Open Research Online The Open University’s repository of research publications and other research outputs Bernard Suits’ Utopia of Gameplay: A Critical Analysis Thesis How to cite: Yorke, Christopher C. (2019). Bernard Suits’ Utopia of Gameplay: A Critical Analysis. PhD thesis The Open University. For guidance on citations see FAQs. c 2018 The Author https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Version: Version of Record Link(s) to article on publisher’s website: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21954/ou.ro.0000e617 Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies page. oro.open.ac.uk Bernard Suits’ Utopia of Gameplay: A Critical Analysis Christopher C. Yorke A Dissertation in The Department of Philosophy Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The Open University Milton Keynes, United Kingdom September 2018 © Christopher C. Yorke, 2018 1 Abstract In this dissertation, I integrate the published and newly available unpublished works of Bernard Suits to arrive at an original, holistic interpretation of his corpus. I identify, analyze, and resolve inconsistencies in his position which have not been previously critiqued in depth. Centrally, I provide a critical analysis of Suits’ relatively obscure utopian thesis: his argument that the ‘ideal of existence’ for humankind is a utopia of gameplay. More specifically, I demonstrate that Suits’ utopian thesis fails on its own grounds because his utopian vision—the thought experiment upon which his utopian thesis rests for its plausibility—requires that humanity enter a post- instrumental phase of culture unimaginable from our current species- perspective. The nature of utopian gameplay is obscured behind this cultural gap, and thus we pre-utopians have no rational reason to accept Suits’ assertion that it instantiates the ideal of existence. Finally, I sympathetically rehabilitate Suits’ utopian thesis along perfectionist lines as the utopian game design thesis, and show that its main value lies in its role as a regulative ideal, offering a unique set of normative recommendations for our current gaming practices. 2 Acknowledgements I am deeply indebted to Jon Pike and Alex Barber, my PhD supervisors at the Open University, for their written and verbal commentary on all previous drafts of this dissertation. They have been boundlessly generous with their time, their enthusiasm for the project, and their various criticisms of it. Where possible I have attempted to isolate their distinct contributions in the main text, but their influence on the work is too deep and ingrained to call out each instance of improvement that they have contributed. For more localized assistance, I would like to thank Duncan MacIntosh for inspiring the direction of Chapter 2, and Tony Milligan for weighing in with commentary on an early version of Chapter 3. Eleni Panagiotarakou invited me to present Chapter 4 to her Philosophy of Leisure class at Concordia University in November 2016, which forced me to significantly refine my arguments therein. Most crucially—from a causal perspective—Robert Cowan was the first to suggest that I channel my academic efforts toward the philosophy of games, and acted as a faithful steward of both my philosophy and game libraries between my degree studies. The raw material of Chapter 5 was presented at the International Association for the Philosophy of Sport, who honoured this piece with their R. 3 Scott Kretchmar Student Essay Award at their September 2016 meeting in Olympia, Greece. It was later presented at the Philosophy of Games Workshop at the University of Utah in October 2016, where it was refined by the verbal feedback of William Morgan, Thi Nguyen, and Brock Rough. Finally it was published as “Endless Summer: What Kinds of Games Will Suits’ Utopians Play?” in the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport (Yorke 2017). Multiple anonymous referees gave their formative feedback on earlier drafts of this chapter, and thanks must go to them as well. A version of Chapter 6 won the R. Scott Kretchmar Student Essay Award at the subsequent September 2017 annual meeting of the International Association for the Philosophy of Sport in Whistler, British Columbia. It would not be an understatement to say that the support and camaraderie of the IAPS community has been a great spur to action, and an essential ingredient to the success of this research project. Thanks go as well to the fellows of the Analytical Philosophy of Sport Reading Group, including Jon Pike, Yuval Eylon, and John William Devine, who each gave this chapter a thorough working over at their November 2017 meeting. Thi Nguyen gave a helpful in-depth critique of a later draft of the work before it was presented at the June 2018 meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association at the University of Quebec in Montreal, where Gwen Bradford offered her formal commentary on it. 4 Chapter 7 benefitted from the insightful commentary of Paul Gaffney, Thi Nguyen, and several anonymous reviewers before it was published as “Bernard Suits on Capacities: Games, Perfectionism, and Utopia” in the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport (Yorke 2018). As I have workshopped this and other parts of the dissertation less formally at the Utopian Studies Society annual conference, the Thomas More Institute, and multiple OU Postgraduate Philosophy Conferences, it is likely that I have forgotten significant individual contributions gleaned at those meetings. Apologies in advance to any who have been thus slighted. Finally, sincere gratitude goes to my wife, Joanie Rivard, for her patience and support during the planning and execution of this project, and to our daughter, Leonie Elle Yorke, who made life feel both deeper and lighter, as needed. 5 Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................ 2 Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. 3 Note on the Unpublished Works of Bernard Suits ............................................................... 8 Introduction: Bernard Suits, in Three Pieces ..................................................................... 10 First Piece: Suits’ Early Questions (1955-1970) ............................................................. 14 Second Piece: Suits’ Middle Answers (1971-1989) ........................................................ 20 Third Piece: Suits’ Late Refinements (2004-2006) ......................................................... 37 Chapter 1: ‘A Longer and More Penetrating Look’: Suits’ Definitions of ‘Gameplay’ and ‘Utopia’............................................................................................................................... 42 1.1 Wittgenstein’s ‘Family Resemblances’ Thesis .......................................................... 44 1.2 Objections to Wittgenstein ...................................................................................... 46 1.3 Suits’ Moderate Definitionist Thesis ........................................................................ 52 1.4 Objections to Suits ................................................................................................... 56 1.5 Suits versus Davis on the Definition of ‘Utopia’ ....................................................... 61 1.6 Suits’ Utopia of Totalized Gameplay ........................................................................ 68 1.7 Summary .................................................................................................................. 70 Chapter 2: ‘Wholly Automated Machines’: Suits, Nozick, and Utopia .............................. 72 2.1: Suits’ Techno-Cockaygne as Nozickian Result Machine ......................................... 74 2.2: The Transformation Machine and the Need for Morally Perfect Utopians ............ 77 2.3: Are Suits’ Utopian Games Nozickian Experience Machines? .................................. 79 2.4: Refuting Nozickian Justifications for Non-Usage of Experience Machines ............. 82 2.5: Utopian Applications of Experience Machine Usage qua Gameplay ...................... 85 2.6: Summary ................................................................................................................. 87 Chapter 3: ‘No Such Shortcomings’: Is Virtue Possible in Suits’ Utopia? ........................... 89 3.1 Prospects for Virtue in Suits’ Utopia of Gameplay .................................................. 90 3.2 The Effort Argument: Effortless Virtue Is Impossible .............................................. 99 3.3 The Autonomy Argument: Conditioned Virtue Is Impossible ................................ 101 3.4 The Desire Argument: Desireless Virtue Is Impossible .......................................... 109 3.5 The Homogeneity Argument: Homogenous Virtue Is Impossible ......................... 113 3.6 Summary ................................................................................................................ 117 6 Chapter 4: ‘The Alexandrian Condition’: Suits on Games, Boredom, and Utopia ........... 118 4.1 The Dilemma of Gameplay or Suicide in Suits’ Utopia .......................................... 119 4.2 The Crisis of Leisure ..............................................................................................