Syracuse University SURFACE Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public History - Dissertations Affairs 5-2013 The British Occupation of Southern New York during the American Revolution and the Failure to Restore Civilian Government Frank Paul Mann Syracuse University Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/hst_etd Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Mann, Frank Paul, "The British Occupation of Southern New York during the American Revolution and the Failure to Restore Civilian Government" (2013). History - Dissertations. 100. https://surface.syr.edu/hst_etd/100 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in History - Dissertations by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Abstract A decade of political unrest over the question of parliamentary taxation resulted in the development of an alternate political structure of committees and congresses in the province of New York. By 1776, a revolutionary government led by the Provincial Congress controlled the province. Upon learning of the Declaration of Independence, the New York Provincial Congress declared independence from the British. Within months of this declaration, southern New York was occupied by British troops, and remained under British control for the duration of the Revolutionary War. The area was under martial law for the duration. Britain’s loss of the Saratoga Campaign brought French entry into the war, and a major strategic reassessment as the American colonies became to the British but one front—and not even the most important—in a world war with France (and later others). A peace commission led by the Earl of Carlisle was sent to America, spending time in Philadelphia and New York, but its proposals were met with contempt. Partially as a result of the failed mission, a new strategy was developed for fighting the war by the British. A major part of this new strategy was the restoration of civilian government to the province of New York. It was hoped that, among other things, this would showcase Britain’s desire to, rather than impose a tyranny, restore free government to the colonies. General James Robertson was chosen to be the new governor, arriving in 1780, but was unable to implement the strategy because of opposition by Sir Henry Clinton, the commander of Britain’s forces in America. The dissertation examines the developing break with Britain, the occupation, and the failure of the attempt to restore civilian government it. The dissertation examines the effect that various appalling, violent or questionable acts by British troops or officers had on the people of New York, and discusses briefly how British military actions and the occupation affected the developing independent New York government. It contrasts events in Georgia, where civilian government, complete with an assembly was created, with events in New York. Lastly, the dissertation examines the question of whether the restoration of civilian government was just too late in 1780 to have been an effective strategy to win back the loyalties of New Yorkers and Americans, even if civilian government had been restored. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN NEW YORK DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE FAILURE TO RESTORE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT By Frank P. Mann B.A. Columbia University, 1980 J.D. Hofstra University School of Law, 1983 Master of Liberal Studies, University of Minnesota, 2002 M. Phil History, 2009 DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the Graduate School of Syracuse University May 2013 Copyright 2013 Frank Paul Mann All rights Reserved Acknowledgements It is with great pleasure that I would like to acknowledge my advisor, J. Roger Sharp, for his tireless help, suggestions, and constant re-readings of this work. In general, I would also like to thank the faculty of Syracuse University’s History Department both past and present for their assistance and suggestions, and generally for giving me a good education as a historical researcher, writer, and educator, and for admitting me to their fine program. I also must thank the staff for their invaluable assistance and helping me navigate through the paperwork, especially Ms. Patti Bohrer. I would also like to thank the staff of the David Library of the American Revolution in Washington’s Crossing Pennsylvania for their help and assistance in researching. I would also like to the staff of the Clement Library at the University of Michigan as well for their aid and assistance in researching. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents and my family and my friends for their invaluable love and support. I could not have done this without them. Frank P. Mann Feb 25, 2013 v Table of Contents Introduction 1 Chapter I A Brief History of Colonial New York, 1609-1774 29 Chapter II The American Revolution in New York 79 Chapter III The Final Break with Britain and the Capture of Southern New York 123 Chapter IV The New Strategy 182 Chapter V The Failed Attempt to Restore Civilian Government to New York 239 Chapter VI The Military Occupation of Southern New York 296 Chapter VII The Waning of British Rule 348 Conclusions 404 Bibliography 448 Vita 473 vi 1 Introduction I. Basic Statement of Question A decade-long constitutional dispute between Britain and her colonies in the Western hemisphere culminated with thirteen of her mainland colonies declaring independence in July of 1776. The triggering cause was the question of the right of Parliament to tax the colonies. The colonies were represented in London by agents, the functional equivalent of lobbyists, but they had no members in Parliament. The colonies rejected the assertions of some members of Parliament that they were “virtually represented” in Parliament; they did not see how the interests of, for example, New York could be represented or even understood by a Member of Parliament from Cornwall or Newcastle. The colonists believed that they were thus unrepresented in Parliament and that there could be no taxation without some form of representation. Taxes were supposed to be free gifts from the commons, the ordinary people, through their members of Parliament in the House of Commons to the king, and the colonists 1 had no representatives in Parliament. 1 William Pitt the Elder during the Stamp Act Crisis argued that Americans were “the sons, not the bastards, of England. Taxation is no part of the governing or legislative power. The taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the Commons alone…When therefore, in this House we give and grant, we give and grant what is our own. But in an American tax, what do we do?...we give and grant to your Majesty, the property of your Majesty’s commons of America. It is an absurdity in terms.” He continued by attacking the idea that the colonies were virtually represented in the Commons. Parliamentary History, XVI, 97-108. See Edmund S. Morgan, ed. Prologue to Revolution, Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764-1766, (University of North Carolina Press : Chapel Hill), 1959, 136. See also Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America, (W. W. Norton: New York) 1988, 239. Perhaps the most famous of the colonial agents was Benjamin Franklin, who served as the Pennsylvania Assembly’s agent from 1757 to 1762. 2 Put in these terms, this seems like a fairly easy problem to solve. The colonies, after all, all accepted George III as their rightful ruler. Their governments were modeled in most respects on Britain’s, with a governor representing and usually c hosen by the King, a Council acting as an upper house, high court, and body of advisors for the governor, and an assembly representing the people (or at least free white males who owned property). The colonists respected Parliament, just rejected its righ t to impose certain taxes on them —that was a task for their own assemblies. A few representatives in Parliament for the colonies, or some kind of continental assembly with a delaying power or veto over Parliamentary actions concerning the colonies, would p robably have satisfied the vast majority of Americans, and maintained British rule over the Americans. 2 But for various reasons, the problem, the “Imperial Question”, proved unsolvable. A structure of committees designed for a protest movement morphed in each colony into a second government, and eventually the legal government was replaced by a new revolutionary structure. Fighting broke out in Massachusetts, and throughout the thirteen colonies, preparations were made for war. Yet the colonists still clu ng to their loyalty to the king, even though they were fighting bloody battles with His Majesty’s troops. The decision to become independent, to become independent republics, was not taken lightly. It occurred only when it became clear that there was no co mpromise, no choice but war or surrender, and that the king was not on their side. This realization was a devastating psychological blow to many. Patriots 2 The latter was proposed by Joseph Galloway in his 1774 Plan of Union. 28 Sept. 1774 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1:49—51; The Founders' Constitution , Volume 1, Chapter 7, Document 3 http://press -pubs.u chicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch7s3.html The University of Chicago Press. 3 and Loyalists 3 were in the beginning both loyal to the king; indeed, one British officer opined that “So far were [the Americans] in 1767 from thinking of a Form of Gouvernent without a king, that the People believed the King would take their Part if he was rightly informed.” 4 The King was considered the protector of their liberties.