The Value when Cybernetics is added to CAAD Ranulph Glanville CybernEthics Research TM United Kingdom In this paper it is argued that cybernetics gives added value to design in general and to CAAD in particular. Essential cybernetic concepts are introduced, and are then shown to reflect design. These reflections are shown to be potentially amplifiable by the use of computers through CAAD, if we will and dare it. The Value when Cybernetics is Added to CAAD The Value when Cybernetics is Added to CAAD Foreword The theme of this conference is added value. In general, the idea is to explore how CAAD gives added value when it is applied. In contrast, in this paper (in some respects more of a tutorial) I explore how another subject (in this case, Cybernetics) adds to the value of CAAD. In order to do this, I firstly talk about the relationship of theory to those subjects in which it is applied. It has become common for theory to be imported from one area into another, and it is interesting to consider why. What is theory about and why do we like to have it? This is a question of particular interest, I believe, in architecture. But it also leads to the need for examining aspects of theory, in itself. There then follows what is, in effect, a tutorial section, in which I introduce a number of cybernetic concepts which I believe to be of great value to architecture, both from the point of view of the application of theory, and also in their own right. (I assume, as has been indicated by many including me, that architecture, or, more generally, design and Cybernetics have a great deal in common.) This forms the main section of this paper. I explain these Cybernetic concepts and their extensions, and I also introduce certain concepts concerning computation, some of which are clearly tied up in the Cybernetic concept-world. Finally, I indicate how these concepts shed light on design and outline their particular relevance in CAAD, improving performance and, thus, adding value. This is an ambitious undertaking. Inevitably, it is underexplained. There is much to be argued, and this is not possible within the scope of a single, short paper. Much of this I have argued elsewhere (see, eg, Glanville 1995, 1997). But not all. Much is also new. Theory Scientists have some clearly thought out concepts concerning theory. For instance, theory is what is proposed to explain the phenomena that science concerns itself with. This approach to theory concerns itself with the notion of description, abstraction (pattern finding) and testing, for instance: it is looking to exactly describe patterns in the phenomena of observation such that the description is always in accordance with the patterns in the phenomena. Thus, this sort of theory is attempting to attain the unattainable: it is constituted of a number of concepts, several of which even seem to be in contradiction: for instance, that the description is made of observations, yet that there may be a “truth” waiting to be revealed. In its peculiar and sceptical approach it espouses Glanville falsification: the job of science is to test these descriptions to destruction.1 (Popper 1963) The benefits of this approach and of the development of this sort of theory (especially, I believe, the avowal of rigour and argument) are always with us as part of our everyday lives. I would like to suggest that our use of, even need for, theory may be considered in another way. Theory lets us believe we are alright. If what we say is in accord with a theory, we have reason to believe it is strong and viable. (This assumes the theory is “right”. But for many, merely having a theory makes it right.) Thus, theory satisfies a psychological need, the need to feel that there is justification and that opinions are not alone. It provides security in an insecure, unmanageable world. It helps us . It gives cohesion and an overview: and it simplifies the world so that we do not have, personally, to take responsibility for everything we find. It is a prop. And it lends authority.2 This view is in accord with the general view of theory and, in particular, science. This view holds that humankind starts to face the complexity of the world it finds itself in (or it constructs for itself) by the construction of myth, the first theory. The role of myth is to explain the universe, to handle the incomprehensible, and to give rites and routines that allow both a belief in control and the ability to pass on some responsibilities. In this (constructed, historical) view, theory helps us believe there is sense and that we have a place. This belief remains behind all developments and applications of theory. My proposal of the psychological basis for the acquisition and application of theory is in broad accord with this view. Cybernetics as the Theory of/for Design It is my view that Cybernetics is the theory that matches the activity of design. It shares the form and preoccupations of design, and its way of working, unlike so many other theories that design has borrowed, pasting them on top of the practice of design. The connection is integral and natural. I am not alone in this view. As early as 1969, my teacher Gordon Pask indicated he saw a relevance of Cybernetics for Architecture both inn providing a sensitive and appropriate theory and in his characterisation of design as a conversation with yourself via paper and pencil, about which more later (Pask 1969). In order to demonstrate the viability of this assertion, we can look to the sort of appreciation of theory that the scientist has. We have to ask not only about the theory’s ability to support our insecurities, but also its ability to shed light on the subject. In particular, we look to see if the theory not only helps us understand a subject area better (with more 1 I do not wish to debate the social correctness of the position assumed here, as many have done, although I do not believe scientists really behave in this manner: it is a (hopeless) ideal. 2 On another occasion I shall hope to argue this point more fully: I include it here because I believe it will have an immediate resonance with thinking architects. 38 The Value when Cybernetics is Added to CAAD clarity, greater coherence, etc), but also whether it can extend our understanding and appreciation of the area the theory operates on. Usually this is taken to be successful prediction. Good theories predict what we had not yet experienced/known. But they also account for more with less: this is Occam’s Razor, the origin of Philip Johnson’s Miesian aphorism “Less is More”. If Cybernetics does this for design, and particularly for Computer Aided Architectural Design, then my assertion can be taken to have more than psychological value (although I am certainly not belittling the importance of this). If it does not, we can dismiss the parallel, or pursue modification possibilities: but we will not need to do either of these! Cybernetics In its modern incarnation, Cybernetics can be said to stem from Norbert Wiener’s book (Wiener, 1948) entitled “Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine”. However, it is Ross Ashby’s 1956 book “An Introduction to Cybernetics” (Ashby 1956) that is the main source for (aspects of) the characterisation of Cybernetics given in the following sections, for it takes the work of Wiener and his colleagues and distils it into one, unified, coherent and highly abstracted body.1 I use this book as a general reference for Cybernetics in general and for most of Ashby’s concepts (except where otherwise referenced). In this paper I briefly introduce certain aspects of Cybernetics that do, I believe, add value to CAAD. Feedback Cybernetic systems are often characterised through feedback. Feedback is necessary wherever there is (potential) error: Feedback lets the actor in a situation know whether the result of his action is what he desired (ie, did it achieve the goal). If not, it is possible to try again, having modified the action according to the error (the result), to compensate for (take account of) it. Control Feedback is, therefore, central to the working of control. If one system is to control another, it needs to know what that other is doing and, if it is not doing as required, to be able to control the other (use it to modify its behaviour) so that it performs more as required. However, the controlling system must also modify its behaviour, itself, according to how the other system is doing. Ie, it is controlled by the other system. Thus control, through the action of the feedback loop, is circular. The controlling system is itself controlled by the controlled 1 Heinz von Foerster tells a lovely story about Ashby. When in the late 1960s he was visiting the Biological Computer Laboratory in Urbana Illinois, Heinz asked Ashby’s students how he was getting on. The students said it was all rather simple. With some trepidation, Heinz told Ashby this. Ashby burst into enormous guffaws of laughter. He said “It’s taken me 20 years to make it that simple”. 39 Glanville system: which is controlling and which is controlled is a matter of a naming convention. Control exists within the circularity (between the systems), and not in one, the other, or even both of them. Think of a thermostat. The wall switch turns the heating system on and off.
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