and Eckart Förster. For insightful feedback on various versions of this paper, I am indebted to Béatrice Lon- guenesse and Anja Jauernig, in whose 2016 course on the Critique of Judgment at NYU it initially originated, as well as Patricia Kitcher (on numerous revisions!), Axel Honneth, Wolfgang Mann, Frederick Neuhouser, Taylor Carman, Andrew Cooper, Janum Sethi, Daniele Lorenzini, Jake McNulty, Connie Wang, and two anonymous reviewers from Archiv. 2 Abbreviations of Kant’s works accord with the scheme given at the conclusion of the paper. 3 The larger problem of how theoretical and practical reason might be united in one system preoc- cupied Kant both before and after the publication of KU; see Förster (2000). Sabina Vaccarino Bremner 2 Forthcoming in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. Please cite published version. plural: not that of providing or constituting two distinct ‘mediating concepts’, ‘intermedi- aries’, or points of ‘transition’, but one mediating concept, intermediary, transition. Indeed, scholars have increasingly turned to what they have called the ‘question’ or ‘problem’ of the ‘unity’ of the two halves of the work, advancing several prominent pro- posals for its unifying theme. Ginsborg (2006) suggests ‘normative purposiveness’; Zuckert (2007) ‘purposiveness without a purpose’; Allison (2001), while professing agnosticism on the general question of the work’s unity, nevertheless alludes to the ‘purposiveness of na- ture.’4 Yet, because these proposals have generally been conceived in abstraction from the central and unified task Kant situates for reflective judgment in both its aesthetic and tel- eological guises, they have succeeded mainly in establishing points of commonality or ‘com- mon threads’ (Ginsborg 2014: 228) between the two halves, rather than cohesive responses to this more general question. Zuckert (2007), for example, claims that purposiveness with- out a purpose is what allows us to think “the unity of the diverse” of both biological and aesthetic phenomena (24); Ginsborg (2006) that normative purposiveness allows us to see that “aesthetic and biological purposiveness are applications of a single underlying concept,” and therefore that the two parts of the work “represent aspects of a single project” (228). But just because purposiveness is common to the two halves, or even that its treatment in each half can reciprocally inform the subject matter of the other half, does not explain how it is to be related to the problem of thinking the transition from nature to freedom Kant situates as the task of the power of judgment in the Introduction. In light of the transition problem, the problem of unity might be reformulated as re- ferring to the following interpretive question: how does either half contribute to a unified answer to KU’s more general problem of the transition from nature to freedom? That is, we face the task of explaining at once the work’s general thesis for how both aesthetic and teleological judgment mediate from thinking the sensible to the supersensible, and the con- nection between these two seemingly distinct lines of argument. Two separate, but inter- related, interpretive tasks. As I understand the problem of unity, Kant situates each half as cooperating to give one answer to the transition problem. By characterizing the task of the power of judgment in general—both aesthetic and teleological—as the ‘intermediary’, or thinking the ‘transition’, between the two domains, Kant suggests that the two, despite their distinct domains, share a singular, unified aim. By abstracting the problem of unity from the transition problem, the candidates for the unifying concept advanced so far have fallen short of demonstrating what this singular aim, so understood, could be.5 4 Allison (2001): 218; for Allison’s expression of general agnosticism, see p. 6. Gardner (2016) also offers an account of the unifying concept of the Third Critique: “The culminating point of both of its halves [of KU], the point where they converge, as distinct from merely exhibiting parallels, is provided by morality” (169). However, because he identifies this concept as the ‘culminating’ rather than the ‘mediating’ point, this proposal fails to respond to the transition problem. 5 Of course, this may also be attributable to the different ways in which the relation between the two problems can be understood. Zuckert (2007), for example, distances the problem of unity from the transition problem: “In order to constitute a transition to morality, indeed, the principle of purpos- iveness must be independently articulated and grounded; only then may it have… transitional Sabina Vaccarino Bremner 3 Forthcoming in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. Please cite published version. While I do not claim to conclusively resolve these deep and intractable interpretive problems in this paper, they do inform the account I will advance of the role of culture in each half of the Third Critique. The role of culture has so far been overlooked with respect to both the unity and transition problems, perhaps because it has been regarded as marginal to the work’s function as a critique, namely to examine the power of judgment’s claim to an a priori principle.6 Nevertheless, considering the role of culture in relation to both problems is instructive: as I show in this paper, Kant’s full account of culture extends over both halves of the work, where its treatment in each half crucially relies on aspects of its treatment in the other half, and where, in either instance, Kant’s account centrally involves reflective judgment’s role in thinking the transition from nature to freedom. In KtU, cul- ture is positioned as what teleological judgment must think in order to transition from the externally purposive chain of nature to the unconditioned purpose outside this chain, the morally acting human subject (in other words, in thinking the transition from nature to freedom). In KaU, culture characterizes the process by which aesthetic judgment thinks the transition by associating sensible representations with moral ideas, naming the morally significant effects of doing so on the empirical subject’s acquisition of moral character. Culture is thus represented both as what the power of judgment must posit in order to think the transition from the supersensible in nature to that in freedom, and as the process by which this transition actually takes place. Clearly, in order for this proposal to shed light on the prospect of unifying the two halves, the task of harmonizing nature and freedom is to be taken on the “empirical-anthropological level”, as Allison has suggested (2001: 205). More precisely, Gardner (2016) affirms that in KU Kant “is concerned with the success conditions of the worldly moral enterprise”, since “the moral agent… has been left adrift by the two earlier Critiques, in so far as each of these has merely sought to account for its own domain, without coordinating them” (4-5). And Zammito (1992) interprets “the one ultimate and persistent problem” in KU as how the human subject could “reconcile his self- conception as noumenally free with his knowledge of his own natural materiality”—that is, how the autonomous moral agent and the empirically conditioned human being can relate within the order of nature (267).