CONSTRUCTING A GLOBAL ACCOUNT OF REASON CONSTRUCTING A GLOBAL ACCOUNT OF REASON DISCOURSE, MORAL ENGAGEMENT AND ECOLOGICAL TRUTH By MICHAEL HEMMINGSEN, B.A. Hons, M.A., M.I.R. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Doctorate of Philosophy McMaster University © Copyright by Michael Hemmingsen, November 2015 McMaster University DOCTORATE OF PHILOSOPHY (2015) Hamilton, Ontario (Philosophy) TITLE: Constructing a Global Account of Reason: Discourse, Moral Engagement and Ecological Truth AUTHOR: Michael Hemmingsen, B.A. Hons, M.A., M.I.R. (Victoria University of Wellington) SUPERVISOR: Professor Violetta Igneski NUMBER OF PAGES: vii, 193 ii This dissertation argues for a method of resolving moral disagreement by the exchange of reasons by those affected by the disagreement under certain conditions. However, it suggests that typical Western accounts of the varieties of reasons admissible in these kind of conversations is limited, privileges Western ways of looking at the world, and devalues non-Western and, in the focus of this dissertation, particularly indigenous worldviews. As such, a fuller and more just account of reason is needed, one that includes the kinds of reasons used by all, if we are to have just, fair and equitable conversations in order to resolve moral disagreements. iii In this dissertation I argue that Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics is our best understanding of morality, but that as it stands it has some serious deficiencies that need to be overcome before it can live up to its own promise. In particular, its insistence that facts, norms and self-expressions constitute the full range of validity claims available to us privileges Western voices in discourse, and undermines its own principles of equality and coercion-free dialogue. According to Habermas, others who do not utilise validity claims in the same way that Western speakers do are merely blurring the lines between these three categories and hence fall short of the ideal practices of discourse. In other words, they are less than fully rational. Rather, I argue that these three categories do not exhaust the full range of possible reasons. I suggest that we ought to understand statements that do not fit as one of these kinds of validity claim as instances of different kinds of claims entirely. Instead of being a confused blurring-of-the-lines, expressions on the part of indigenous and “traditional” societies that do not conform to Habermas’ categories of fact, norm or self-expression are just as likely to be instances of an expanded ontology of reasons that are equally legitimate. After examining some alternative explanations regarding claims that do not fit into Habermas’ categories, I finally suggest and describe a different, place-based kind of validity claim that I refer to as “ecological truth”, and suggest that it shows up the limitations of Habermas’ ontology of reasons. Ecological truth is a potential kind of reason available in discourse that is rooted in a close intertwining of practices and communities with particular ecologies and environments. This kind of reason cannot be subsumed into the categories of fact, norm and self-expression. iv Acknowledgements I would like to thank Violetta Igneski, whose help and support as my supervisor was invaluable and very much appreciated throughout my time at McMaster University, both with my dissertation and otherwise. I would also like to thank Elisabeth Gedge and Daniel Coleman, both of whom gave me a great deal of their time and energy, helped me a lot and improved my work immeasurably. I am also very grateful to have had Elisabeth as department Chair throughout my Ph.D. Not only did she provide an extremely positive and supportive environment in the department generally, but also did everything she could to promote the interests of the department’s students, both as a group as well as individually. I am grateful, too, to my colleagues in the department over the past four years, from whom I learnt a lot, as well as the faculty, whose hard work and passion gave rise to a rich and engaging learning environment. I would also like to thank all of my Hamilton friends, who made the time I spent studying for my doctorate enormously fun. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Mariko Hemmingsen. I can confidently state that without her support, of innumerable different kinds, this work would never have been possible. v Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Epistemological Exclusion .......................................................................................... 3 Indigeneity ................................................................................................................. 6 Audience .................................................................................................................... 8 Summary .................................................................................................................. 10 Part I: Discourse and Validity Claims Chapter One: The Pragmatic Presuppositions of Discourse, Universalism/Relativism, and Liberalism/Communalism ..................................................................................... 15 The Pragmatic Presuppositions of Discourse ........................................................... 16 Why Be Rational? ..................................................................................................... 21 Relativism and Proceduralism .................................................................................. 23 A Relational Account of Identity and Autonomy ..................................................... 26 Liberalism and Communalism .................................................................................. 29 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 32 Chapter Two: Discourse Ethics and the Justification of Validity Claims ...................... 37 Language .................................................................................................................. 40 Reaching Understanding .......................................................................................... 42 Kinds of Reasons ...................................................................................................... 45 Facts and Cognitive-Instrumental Discourse ........................................................... 47 Truthfulness/Evaluation and Aesthetic-Practical Discourse .................................... 53 Rightness and Moral-Practical Discourse................................................................. 58 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 64 Part II: Alternative Explanations Chapter 3: Validity Claims and Relativism ................................................................... 72 Epistemological Relativism ...................................................................................... 77 Relativism and Contextualism .................................................................................. 84 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 102 Chapter 4: Alternatives to a New Kind of Validity Claim ........................................... 106 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 106 Possibly Uncategorisable Statements and Concepts ............................................. 107 vi Possible Explanations ............................................................................................. 113 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 125 Part III: Ecological Truth Chapter 5: The Nature of Ecological Truth ................................................................ 132 Nature & Culture .................................................................................................... 133 Ecological Knowledge ............................................................................................. 137 Knowing That vs. Knowing How ............................................................................. 139 Three Examples ...................................................................................................... 141 Concerns, Questions and Objections ..................................................................... 145 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 152 Chapter 6: Conditions of Validity ............................................................................... 157 Similarities and Differences ................................................................................... 158 Determining Validity .............................................................................................. 160 Use ......................................................................................................................... 173 Ecological Truth and Relativism ............................................................................. 175 Conclusion .............................................................................................................