Part1 BundlingTying&Portfolio 7/2/03 12:51 PM Page a DTI ECONOMICS PAPER NO. 1 Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects PART 1 - CONCEPTUAL ISSUES BY PROFESSOR BARRY NALEBUFF YALE UNIVERSITY FEBRUARY 2003 DTI ECONOMICS Part1 BundlingTying&Portfolio 7/2/03 12:51 PM Page b Part1 BundlingTying&Portfolio 7/2/03 12:51 PM Page 1 DTI ECONOMICS PAPER NO. 1 Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects PART 1 - CONCEPTUAL ISSUES BY PROFESSOR BARRY NALEBUFF YALE UNIVERSITY FEBRUARY 2003 1 Part1 BundlingTying&Portfolio 7/2/03 12:51 PM Page 2 2 Part1 BundlingTying&Portfolio 7/2/03 12:51 PM Page 3 Foreword Following the reviews of the DTI in Autumn 2001, the Department emphasised the need to put analysis at the heart of policy-making. As part of this process we have decided to make our analysis and evidence base more publicly available through the publication of a series of DTI Economics Papers that will set out the thinking underpinning policy development. The first in the series is the study of the impact of bundling, tying and portfolio effects in competition analysis. These issues have played a central role in a number of much-discussed high profile cases in both Europe and the United States recently. To throw light on the debate the DTI commissioned Professor Barry Nalebuff of Yale University and Charles River Associates to prepare this research report. This is a leading-edge report that will be of value to competition authorities around the world, as well as to practitioners in the UK. However, any views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the DTI, nor should they be treated as a guide to the application of, or interpretation of UK competition policy. In the next few months the Department will be publishing further DTI Economics Papers. I hope they will stimulate discussion and debate and form part of a wider dialogue between the DTI and the research community. Vicky Pryce Chief Economic Adviser and Director General, Economics 3 Part1 BundlingTying&Portfolio 7/2/03 12:51 PM Page 4 4 Part1 BundlingTying&Portfolio 7/2/03 12:51 PM Page 5 Table of contents 1 Introduction..............................................................................................8 1.1 Conclusions of the Report ............................................................................9 2 What is Bundling?...............................................................................13 2.1 Pure Bundling..............................................................................................13 2.2 Mixed Bundling ...........................................................................................14 2.3 Tying............................................................................................................15 2.4 Metering .....................................................................................................16 3 Incentives to Bundle ..........................................................................18 3.1 Can Market Power Be Leveraged?.............................................................19 3.2 Introduction to the Chicago School Argument ...........................................20 3.3 Where the Chicago School Argument Breaks Down .................................22 3.3.1 Exception #1: Metering .....................................................................22 3.3.2 Exception #2: Dynamics ....................................................................24 3.3.3 Exception #3: Leveraging Multiple Market Powers ..........................26 3.3.4 Exception #4: Creating Efficiencies ...................................................27 4 Why Bundle: The Complete List...................................................28 4.1 Plus Factors / Minus Factors ......................................................................29 4.2 Index ...........................................................................................................30 4.3 Efficiency Reasons......................................................................................31 4.3.1 Bundling to Achieve Cost Savings and Quality Improvements .........31 4.3.2 Bundling to Reduce Pricing Inefficiencies .........................................33 5 Part1 BundlingTying&Portfolio 7/2/03 12:51 PM Page 6 4.4 Strategic Reasons .......................................................................................39 4.4.1 Bundling Complements to Undercut Rivals.......................................39 4.4.2 Bundling to Create an Entry Barrier...................................................42 4.4.3 Bundling to Mitigate Competition......................................................45 4.4.4 Bundling to Gain Competitive Advantage..........................................49 4.4.5 Bundling to Create Network Externalities .........................................53 4.4.6 Technical Bundling .............................................................................56 4.4.7 Bundling as a Commitment to Fight Entry ........................................58 4.4.8 Bundling and R&D Incentives............................................................59 4.4.9 Bundling as a Way to Obscure Prices ...............................................61 5 Policy Recommendations for Bundling ......................................63 5.1 Learning from Vertical Integration...............................................................64 5.2 Remedies....................................................................................................65 5.3 Policy Options for Variety Bundles .............................................................66 5.4 Policy Options for Bundles as an Entry Barrier...........................................69 6 Tying and Metering.............................................................................70 6.1 Introduction.................................................................................................70 6.2 Three Reasons to Tie ..................................................................................70 6.3 Tying and Entry Deterrence ........................................................................71 6.4 History of Metering and Tying ....................................................................72 6.5 Why Not Meter Directly?............................................................................74 6.5.1 A Policy Towards Metering and Tying to Meter ................................76 6.6 False View that Price Discrimination Leads to Efficient Outcome .............77 6.7 Tying by Other Means: Warranties and Toner Cartridges...........................79 6.7.1 Policy Recommendations ..................................................................82 6 Part1 BundlingTying&Portfolio 7/2/03 12:51 PM Page 7 7 Portfolio and Conglomerate effects ............................................84 7.1 The Nature of Portfolio Relationships.........................................................84 7.2 No Relationship Case..................................................................................86 7.3 The Competitors Case ................................................................................89 7.4 Structural versus Contractual Issues ..........................................................93 8 Mathematical Annex..........................................................................94 8.1 Annex A: The Connection Between Double ..............................................94 Marginalisation and the Cournot Effect 8.2 Annex B: Metering Math Model.................................................................95 7 Part1 BundlingTying&Portfolio 7/2/03 12:51 PM Page 8 1 Introduction This report, commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), was prepared by Barry Nalebuff.1 Any views expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the DTI. In this report, we use economic theory to explore the impact of bundling, tying, and portfolio effects on competition and the appropriate competition policy response. This is a timely subject. These issues have played a central role in a number of high profile cases in both Europe and the United States over the past several years. At times, the application of competition policy to bundling and market power leverage has appeared ad hoc. One goal of this paper is to help develop an economics-based framework for understanding the potential impact of these effects. We believe this will help policymakers develop, codify, and enforce appropriate and consistent responses to issues surrounding bundling, tying, and leverage in merger and in antitrust cases. The four basic requirements set out in the DTI proposal were: • A clear and up to date synopsis of the economics literature in the area, including definitions; • A review of competition authorities’ (especially the OFT and EC) approach to assessing bundling, plus five to ten case study examples (including at least one telecoms related case); • Consideration of how the existing approaches and techniques can be developed, improved and more generically articulated; • Consideration of the implications for the (ex ante) Merger policy role of the OFT; and the “correct” ex post legal test for Chapter II CA98 cases. We have attempted to address these requirements by posing the following questions: • What is the appropriate approach and response for competition authorities when faced with cases involving bundling, tying, and portfolio power? • What market characteristics lead towards the potential of abuses from bundling, tying, or portfolio