The Missile Gap: A Moral Panic for an Atomic Age Brian Gresham Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In Sociology Dr. James Hawdon Dr. John Ryan Dr. Dale Wimberley Dr. Michael Hughes September 24, 2015 Blacksburg, VA Keywords: moral panic, missile gap, strategic nuclear weapons crisis, military Keynesianism Copyright © 2015 by Brian Gresham The Missile Gap: A Moral Panic for an Atomic Age Brian Gresham ABSTRACT This research is examines the nuclear arms race that dominated the 20th century, during which the United States manufactured and stockpiled a large number of strategic weapons. Using moral panic theory, the roles of the President of the United States and the media are examined in facilitating public interest in the manufacture of these weapons from 1955-1990. The project uses both time series and historical analyses to determine the extent to which the strategic nuclear weapons crisis was a moral panic created to insure public acceptance of such this massive defense sector expenditure. The time series analysis reveals that the President does have the ability to influence the public via the State of the Union Address, but that influence does not extend strongly to the media. However, what influence the President does have appears to be correlated to the use of substantive rhetoric, and the percentage of the speech dedicated to the issue. Finally, the historical analysis demonstrates that the moral panic moves through three phases. The first phase is characterized by grassroots concern over the technical gap represented by Sputnik 1’s launch was utilized by interested actors to accomplish their goals. During the second phase, this concern transformed into an institutional technique utilized for deflecting institutional challenges when the moral panic moved into an interest group model. The final phase occurs during the rise of the “security state,” when elites begin using the moral panic to achieve their own ends. Acknowledgements Writing a dissertation is equal parts a labor of love and a labor of Hercules. And while I did all the actual writing, I never would have done it without a little help from family, friends and colleagues. So I would like to take a fraction of the space dedicated to nuclear weapons to thank and dedicate this work to the people who helped me along the way: First and foremost I dedicate this to my Mother and Father. As a small token of thanks for always being there for me, and for everything they’ve done for me through the years. I would also like to give my sincerest and deepest appreciation to all the members of my committee that helped to make this project possible. “Thank you,” to my most very dear Friend. Who always believes in me, and whose crazy ideas still bring a smile to my face. To Sean and Chuck, two gentlemen of unparalleled character and quality. Lastly, to Katelynn. iii Table of Contents ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. ii Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ iii Table of Contents .................................................................................................................... iv Tables and Figures .................................................................................................................. v Ch. 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1 Ch. 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................... 3 The Growth of Military Keynesianism ............................................................................................... 6 Moral Panics .......................................................................................................................................... 8 The Post-War Period ......................................................................................................................... 13 Missile Gap as Moral Panic .............................................................................................................. 18 The Political Economics of Nuclear Technology .......................................................................... 21 The Media and Nuclear Technology ............................................................................................... 23 The Agenda Setting Function of the Media ................................................................................... 27 The Role of Hegemony ...................................................................................................................... 29 Ch. 3 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................ 36 Data Source ........................................................................................................................................ 42 Ch. 4 DATA ANALYSIS—TIME SERIES ............................................................................. 44 Ch. 5 DATA ANALYSIS—HISTORICAL ANALYSIS ......................................................... 71 Themes of the Moral Panic Narrative ...................................................................................... 72 Ch. 6 Setting the Baseline: Grassroots Concerns: 1955-1959 ........................................ 75 Soviet Aggression and the Hungarian Revolution ......................................................................... 81 Escalating the Stakes: The Suez Crises and Staking Claims ....................................................... 83 The Baseline: Eisenhower and Public Opinion in the Immediate Pre-Sputnik Period .. 85 Sputnik 1: An Objective Threat Is Launched .................................................................................... 93 The New World: Life After Sputnik 1’s Launch ............................................................................. 103 Ch. 7 Interest Groups: 1960-1978 .......................................................................................... 116 Slowing the Tide of Public Opinion .................................................................................................... 129 The Great Struggle: To Test or to Disarm? ...................................................................................... 141 The Missile Panic Begins to Recede .................................................................................................... 155 Ch. 8 1970-1979 ............................................................................................................................ 176 The Nascent Signs of a Second Missile Panic ................................................................................. 202 Ch. 9 Re-enter the Elites: 1979-1990 ..................................................................................... 235 1980-1989 ..................................................................................................................................................... 248 The Slow Decline of SDI ........................................................................................................................... 287 Ch. 10 DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................. 310 Ch. 11 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 319 iv Tables and Figures Tables Table 1: Regression of Confidence in the Military on Soviet Nuclear Mentions in The Chicago Tribune and State of the Union Addresses from 1971-1990 . 48 Table 2: Regression of Soviet Nuclear Mentions in The New York Times on State of the Union Address from 1955-1990 . 50 Table 3: Regression of Soviet Nuclear Mentions in The Chicago Tribune on State of the Union Address from 1955-1990 . 51 Table 4: Regression of Soviet Nuclear Mentions in The New York Times on Peaceful/Bellicose and Substantive/Symbolic Mentions from 1955 to 1990 . .55 Table 5: Regression of Soviet Nuclear Mentions in The Chicago Tribune on Peaceful/Bellicose and Substantive/Symbolic Mentions from 1955 to 1990 . .56 Table 6: Regression of Soviet Nuclear Mentions in The New York Times on Military and National Threat Statements from 1955 to 1990 . 59 Table 7: Regression of Soviet Nuclear Mentions in The Chicago Tribune on Military and National Threat Statements from 1955 to 1990 . 60 Table 8: Regression of Soviet Nuclear Mentions in The New York Times on Economic and Allied Threat Statements from 1955 to 1990 . .63 Table 9: Regression of Soviet Nuclear Mentions in The Chicago Tribune on Economic and Allied Threat Statements from 1955 to 1990 . .64 Table 10: Regression of Soviet Nuclear Mentions in The New York Times on Ideological Threat Statements and Speech Percentage from 1955 to 1990 . 67 Table 11: Regression of Soviet Nuclear Mentions in The Chicago Tribune on Ideological Threat Statements and Speech Percentage from 1955 to 1990 . 68 Table 12: The Gallup Poll survey 1955-544-K . .80 Table 13: The Gallup Poll survey 1956-566-K . .91 Table 14: The Gallup Poll survey 1957-582-K . .104 Table 15: The Gallup Poll survey 1958-598-K . .111 Table 16: The Gallup Poll survey 1959-619 . .115 v Table 17: The Gallup Poll